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ABSTRACT
BUILDING MEANING IN NAVAJO
FEBRUARY 2016
ELIZABETH BOGAL-ALLBRITTEN
B.A., SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rajesh Bhatt
This dissertation contributes to the growing tradition of work in which detailed
exploration of understudied languages informs formal semantic and syntactic theory
and probes the tension between crosslinguistic grammatical variation and crosslinguis-
tic commonality in communicative goals. The dissertation focuses on two topics in
Navajo (Diné Bizaad): (i) attitudes of ‘thinking’ and ‘desiring’ and (ii) the expression
of adjectival meaning and degree constructions.
The first part of the dissertation presents the methodological and linguistic back-
ground for the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 1 discusses the project of crosslin-
guistic semantic research and fieldwork methodology. Chapter 2 gives a broad intro-
duction to the Navajo language and the literature which has explored it.
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the expression of attitudes in
Navajo. Chapter 3 presents an empirically rich description of the morphological,
syntactic, and semantic characteristics of Navajo sentences that report distinct at-
viii
titudes of ‘thinking’ and ‘desiring’ despite containing the same attitude verb, nisin.
Chapter 4 argues that the meaning of the embedded clause — not nisin — determines
what attitude is reported. The exploration of Navajo is guided by investigation of
English and German attitude reports begun by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and developed
by Moulton (2009, 2015). These authors develop a fully compositional account that
presents an alternative to familiar verb-driven analyses of attitude reports; in their
account, key aspects of the semantics of attitude reports come from material in the
embedded clause. It is argued here that Navajo is a limiting case within the em-
pirical landscape explored by Kratzer and Moulton, in which the attitude verb only
determines the attitude holder.
The third part of the dissertation (Chapter 5) builds on work published as Bogal-
Allbritten (2013) and investigates the syntax and semantics of Navajo adjectival
expressions and degree constructions, e.g. comparative and equative constructions.
Chapter 5 argues that while all Navajo adjectival expressions have the same semantic
type, their syntactic structure differs depending on the morphology they bear. The
proposed syntactic heterogeneity explains differences in degree constructions which
contain adjectival expressions of different morphological shapes.
ix
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation explores the linguistic expression of attitude reports and compar-
ison in Navajo (Diné Bizaad, Athabaskan). The investigation has three goals. First, to
present detailed documentation of the morphological, syntactic, and semantic strate-
gies used to express these meanings in Navajo. Second, to investigate how the findings
from Navajo may inform formal accounts of comparison and attitude reports while
shedding light on points of crosslinguistic semantic similarity and variation. Third, to
detail the methodologies that led to the findings which are presented here and which
may be helpful in the investigation of similar meanings in other languages.
These three goals are of a piece with a much larger tradition of research. In the
past twenty years, investigation of typologically diverse understudied languages has
challenged and informed formal semantic and syntactic theories. Topics that have
particularly benefited from such work include quantification, nominal meaning, tem-
porality, modality, and comparison. In many cases, the languages that have done
the most to enrich our theoretical understanding are also underdocumented, under-
studied, and endangered. The careful investigation of these languages’ semantics and
syntax produces new documentation that may be useful not only to researchers but
to individuals who wish to learn or teach these languages.
The dissertation is divided into three parts comprised of shorter chapters. I sum-
marize each part in turn. The first part of the dissertation (Chapters 1 and 2)
presents background for the rest of the work. Chapter 1 discusses the goals and
methodologies of crosslinguistic and fieldwork-based semantic research. Chapter 2
gives a short overview of Navajo linguistics and briefly surveys certain aspects of the
Navajo language that will be useful to later discussion.
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The second part of the dissertation (Chapters 3 and 4) presents a case study in
the expression of attitudes of thinking and attitudes of desire in Navajo. Chapter 3
gives a descriptive overview of the semantic, morphological, and syntactic character-
istics of the attitude reports in (1), which I refer to collectively as nisin-sentences.
These structures are of theoretical interest since they all seem to contain the same
verb (nisin) but are shown to express different attitudes (e.g. ‘thinking’ vs. ‘want-
ing’).1 I demonstrate that the interpretation of nisin-sentences is correlated with the
morphosyntactic shape of the clause embedded by nisin. I highlight the importance of
temporal morphology and particles like sha’shin (1a) and laanaa (1b). Only sentences
of the shape in (1d) are ambiguous between expressions of thinking and expressions
of desire: diagnostics for their ambiguity are presented in Chapter 3.
(1) a. [Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it will probably rain.’
(‘Thinking’ about future)
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it were raining now.’
(Desire about future)
1As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Navajo verbs change shape for person, number, and temporal
orientation (e.g. aspect). Nisin is the imperfective form of the verb marked for a first-person
singular subject. I use nisin to refer collectively to all instances of this verb. I choose the first-person
imperfective form since this is the form of all verbs used as entry labels in Young and Morgan’s
(1987) dictionary and grammar of the Navajo language.
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c. [Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
yę]
yee
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish it were raining,’ ‘I wish it would rain.’
(Desire about present or future)
d. Kii
Kii
[’atoo’
stew
bił ’adeeshł]
3O.with.1S.eat.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants to eat stew,’ ‘Kii thinks he will eat stew.’
(Desire or ‘thinking’ about future)
Chapter 4 focuses on one puzzle posed by nisin-sentences: what piece, or pieces,
of a nisin-sentence determine what kind of attitude is reported? I will argue that
the difference in truth conditions of sentences like (1) cannot be attributed to the
interpretation of nisin but instead should be attributed to material in the clause
embedded by nisin. I further demonstrate that this embedded material is also found
in main clauses. I compare and contrast the interpretation of this material as it
occurs in main clauses and as it occurs in nisin-sentences. Finally, I summarize
theoretical work on constructions from other languages which appear to share with
nisin-sentences the following characteristics: an embedded clausal structure in which
embedded material is central to the truth conditions of the construction as a whole.
My investigation of the expression of attitudes in Navajo is guided by the questions
and answers in addressed the research program begun by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and
subsequently developed by Moulton (2009, 2015). Kratzer and Moulton explore a
rich range of evidence from English and German that demonstrate that even in these
languages,‘familiar,’ verb-driven analyses of attitude reports may not be correct. On
the basis of the evidence from English and German, Kratzer develops an alternative
picture of attitude reports in which key aspects of the semantics of attitude reports
are contributed by material contained in clauses embedded by attitude verbs. The
attitude verb works in concert with the embedded material to determine the attitude
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reported. I show that the Navajo facts fit naturally into the empirical landscape
explored by Kratzer and Moulton. Navajo acts as limiting case within this landscape,
in which the attitude verb has an evidential-like meaning — it establishes the holder
of the reported attitude — similar to the kind explored for ‘parenthetical’ uses of
attitude verbs in English discussed by Urmson (1952), Rooryck (2001), Simons (2007),
Lewis (2013), and others. In this chapter, I do not provide a compositional treatment
for nisin-sentences; however, the compositional proposals which are worked out by
Kratzer and Moulton provide a model for the development of such a treatment.
The third part of the dissertation (Chapter 5) presents the second case study: the
expression of adjectival and comparative meaning in Navajo. This chapter gives an
updated and reorganized version of my work published in 2013 in Natural Language
Semantics (volume 21: 3). Comparative constructions are the site of particularly
rich typological and theoretical investigation (Stassen 1985; Beck, Oda, and Sugisaki
2004; Kennedy 2007; Beck et al. 2009; Pearson 2010; Schwarzschild 2010, 2011,
2014; Bhatt and Takahashi 2011; Hohaus 2012; Shimoyama 2012; Bochnak 2013,
2015; among others). To this rich base I add work on Navajo. I investigate degree
constructions like those in (2) and the adjectival verbs they contain (e.g. ’áníłnééz,
nizhóní).
(2) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
shideezhí=gi
1poss.little.sister=loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is as tall as my little sister.’
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
shideezhí=gi
1poss.little.sister=loc
’át’ée=go
3S.be=go
nizhóní.
3S.tall.aa
‘My mother is as pretty as my little sister.’
I develop a theoretical account in which all Navajo adjectival verbs have the same
semantic type — they denote relations between degrees and individuals — but differ
in their syntactic structure. Whereas an adjectival verb like nizhóní in (2b) projects
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a structure with only one argument position, adjectival verbs like ’áníłnééz in (2a)
are associated with two positions, one for a DP (the subject) and one for a degree
expression (e.g. the equative phrase shideezhí=gi in (2a).
I argue that by positing morphologically-determined syntactic heterogeneity among
the set of Navajo adjectival verbs, we can explain various differences in degree con-
structions which contain adjectival verbs of different morphological shapes. I argue
that syntactic differences among adjectival verbs have semantic consequences for their
participation in degree constructions, e.g. equative constructions as in (2). I build
on proposals by Schwarzschild (2010, 2011, 2014) and argue that while the degree
expression in (2a) directly manipulates the adjectival verb’s degree argument, the
degree argument of the adjectival verb in (2b) is indirectly manipulated via domain
restriction.
Taken together, the case studies of attitude reports and degree constructions in
Navajo illustrate the following tension, paraphrased from Bittner (2014): while lan-
guages may have in common broad communicative goals — the expression of attitudes
of ‘thinking’ or attitudes of desire, the expression of comparison and adjectival mean-
ing — close investigation of these goals in typologically distinct languages may reveal
diversity in the grammatical strategies used in their expression. In turn, however, in-
vestigation of this diversity may support or shed new light on alternative theoretical
views of data from better-studied languages.
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PART I: THE RESEARCH AND
LINGUISTIC CONTEXT
CHAPTER 1
THE PROJECT OF CROSSLINGUISTIC SEMANTIC
INVESTIGATION
The investigation of attitude reports and comparison in Navajo fits into the rich,
but still relatively young, tradition of work in which formal semantic theories are
shaped by detailed investigation of understudied languages. This section introduces
the goals and methodologies used in work of this kind. A question that is central both
to my work and to this tradition of work as a whole is the tension between crosslin-
guistic grammatical variation and crosslinguistic universality in communicative goals.
I take up this issue first in section 1.1.
1.1 Universality and variation
At the heart of crosslinguistic semantic research is tension between universality (or,
at least, crosslinguistic commonality) and variation. This tension has been addressed
by authors including Sapir (1949), Katz (1976), Keenan (1978), van Benthem (1991),
and von Fintel and Matthewson (2008). In her recent investigation of crosslinguistic
expressions of temporality, Maria Bittner (2014) summarizes the tension as follows:
“Languages agree on communicative goals, but disagree on grammat-
ical means. A discourse in one language can be translated into any other
language, but there is no one-to-one correspondence at any grammatical
level: morpheme-to-morpheme, word-to-word, phrase-to-phrase, and for
some languages, even sentence-to-sentence.”
(Bittner 2014: 298)
This tension can be illustrated using the following example of comparative con-
structions in English and in Washo, an isolate spoken in California and Nevada,
7
originally discussed by Bochnak (2013, 2015). Both English speakers and Washo
speakers have a way to communicate in context (1a) that the height of the man is
greater than the height of the girl.
(1) a. Context: Comparing a man and a girl. The man is six feet tall, the girl
is five feet tall.
b. The man is taller than the girl.
c. t’éːliwhu
man
delkáykayiʔ
3S.tall.nmlz
k’éʔi
3S.be
šáwlamhu
girl
delkáyayiʔéːs
3S.tall.nmlz.neg
k’áʔaš.
3S.be
Lit: The man is tall, the girl is not tall.
(Bochnak 2013: (271), (272))
As Bochnak demonstrates, however, while speakers of neither language would be
at a loss for how to describe the situation in (1a), the two sets of speakers use dis-
tinct grammatical strategies to achieve this particular communicative goal. In the
English sentence in (1b), the linguistic expression of comparison involves specialized
morphemes like more/-er and than. As has been argued extensively for English (e.g.
Cresswell 1976, von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1999, among many others), these mor-
phemes indicate that the topic of comparison (here, the man) exceeds the standard of
comparison (here, the girl) in terms of the property described by the adjective (here,
tall). These morphemes are assigned meanings which, once combined, yield a sen-
tence with truth conditions consistent with the context in (1a). The Washo sentence
in (1c), on the other hand, lacks specialized morphemes in comparative constructions.
Instead, as Bochnak discusses, Washo uses two conjoined clauses: the subject of the
first clause is described as being tall while the subject of the second clause is described
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as being not tall. Bochnak argues that conjunction of these two clauses produces an
expression with truth conditions consistent with the context given in (1a).1
In Bittner’s terms, Washo and English ‘agree on the communicative goal’ of being
able to compare individuals in terms of their properties. However, the languages
‘disagree on the grammatical means’ used to express this goal. Not only do Washo
and English differ in their inventory of comparative morphology, neither do the Washo
and English sentences in (1) have fully identical truth conditions. Bochnak (2013,
2015) makes this point by investigating the same Washo and English sentences in the
new context in (2a). Here, the English sentence in (2b) (=(1b)) is judged to be true
but the Washo sentence in (2c) (=(1c)) is judged to be false.2;3
(2) a. Context: Comparing a man who is five feet tall and a woman who is four
and a half feet tall (i.e., both are clearly short).
b. The man is taller than the woman.
c. #t’éːliwhu
man
delkáykayiʔ
3S.tall.nmlz
k’éʔi
3S.be
daʔmóʔmoʔ
woman
delkáyayiʔéːs
3S.tall.nmlz.neg
k’áʔaš.
3S.be
Lit.: The man is tall, the woman is not tall.
(Bochnak 2013: (316))
1Conjoined comparison is attested in a range of other languages, including Fijian (Pearson 2010),
Motu (Beck et al. 2010), and Samoan (Hohaus 2011).
2I follow Bochnak (2015) in describing these sentences as (semantically) false as opposed to
(pragmatically) infelicitous. As I discuss below, later discussion of data from Navajo will blur
this line and refer to any grammatical sentence rejected by consultants in a particular context as
‘infelicitous,’ a term that I will use to cover the ground of both truth-conditional falsity and various
types of pragmatic failures, following McKenzie (2012).
3The crucial difference between the English and Washo sentences is whether the compared indi-
viduals are also required to meet the contextual norm for the adjective tall. Bochnak demonstrates
that Washo ‘conjoined comparatives’ require both compared individuals not only to stand in the
relationship described by the comparative — the man is taller than the girl — but both individuals
must also ‘count’ as tall people relative to the usual contextual norms. As a result, the Washo com-
parative is judged false in the context. By contrast, English comparative constructions generally do
not impose this requirement imposes no such requirement and is judged true in the context given
here.
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Comparison is certainly not the only semantic domain where we find languages
agreeing on communicative goals but disagreeing on grammatical means. Other areas
that have been the subject of similar investigation include quantification — the ability
to indicate what relative quantities of individuals (e.g. a lot, a few) took part in some
state of affairs — temporality — the ability to indicate when a state of affairs took
place relative to some reference time — modality — the ability to express that some
state of affairs is possibly or definitely true in light of various types of evidence and
considerations — and comparison — the ability to compare objects in terms of their
properties.4
We can organize our investigation of semantic universality and diversity in terms
similar to those discussed by von Fintel and Matthewson (2008) in their overview of
crosslinguistic semantic investigation and the search for semantic universals:
(3) a. Universality and variation in lexical inventories:
What morphemes does the language use and what is the semantic
content of these morphemes?
b. Universality and variation in manner of composition:
How do these morphemes fit together — both syntactically and
semantically — to build complete meanings?
The first question concerns the contents of languages’ lexical inventories. I include
both content morphemes and functional morphemes in this category. Content mor-
phemes allow speakers to describe the world by labeling and characterizing objects,
states, and events. By contrast, functional morphemes encode grammatical notions
4Selected typological and theoretical works that investigate these domains of meaning include
Jelinek (1993), Bach et al. (1995), Matthewson (2001), Everett (2005), and Lima (2014) on quan-
tification; Bohnemeyer (2002), Ritter and Wiltschko (2005), Tonhauser (2006), Smith, Perkins and
Fernald (2007), and Bittner (2014) on temporality; Palmer (1986), Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca
(1994), de Haan (1997), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), Rullmann et al. (2008), Deal (2011),
and Matthewson (2014) on modality; Stassen (1985), Kennedy (2007), Beck et al. (2010), Hohaus
(2012), Pearson (2012), Bochnak (2013), and Bogal-Allbritten (2013) on comparison.
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and include determiners, comparative modifiers (e.g. more, very), morphology relat-
ing to case (person, number, gender), morphemes expressing relative quantities (a lot,
a few), expressions indicating possibility and probability relative to evidence (modals,
evidentials), and morphemes locating an event or state in time.
The second question concerns strategies of composition (semantic and syntactic)
employed by languages to form complete meanings from an array of content and
functional morphemes. Potential points of crosslinguistic variation include languages’
inventories of compositional principles, the range of semantic types that lexical items
may have, and the argument structure of particular languages.
Note that the distinction between variation in lexical inventories and strategies of
composition is more useful for expository purposes rather than for characterizing the
focus of a particular piece of semantic research. It is necessary to consider both lexical
and compositional variation in order to develop a full picture of ways that languages
may vary in their expression of particular meanings. Furthermore, it is particularly
difficult — if not impossible — to distinguish fully between the investigation of the
semantics of functional morphemes and the study of strategies of composition. In the
terminology of von Fintel and Matthewson (2008), both functional morphemes and
strategies of composition act as “semantic glue” to relate content morphemes to one
another.
In their discussion of this tension between variation and universality, von Fintel
and Matthewson (2008) note the following recurring theme: “what language X ex-
presses simply is also expressible in language Y but at the price of some complexity”
(2008: 144). While it is difficult to characterize Washo or English’s strategy for ex-
pressing comparison as more complex overall, we might describe the two languages’
strategies as exhibiting tradeoffs in their complexity. The English lexical inventory
involved in comparison is more complex in that it contains morphemes with special-
ized meanings (e.g. more/-er) that Washo lacks. On the other hand, we might claim
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that Washo introduces complexity lacking in English via its manipulation of norms or
standards in order to make comparisons. This notion of a tradeoff in complexity will
return in our discussion of attitude reports and comparison in Navajo in subsequent
chapters.
1.2 Developing initial hypotheses about meaning
In order to address scientifically the tension between shared communicative goals
and (potentially) differing grammatical means, crosslinguistic semantic investigation
must be hypothesis-driven. Hypotheses guide the research process by temporarily
reducing the practically infinite range of potential analyses to a single starting point.
This hypothetical analysis is tested against the available data which (generally) shows
it to be insufficient, and is subsequently revised. The revised hypothesis is then tested
again, and so on.
Following Haspelmath (2014), I categorize the kinds of hypotheses important to
crosslinguistic semantic research into the following categories:
(4) a. Comparative Hypotheses: Hypotheses that start with the assump-
tion of commonality with the results of earlier theoretical work on the
phenomenon of interest as realized in some other language.
b. Descriptive Hypotheses: Hypotheses that are informed primarily by
data from the language under investigation and which do not focus on
previous analyses.
Sometimes, a hypothesis that counts as ‘comparative’ may also count as ‘descrip-
tive’: the phenomenon under investigation in some language may seem to naturally
suggest an analysis in terms familiar from earlier theoretical investigation of other
languages. In many cases, however, there will be tension such that a hypothesis that
seems to fit closely the new data is far-removed from familiar theoretical ground.
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To a certain extent, this tension isn’t especially worrying: most projects in crosslin-
guistic semantics — and certainly the ones discussed in this dissertation — consider
both kinds of hypotheses at various points. If one is — as I am — interested in
universality and variation in the expression of particular meanings, it does not seem
possible to eschew either type of hypothesis entirely. The adoption of a particu-
lar initial hypothesis does not commit a research to a particular eventual analysis.
The case studies discussed by Davis et al. (2014) demonstrate how a comparative
initial hypothesis may give way to an analysis of crosslinguistic variation (see also
Matthewson 2001 and Bittner 2014).
However, a topic of debate in the recent literature is whether the initial hypothesis
should lean ‘descriptive’ or ‘comparative,’ where the two conflict. While the initial
hypothesis is almost never maintained in its precise original form, the choice of an
initial hypothesis may influence the course of early research and further data collec-
tion. Each type of initial hypothesis brings potential benefits and drawbacks that the
researcher should weigh.
On one hand, initially positing a strongly descriptive hypothesis — which I take
to be one that does not worry at all about making contact with prior theoretical lit-
erature — removes the threat of an Anglocentric perspective. Since much theoretical
work concerns English and its close linguistic relatives, the concern is that earlier
theories may actually reflect accumulated understanding of the operation of English
rather than our accumulated understanding about how languages operate more gener-
ally. As long as we recognize this, however, this particular concern about comparative
hypotheses seems entirely avoidable. For instance, Matthewson (2001) and Bittner
(2007) develop comparative hypotheses about English data based on analyses previ-
ously developed on the basis of St’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish) and Kalaallisut (West
Greenlandic) data, respectively.
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A second point in favor of descriptive initial hypotheses is discussed by Haspelmath
(2014): entering a project with the goal of developing a descriptive initial hypothesis
may encourage the study of phenomena that are not readily comparable to previously-
studied constructions. If such phenomena are encountered by a researcher committed
to a comparative initial hypothesis, the worry is that these phenomena will be set
aside in favor of studying another topic that is better-attested crosslinguistically.
Descriptive initial hypotheses encourage openness of the field of investigation.
At the same time, however, descriptive initial hypotheses may leave the theoretical
side of the investigation too open. A comparative initial hypothesis is clearly falsifi-
able: either language A can be demonstrated to use the same grammatical strategy as
language B, or it cannot be. Beginning with a clearly falsifiable hypothesis provides
the researcher with a ready list of predictions to test.
Both comparative and descriptive initial hypotheses are at work in the two case
studies from Navajo presented here. I have already noted how a comparative initial
hypothesis informs my investigation of Navajo adjectival meaning (Chapter 5). My
investigation of Navajo attitude reports (Chapters 3 through 4) considers a series
of comparative hypotheses in which Navajo attitude reports compose via strategies
previously posited for other languages. The hypothesis that I ultimately argue is
supported by the Navajo data is both descriptive and comparative, however: while
the basis of the hypothesis is comparative — it is based on hypotheses about the
composition of attitude reports developed for other languages by Kratzer (2006, 2013)
and Moulton (2009) — its details are further shaped by novel data from Navajo.
1.3 Studying meaning in the field
This section discusses methodologies in fieldwork-based linguistic research. As
part of the discussion, I present examples of contexts that I used in field elicitation
interviews.
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1.3.1 Fieldwork as a research paradigm
Much linguistic research has been accomplished via introspection by linguists who
speak natively the language of study and are able to investigate their own linguistic
intuitions. While the validity of introspection as a primary mode of data collection
has received recent debate,5 I did not use introspection to collect any of the Navajo
data reported here for the simple reason that I am not a fluent native speaker of
Navajo. All Navajo data reported here were collected in one-on-one interviews with
fluent native Navajo speakers, whom I refer to as ‘consultants.’ The remainder of this
subsection discusses the logistics and the methodology of my research.
I refer to this paradigm of linguistic research as ‘fieldwork.’ I do not take the
defining characteristic of fieldwork to be the ‘field’ — the physical location where
the research is conducted — but rather intensive investigation conducted with a
relatively small number of fluent speakers. Fieldwork can be compared with experi-
ments. Semantic fieldwork and experimental semantics both involve the collection of
other individuals’ intuitions about language. As such, a crucial step in both research
paradigms is the construction of materials that elicit these intuitions in a controlled
and careful way. While later discussion will refer specifically to the creation of elicita-
tion materials to be used in fieldwork, readers who are familiar with the construction
of experimental materials will see many similarities. For detailed discussion of elic-
itation materials, see the papers collected in the recent volume edited by Bochnak
and Matthewson (2015).
The similarity in materials and methodology employed in fieldwork and experi-
ments means that the line between the two paradigms is not always clear. Perhaps
the clearest line between fieldwork and experiments is the number of participants.
Experiments generally involve larger number of participants, such that the data pro-
5The validity of introspection as a method of linguistic investigation is discussed at length by
den Dikken et al. (2007), Featherston (2007), and Phillips (2010), among others.
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duced is amenable to quantitative investigation. Collection of data from a larger
number of participants can also help to eliminate ‘noise’ that arises when only the
judgments of a single speaker are considered. In her investigation of nominal individ-
uation and counting in Yudja (Juruna, Tupi), Lima (2014) used similar materials in
both elicitation sessions and in experimental work with larger numbers of speakers.
Lima writes that her motivation for including experimental work in addition to field-
work interviews was to establish the consistency of intuitions across a larger number
of speakers of different genders and ages.
The number of participants in the research project also determines the degree to
which participants are able to interact directly with the researcher and participate
more deeply in the research process. As noted by McKenzie (2012), fieldwork is gen-
erally conducted so that consultants have more freedom to provide further comments
and intuitions beyond those explicitly requested by the researcher. Fieldwork con-
sultants are often extremely linguistically aware: the judgments and comments they
provide can provide important clues about linguistic meaning and inspire the con-
struction of later test items. In addition, fieldwork can be conducted in such a way
that consultants can gain skills from the experience such that they can ultimately
direct future research on their language.
1.3.2 Fieldwork elicitation methodology
The methods that I employed in fieldwork sessions come from the the methodology
elaborated by Matthewson (2004). The topic of fieldwork methodologies has received
increasing attention in recent years: in addition to Matthewson’s work, key references
include Whalen and McDonough (2015) — who consider the use of new research-
related technologies in a fieldwork context — and the collection of papers in Bochnak
and Matthewson (2015).
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As noted above, fieldwork as it is used here involved targeted elicitation with a
small number of consultants. Consultants were generally presented with a context in
English followed by a sentence in Navajo. (I return to variations on this paradigm
below.) Consultants were asked whether the Navajo sentence sounded ‘good,’ or like
something they, or another fluent Navajo speaker, might say in the kind of situation
described by the context. While consultants were able to reliably judge when a
sentence sounds ‘bad,’ consultants were not asked to determine the source of this
‘badness.’ Following Matthewson (2004), consultants were never explicitly asked to
produce such ‘metalinguistic’ judgments.
I illustrate the process of elicitation with the example in (5). Consultants were
first read the context in (5a). I then asked about each of the Navajo sentences in (5b)
and (5c) in turn. The diacritics shown reflect the judgments and comments received
about each sentence, discussed below.
(5) a. Context: You just drove past Mary’s house. You saw her inside as you
went by. You say:
b. *Mary
Mary
sha’shin
probably
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá.
3S.be.impf
c. #Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.be.impf
sha’shin.
probably
Following linguistic convention, I indicate ungrammaticality in (5b) with *.
Grammaticality judgments concern whether under any circumstance, the grammar
can produce the string in question. I determined that (5b) was ungrammatical by
tracking consultant comments and, in particular, whether the string was ever accepted
in any other context. I obtained comments like (6) for (5b) which suggest that (5b)
is not a good string in Navajo:
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(6) Comment about (5b): “You meant to put sha’shin at the end. This sounds
like you’re just learning [Navajo].”
To confirm the ungrammaticality of (5b), I tested it in contexts like (7a) and obtained
the same kinds of judgments and comments:
(7) a. Context: You just drove past Mary’s house. You saw her car parked
outside. You conclude that she’s probably at home.
b. *Mary
Mary
sha’shin
probably
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá.
3S.be.impf
By contrast, the sentence in (5c) is marked with # to indicate that it is infelic-
itous, as opposed to ungrammatical. I treat a sentence as felicitous if it truthfully
and appropriately describes a particular state of affairs.6 I tested (5c) in contexts like
(8a) and found that speakers accepted it. I took the comment shown below as a clue
that this sentence was not only grammatical but was felicitous in the context given.
(8) a. Context: You just drove past Mary’s house. You saw her car parked
outside. You conclude that she’s probably at home.
b. Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.be.impf
sha’shin.
probably
Comment: “This sounds good. You can say this.”
Since sentence (5c) was independently found to be grammatical but it was still
judged to be unacceptable in the context (5a), I determined that its unacceptablity
there must be due to infelicity in the context. This conclusion was further supported
6Felicity can be divided into semantic and pragmatic felicity, but I use the term loosely here. I
refer to any sentence which is grammatical but unacceptable in a particular context as ‘infelicitous.’
For further discussion of differences between semantic and pragmatic felicity, see Matthewson (2004)
and articles in Bochnak and Matthewson (2015).
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by the kinds of consultant comments I obtained about sentences like (5c) in the
context in (5a), one of which I replicate below:
(9) Comment about (5c): “You saw her there? This doesn’t right.”
As I use the term here, sentences’ felicity concern (in part) the truth conditions
of a particular sentence. Thus, as Matthewson (2004) discusses, felicity can only be
determined for grammatical sentences presented in particular contexts. The contexts
establish the targeted truth conditions: what does the world look like when the
sentence of interest is uttered? If the sentence is accepted in the context as given, its
truth conditions must be consistent with the state of the world as described by the
context. Testing the same sentence in a range of contexts allows the researcher to
hone in on the sentence’s truth conditions: what is the range of situations that can
be truthfully described by the sentence of interest?
1.3.3 Using contexts in fieldwork
Given the crucial role that contexts play in studying meaning, it is important to
take care when setting up contexts. Contexts can be presented verbally or with visual
or tactile stimuli. Most contexts used in the research discussed here were presented
verbally by means of short stories designed to establish relevant background infor-
mation and to elicit a particular sentence. Alternatively, contexts can be presented
via tactile stimuli — as were used by Bochnak (2013, 2015) in his study of Washo
conjoined comparatives — or via visual stimuli. An example of visual stimuli is sto-
ryboards, which are consecutive series of pictures which present a simple narrative.
Storyboards can be designed to elicit particular constructions. For discussion of the
design and uses of storyboards, see Burton and Matthewson (2015).
Regardless of how the context is presented, however, the researcher and the con-
sultant will generally rely on a shared language to communicate about particular
aspects of the context. If the context is presented verbally, the choice of language
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takes on heightened importance. All Navajo consultants that I worked with are fully
fluent in both English and Navajo. Since I am not fluent in Navajo, English was used
as the language of context communication in all elicitation sessions. Discussion of
other factors that may lead one to use different languages for this purpose — the
language of study as opposed to a language of wider communication (Grenoble and
Whaley 2006) — can be found in Matthewson (2004) and McKenzie (2012).
As noted above, the research presented here largely relied on verbal presentation
of contexts. In (10), I give an example of a more complex context used to elicit
judgments about the expression of desires in Navajo. I had previously elicited the
target sentence in (10b) in another context, so I was confident that it was a complete
and grammatical sentence. However, I was unsure whether this sentence could be
used felicitously in contexts like (10a), which was designed to target an attitude of
desire about what the world is currently like.
(10) a. Context: You are talking to Sally, who gave her infant son up for adoption
20 years ago. She has not seen her son since, and has no idea what her
son looks like. You and Sally are talking about what she wants for her
son to be like at the present time. In this scenario, can you say...
b. Sally
Sally
biyáázh
3poss.son
k’ad
now
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł
fut
nisin.
1S.att.impf
c. Judgment and comment: “You can’t say this. She’s saying she wants him
to grow up tall. You want to say...”
d. Sally
Sally
biyáázh
3poss.son
k’ad
now
nineez
3S.tall
laanaa
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
As discussed by Matthewson (2004), comments can provide valuable clues to
meaning. In addition to reporting that (10b) would not sound right in the context
as given, the consultant gave the comment in (10c) — a paraphrase of the conditions
under which (10b) would have been acceptable — and volunteered the sentence in
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(10d) as a sentence that would have been acceptable in the context as originally given.
While comments cannot provide direct evidence for meaning (e.g. truth conditions),
they were valuable clues that informed subsequent elicitation session. In later ses-
sions, the sentence in (10d) became the new target sentence for the context in (10a)
so that I could confirm the felicity of this utterance in this particular context.7
1.3.4 The role of translations in fieldwork
In many cases, the target sentences that I asked consultants about were modeled
on sentences that I found in Navajo dictionaries (Young and Morgan 1980, 1987;
Young, Morgan, and Midgette 1992) and in previous research on Navajo (e.g. Willie
1996, or my own fieldwork). At some points, however, I was unsure how to begin
constructing a particular kind of sentence in Navajo. In such cases, I made limited
use of translations from English into Navajo. As discussed by Matthewson (2004),
translations were only requested for entire and grammatical English sentences pre-
sented in contexts. An example of this method of elicitation is given in (11). The
Navajo sentences in (11c) and (11d) were volunteered by a different consultant in
response to the context and prompt in (11a-b). The consultant then spontaneously
translated the sentence back into English.
7McKenzie (2012) refers to contexts like (10) a lead-in contexts, contrasting them with lead-out
contexts like the one exemplified below for an English sentence:
(i) You say, I am going to be the Super Bowl MVP...
a. Could you say that if the Super Bowl was halfway through?
b. What about the morning of the Super Bowl? The day before?
c. Could a little kid say it?
d. Could you say it if the game is over but the MVP hasn’t been selected yet?
(McKenzie 2012: 15)
In my own fieldwork, I generally avoided multiple follow-up questions for a single target sentence
in order to avoid muddying the intended context. As McKenzie notes, the lead-out strategy is
“risky, because it forces speakers to come up with the details of the scenario, which might make
the truth-conditions they are judging about substantially different from those you expect” (2012:
16). As such, if I was curious about the felicity of a sentence in a variant of a previously-introduced
context, I would repeat the constant parts of the context to the consultant, making modifications
where necessary.
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(11) a. Context: You and I are town inspectors. We visit towns and tell them
what they need to fix, and what will be possible given their budgets. You
think the roads in this town need to be fixed, but you have seen that the
town is very low on money and will not be able to afford it. You’re telling
me about the situation.
b. Prompt: You say, There need to be new roads, but I don’t think it’s going
to happen. How would you say this in Navajo?
c. ’Atiin
road
t’áá yá’adát’ééh=ígíí
3plS.good=igii
’ádadoolnííł,
3S.be.fut
’ákondi
but
doo
neg
’ádadoolnííł
3S.be/do.fut
da.
neg
Consultant translation: ‘There need to be new roads, but it’s not going
to happen.’
d. ’Atiin
road
t’áá yá’adát’ée=go
3plS.good=go
’ánáhodoolnííł,
ArealS.again.be.fut
ndi
but
bééso
money
bá ’ádin.
there.is.none
Consultant translation: ‘They need to repair the roads, but there’s no
money for it.’
In later sessions, I used the Navajo sentences in (11c) and (11d) in conjunction with
modified contexts.
I only asked consultants to translate entire and grammatical English sentences
presented in detailed contexts. Linguistic researchers cannot directly ask consultants
what an individual morpheme ‘means’ or the conditions on this morpheme’s use. As
Matthewson (2004) points out, such ‘metalinguistic’ inquiry at best yields clues to
meaning, but will not result in generalizations clear enough to have predictive power.
Producing such generalizations and analyses is the task of the linguist, who has the
luxury of a fuller set of data and more time to consider the evidence.
In addition, it also may be the case that the target language does not have an
obvious counterpart to a particular English morpheme. In the context in (11a), the
English prompt sentence contains the lexical item need while the Navajo sentences in
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(11c) and (11d) expressing necessity contain only future-marked verbs (underlined).
As such, asking a consultant directly how to translate English need into Navajo would
be unfruitful and potentially frustrating for the consultant.
1.3.5 Elicitation vs. corpora
I am only concerned with fieldwork which involves the elicitation of consultants’
judgments about the grammaticality and felicity of particular sentences presented
in specific context. This is a very narrow definition of fieldwork. More broadly
construed, fieldwork may also involve the elicitation of lexical items or grammatical
paradigms and the collection of narratives and naturalistic speech.
The collection of narratives and naturalistic speech not only generates documen-
tation of the language’s cultural, social, and historical context, but can provide the
linguistic researcher with a corpora of grammatical sentences in the language of study.
In early stages of my research, I searched for morphemes of interest in the corpus of
sentences drawn from naturalistic speech in Young and Morgan’s (1987) The Navajo
Language. These sentences not only gave me ideas about what kinds of sentences
might be interesting to test in later elicitation sessions, but also suggested the exis-
tence of certain patterns which informed my initial hypotheses.
However, corpora present incomplete picture of languages. Perhaps most notably,
corpora can only show the researcher what sentences have been naturally produced
and recorded for a particular language. However, the development of testable hy-
potheses and theories relies on the existence of negative data — examples of un-
grammatical or infelicitous sentences — alongside positive data: the researcher must
be able to see what differentiates ungrammatical or infelicitous sentences from their
grammatical and felicitous counterparts.
In addition, the positive data presented by corpora is also likely to be incomplete.
Even in a long and linguistically rich story, certain constructions may never appear
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because the meanings they express were not relevant to the narrative. For instance,
while it is a rich source of information about many other constructions, an hour
long oral history interview conducted entirely in Navajo contains no examples of
adjectival comparative constructions (e.g. bigger, shorter, taller) (Kerley 1994). The
absence of comparative constructions from such a textual source does not mean that
Navajo speakers are in any way unable, or even reluctant, to form comparatives when
prompted in an elicitation session, however (Bogal-Allbritten 2013).
A final shortcoming of corpora is the potential for lack of contextual clarity. The
elicitation of a felicity judgment about a sentence depends crucially on establishing
a very specific context. While a corpora may provide some clues about a sentence’s
context in the form of surrounding sentences, other aspects of the context — the
physical environment, certain assumptions which the speaker does not voice, back-
ground knowledge which is shared by the speaker and the interlocutor but not the
researcher — may be unable to be reconstructed.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON NAVAJO
2.1 Navajo linguistics
The empirical and theoretical focus of this dissertation is the expression of two
kinds of meanings in the Navajo language: attitudes and comparison. This project
not only relates to the broader goals and methods of crosslinguistic semantic research
but also bears on topics of relevance to those interested in the Navajo language more
generally. In this section, I present a broad introduction to the Navajo language,
its speakers, and the literature that has been published about it. I also discuss the
logistics and nature of the fieldwork that I conducted to obtain findings reported here.
2.1.1 The Navajo language and its speakers
Navajo is a member of the Athabaskan (also Athabascan, Athapaskan, and Atha-
pascan) branch of the Na-Dené language family, which also includes Eyak and Tlin-
git. The Athabaskan languages are alternatively referred to as the ‘Dene languages,’
where dene is morphophonologically similar to many Athabaskan languages’ words
for ‘people’ (e.g. Navajo: diné). As Figure 2.1 shows, the Athabaskan language fam-
ily extends across western North America, from Alaska to the northwestern part of
Mexico. The Athabaskan language family is divided into three groups on the ba-
sis on their geographical distribution. Northern Athabaskan languages are spoken
in Alaska and Canada and include Ahtna, Koyukon, Slavey, Gwich’in, Dëne Sųłiné
(Chipewyan), and Tłįchǫ Yat’iì (Dogrib). The Pacific Coast Athabaskan languages are
spoken in Washington, Oregon, and northern California and include Hupa, Chilcotin,
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and Tolowa. Southern Athabaskan languages are spoken in the southwestern United
States and in northwestern Mexico and include Navajo and all of the Apache lan-
guages.1
Figure 2.1. Map showing range of Athabaskan languages
According to 2000 U.S. Census data, 298,197 individuals identified themselves
as Navajo (or, Diné). Of this group, 178,014 reported themselves to be speakers of
Navajo (or, Diné Bizaad). The vast majority (94.4%) reside in Arizona (50.5% of
speakers), New Mexico (38.6% of speakers), and Utah (5.3%), both on the Navajo
Nation and in adjacent areas. The Navajo Nation covers an area of 27,425 square
miles in northeastern Arizona, northwestern New Mexico, and southeastern Utah, as
shown by Figure 2.2.2
1Map from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athabaskan_languages. Based on map in
Mithun (1999).
2Image taken from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navajo_Nation.
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Figure 2.2. Map of the Navajo Nation
While Navajo is the most widely-spoken indigenous language in the United States,
research points toward an ongoing shift toward English (Parsons-Yazzie 1995, Platero
2001, Schaengold 2004, Benally and Viri 2005, Lee 2009). Only 2.9% of self-identified
Navajo speakers reported themselves to be monolingual (American Community Sur-
vey 2010). According to a 2008 report on Navajo Nation programs, census data
demonstrate that the percentage of Navajo youth (ages 5-17) who were monolingual
English speakers rose from 12% to 43% between 1980 and 2000 (University of Arizona
2008).
The process of language shift was driven by a long history of linguistic imperialism
and efforts — both active and passive — to discourage the use of the Navajo lan-
guage. The advent of Navajo boarding schools in 1882 and the subsequent initiation of
compulsory school attendance in 1887 led to widespread acquisition of English among
Navajo young people (Schaengold 2004: 11). Boarding schools were frequently located
far from home communities and physical punishment was frequently used to discour-
age children from speaking in any language other than English (McCarty 2002). The
progress of English was further spurred throughout the 20th century by the economic
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incentives and cultural appeal that English was perceived to offer in contrast with
Navajo.
However, Navajo community members have responded to the endangerment of
Navajo. Schools both on and off the Navajo Nation increasingly offer Navajo lan-
guage programs which, in general, begin with total Navajo immersion for kinder-
garten students and add English back into the curriculum for students in higher
grades. According to Hutchinson (2013: 63), all schools on the Navajo Nation are
mandated to offer some type of Navajo instruction, but the degree of institutional
support varies widely: while some schools offer over an hour of language instruction
daily, other schools only offer 30 minutes of Navajo instruction per week. Navajo lan-
guage classes, and instruction on other subjects conducted in the Navajo language,
are also offered by institutions of higher education both on and off the Navajo Nation,
including Diné College in Tsaile, Arizona, Navajo Technical University in Crownpoint,
New Mexico, the University of New Mexico, Arizona State University, and Northern
Arizona University. In addition, Navajo language proficiency is a prerequisite for the
receipt of tribally-administered scholarships and for admission to the Miss Navajo
competition.3
2.1.2 Research on Navajo
The earliest significant documentation of the Navajo language was Berard Haile’s
series of books Ethnologic Dictionary of the Navaho Language, Vocabulary of the
Navaho Language, and Manual of Navaho Grammar, published in 1910, 1912, and
1926, respectively. Haile later published a four volume series Learning Navajo, be-
tween 1942 and 1949. Haile’s work was followed by significant academic contributions
to the study of Navajo grammar by authors including Pliny Earle Goddard (1933),
3Previously, Navajo language fluency had been required for candidates for President and Vice
President of the Navajo Nation. In July 2015, however, Navajo voters passed a referendum to loosen
fluency requirements. The outcome of this process is still in flux at the time of writing.
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Edward Sapir (1936, 1949), Sapir and Hoijer (1967), Harry Hoijer (1938, 1945, 1974),
Gladys Reichard (1949, 1951), and Ken Hale (1970, 1973).
The most extensive description of the Navajo language came in 1943, with the
publication of the first edition of The Navajo Language, Grammar and Dictionary
by the non-Navajo linguist Robert W. Young and Navajo linguist William Morgan.
Young and Morgan’s collaboration included work on Navajo particles and vocabulary
and culminated in the revision and publication of two massive volumes on the struc-
ture of the Navajo language and its lexicon, The Navajo Language: a Grammar and
Colloquial Dictionary (1980, 1987). Young and Morgan collaborated with non-Navajo
linguist Sally Midgette to produce the Analytical Lexicon of Navajo in 1992. In 2000,
Young published a discussion of the structure of the Navajo verb system.
Taken together, the four volumes produced by Robert Young, William Morgan,
and Sally Midgette provide an incredibly detailed picture of the Navajo grammar and
lexicon. All dictionary entries are accompanied by multiple examples of the entry used
in naturalistic speech produced by native speakers. Entries for verb forms provide
detailed information on the morphological components comprising the verb, noting
other verbs in which the same morphology can be found.
In the past 40 years, theoretical interest in the Navajo language has only increased
in vigor. Space only permits me to highlight certain strands of research: I refer the in-
terested reader to Fernald’s (2006) bibliography of materials on the Navajo language.
Research on Navajo has been especially enriched by dissertations and publications by
Navajo linguists, including Paul Platero (1974, 1978, 1982), Ellavina Perkins (1974,
1978, 2000), MaryAnn Willie (1989, 1991, 1996, 2000), Nicole Horseherder (1998),
Alyse Neundorf (2000), Melvatha Chee (2007), and Michele Kiser (2014). A particu-
larly rich dialogue directed by Navajo linguists concerns the syntax of Navajo relative
clauses (Perkins 1974, Platero 1974, Willie 1989).
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Important work has also emerged from collaboration between Navajo and non-
Navajo linguists (Speas and Parsons-Yazzie 1996; Hale and Platero 1996, 2000; Willie
and Jelinek 2000; McDonough and Willie (2000); and Smith, Perkins and Fernald
2007).
In addition, a large amount of research has been published independently by non-
Navajo linguists in cooperation with Navajo consultants and language experts. Some
areas of work undertaken by non-Navajo linguists include the semantics of tempo-
ral morphology (Midgette 1995, Smith 1996), the morphosyntax of the Navajo verb
(Speas 1986, 1990; Faltz 1998, 2000; Hale 2000, 2001), the morphology, phonology,
and phonetics of the Navajo verb (Kari 1976; Hardy 1979; Slate 1989; McDonough
1990, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003; McDonough and Wood 2008), the syntax of Navajo
clauses (Schauber 1979; Krause 2001), the syntax and semantics of Navajo adjec-
tives (Bogal-Allbritten 2008, 2013, 2014), the intersection of language and culture
(Witherspoon 1977), and language contact between Navajo and English (Schaengold
2004).
A rich literature on issues of language change, revitalization, and maintenance
has also developed. Work on the linguistic outcomes of contact between Navajo and
English has been done by Schaengold (2004) and Hutchinson (2013). Research on
the acquisition of Navajo has been undertaken by Saville-Troike (1996), Gentner and
Boroditsky (2009), and Shepard (2012). Discussion of the intersection of language
with identity, culture, language revitalization, and/or education can be found in work
by Lee (2009), McCarty (2002), Spolsky (2008), Webster (2009), and Jacobsen (2012).
A center for current research on issues relating to the Navajo language is the
Navajo Language Academy (NLA; Diné Bizaad Naalkaah). Founded in 1997, the NLA
is an annual three-week workshop organized by Navajo linguists, language advocates,
and allied external linguists. The NLA provide Navajo language researchers and
language educators with training in linguistic theory, research methodology, and the
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use of existing reference materials, such as Young and Morgan’s (1980, 1987) Navajo
dictionaries and grammars.
2.1.3 Logistics of my research
This research is based on fieldwork that I conducted between July 2013 and July
2015. Initial and exploratory fieldwork was conducted with Ellavina Perkins via
Skype. All other fieldwork was conducted at the Navajo Language Academy (Diné
Bizaad Naalkaah) in July 2013, July 2014, and July 2015. At the NLA, I worked with
six fluent Navajo speakers: Ellavina Perkins, Leroy Morgan, Louise Ramone, Johnny
Harvey, Irene Tsosie, and Louise Kerley. I employed the methodology for semantic
fieldwork outlined in 1.3.
Fieldwork and research prior to 2015 was funded by a Graduate Research Fel-
lowship from the National Science Foundation (NSF) and by a grant awarded by the
Selkirk Linguistics Outreach Fund at the University of Massachusetts. Later fieldwork
was funded by a Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant from the NSF
([#BCS-1451265]). My thesis committee chair, Rajesh Bhatt, is listed as Primary
Investigator on this grant for administrative purposes only: I conducted all fieldwork.
Additional funding for research and the dissemination of findings came from a NSF
grant ([#BCS-1322770]) awarded to Seth Cable.
Interviews conducted prior to 2015 were recorded by field notes. Interviews con-
ducted after 2015 (i.e. as part of research funded by the NSF Doctoral Dissertation
Research Improvement Grant) were, with the consent of participating speakers, dig-
itally recorded and securely stored on an external hard drive.
I have tried to write both descriptive chapters (Chapter 3 on attitudes, Chapter
5 on adjectival and comparative meaning) so as to be accessible and of interest both
to linguists and Navajo speakers with less (or no) background in linguistic theory.
My hope is that the data presented here will be useful to speakers interested in
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language documentation, language revitalization, and the development of pedagogical
materials. I have already used a subset of my findings to develop lectures for a course
on fieldwork and Navajo modality that I taught at the Navajo Language Academy in
2013.
2.2 A sketch of Navajo grammar
This section presents a basic introduction to topics in Navajo grammar that will
aid the reader in parsing Navajo sentences key to the analysis presented here. Section
2.2.1 addresses the morphological structure of verbs. Section 2.2.2 discusses basic
syntactic characteristics of Navajo sentences. Section 2.2.3 discusses the morphosyn-
tactic properties of embedded clauses. Secion 2.2.4 gives a brief overview of temporal
expressions in the language that will be of relevance to later discussion of attitude
reports.
2.2.1 Navajo verb structure
Navajo verbs are famously complex. They express information about aspects of
an event or state including the number and identity of participants, location in time,
whether the event was repeated or not, the direction of motion, etc. A Navajo verb
can, on its own, constitute a full and well-formed sentence: verb-external nominal
expressions corresponding to, e.g., subject and object are completely optional. That
is, (1a) is just as much a well-formed sentence in Navajo as (1b) is.
(1) a. Yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘It kicked it.’
b. Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
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This subsection explores the morphological makeup of the Navajo verb. Verbs
consist of a stem (at the right edge of the verb) and prefixes that occur in fixed order
relative to one another.4 Prefixes are generally monosyllabic, although we will see
some that are phonologically null and others (at the left edge of the verb word) that
are multisyllabic. I illustrate the relative order of verbal prefixes with the following
examples. The variety of prefixes shown in the following verbs is far from exhaustive,
but the prefixes shown demonstrate many of the positions to be discussed below.
(2) a. ch’í’níshkh
ch’í’ = ni = sh = l = kh
out.horizontally = ni.impf= 1.subject = classifier = swim.impf
adverb = Mode = subject = classifier = stem
‘I am swimming out horizontally’
b. ch’í’níłk’
ch’í’ = ni = sh = l = k’
out.horizontally = ni.perf = 1.subject = classifier = swim.perf
adverb = Mode = subject = classifier = stem
‘I swam out horizontally’
c. ch’í’deeshkł
ch’í’ = di = sh = l = kł
out.horizontally = di.fut = 1.subject = classifier = swim.fut
adverb = Mode = subject = classifier = stem
‘I will swim out horizontally’
(Young and Morgan 1987: d288)
4As in other Athabaskan languages, Navajo verbs are traditionally represented by means of a
templatic structure. For discussion of the verb template, see Young and Morgan (1980, 1987),
Young, Morgan, and Midgette (1992), Faltz (1998), and Young (2000).
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I start by discussing morphology that relates to temporal, aspectual, and modal
properties of verbs. I then turn to morphology that marks nominal arguments, includ-
ing subject and object marking. Finally, I consider verbal morphology that neither
marks Mode nor nominal arguments.
2.2.1.1 Morphological Mode
I start by discussing the stem and the prefixes labeled ‘mode’ in (2). The verbs
in (2) are clearly related — they all describe events of swimming out horizontally.
However, they are semantically and morphophonologically distinct. The three forms
are referred to as Modes. The Mode of a particular verb word appears relates to vari-
ous temporal, modal, and aspectual properties borne by that verb word. In addition,
Mode forms are often associated with different Mode prefixes and different forms of
the verb stem. For the three Modes shown in (2), I give morphophonological and in-
formal semantic characteristics of each. The semantic descriptions follow terminology
from the ‘Reichenbachian’ theory of aspect: the term Event Time is defined as the
time at which the event takes place whereas the term Reference Time refers to some
temporal point of reference (e.g. the time which the sentence is about) (Reichenbach
1947, Klein 1994).5
(3) a. Mode of (2a): Imperfective Aspect
(i) Morphophonological: Mode prefix ni, stem -kh
(ii) Semantic: Event Time contains Reference Time
5Note that the Imperfective and Perfective Modes do not always involve the exact prefixes shown
in (3). For instance, while the verb words describing events of ‘swimming out horizontally’ use
a prefix ni to mark Imperfective Mode, other verb words use other prefixes to mark Imperfective
Mode: these prefixes are ?, ni, si, and yi. Comparable variation can be found for different verb
words in the Perfective Mode, as well. For detailed discussion of which prefixes are associated with
each Mode, see Young and Morgan 1987: g144-164.
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b. Mode of (2b): Perfective Aspect
(i) Morphophonological: Mode prefix ni, stem -k’
(ii) Semantic: Reference Time contains Event Time
c. Mode of (2c): Future
(i) Morphophonological: Mode prefix di, stem -kł
(ii) Semantic: Event Time follows Reference Time
Future Mode will be important in our discussion of attitudes in Chapters 3 and 4. I
discuss the Future Mode in somewhat more depth in section 2.2.4.
These three Modes are not the only modes in Navajo. I list all seven Modes in (4).
Smith et al. (2007) note that the Modes do not correspond to a coherent semantic
category, but further observe that the temporal, modal, and aspectual information
conveyed by Mode morphology can be thought of as related concepts (Steele and
Akmajian 1981, Dahl and Velupillai 2005). A given verb can only be marked for one
Mode at a time. That is, the forms listed in (4) are in complementary distribution.
(4) Modes for Eventive Verbs
a. Imperfective (impf)
b. Perfective (perf)
c. Future (fut)
d. Usitative (usit)
e. Iterative (iter)
f. Progressive (prog)
g. Optative (opt)
Basic semantic characteristics of Imperfective, Perfective, and Future Modes were
already described in (3). Verbs in the Usitative Mode describe events that occur
on a usual or customary basis. Verbs in the Iterative Mode describe events that
repeat a regular intervals. As Faltz (1998: 15) notes, Usitative and Iterative Mode
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are not only semantically similar, but morphologically similar as well: the two Modes
have verb stems with the same shape and are only distinguished by the adverbial
prefix ná, found on the Iterative Mode but not the Usitative Mode. Verbs in the
Progressive Mode describe events which are ongoing at the Reference Time. According
to Midgette (1995) and Smith et al (2007), the Progressive Mode is only available for
verbs describing motion.6
Verbs in the Optative Mode will be of interest to us when we investigate attitudes
of desire. Verbs in the Optative Mode occur with special particles (including laanaa
and lágo) to express positive or negative desires:
(5) a. Nahóółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
laanaa.
wishful
‘I wish it would rain.’
b. Nahóółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I hope it does not rain.’
In addition, Optative-form verbs can occur alone to express negative desires:
(6) Tsásk’eh
bed
yik’inaogeeh.
3O.from.3S.fall.opt
‘Don’t let him fall off the bed.’
(YM 1987: d208)
I return to the temporal contribution of Optative Mode in section 2.2.4 below.
So far, we have only discussed verbs describing events or actions. I now turn to
stative verbs. Stative verbs do not vary by Mode but instead only differ according to
6Where a verb can be marked for both Progressive and Imperfective modes, Midgette (1995)
reports that the interpretation of the verb marked for Progressive Mode is similar, but not identical,
to the interpretation of the same verb marked for Imperfective Mode. According to Smith et al.’s
(2007) summary of Midgette (1995), Midgette reports that the “Progressive often conveys a strong
feeling of motion and immediacy” (2007: 57).
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person marking. Although stative verbs do not themselves vary for Mode, different
stative verbs can be described as looking morphologically similar to Imperfective and
Perfective Mode forms for related verb stems. For instance, the stative verb niteel ‘it
is wide’ in (7a) is similar in shape to the Imperfective Mode form of verb words that
describe events of ‘widening.’ Similarly, the stative verb hastin ‘it is frozen’ in (7b) is
similar in shape to the Perfective Mode form of verb words that describe events of
‘freezing.’
(7) Stative verbs
a. niteel ‘He/she/it is wide’
b. hastin ‘It is frozen’
The relation with Imperfective and Perfective Modes is no longer semantically active,
however (Smith et al. 2007). Both of the verbs in (7) describe states.
Since stative verbs lack a Future Mode form, the futurity of a state (e.g. ‘it will
be wide,’ ‘it will be frozen’) is indicated using a postverbal particle, dooleeł ((8)),
which I will return to in section 2.2.4.
(8) Nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł.
fut
‘He/she/it will be tall/long.’
Before continuing, I note that in general, glosses for later examples will not have
as much detail as was shown above. All information about Mode will be indicated
via suffixes on the verb stem, as exemplified in (9) (compare with (2c)). Subject and
object prefixes will be indicated via abbreviations like ‘1S.’
(9) ch’í’deeshkł
out.1S.swim.fut
‘I will swim out (horizontally).’
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2.2.1.2 Morphology related to nominal arguments
This section discusses verbal morphology that marks nominal arguments. As
noted earlier, all Navajo verbs obligatorily bear morphology which records any nom-
inal participants in the event or state described by the verb. While verb-external
nominal expressions can add additional detail, they are never required.
It is a topic of long debate in the Navajo literature whether nominal expressions
like ł’ and dzaanééz in sentences like (10) are arguments of the verb or, instead,
adjoined higher in the clause. If the latter, the idea is that the argument positions of
the verb are instead satisfied by the pronominal morphology it bears (the ‘Pronominal
Argument Hypothesis’).
(10) Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
For arguments on both sides of the debate, see Speas (1990), Willie and Jelinek (2000),
and Hale (2000, 2003). I do not commit myself to a particular side of the debate for
nominal expressions, although Chapter 5 will return to the question of whether any
verb-external material can function as an argument of a verb.
Nominal arguments (subject and direct object) are indicated on the verb via spe-
cial prefixes. A minimal pair is given below to illustrate the relative location of subject
and object prefixes. I give full glosses and simplified glosses.7
7In some cases, morphophonological rules apply to obscure the presence of particular prefixes,
e.g. the second person subject prefix ni in (11b) (Kari 1976, Faltz 1998).
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(11) a. hanishteeh
ha = n = ? = sh = ł = teeh
up = 2.object = ?.impf = 1.subject = classifier = carry.impf
up.2O.1S.carry.impf Simplified gloss
‘I’m carrying you (sg.) up.’
b. hashíłteeh
ha = sh = ? = ni = ł = teeh
up = 1.object = ?.impf = 2.subject = classifier = carry.impf
up.1S.2O.carry.impf Simplified gloss
‘You (sg.) are carrying me up.’
(Faltz 2000: 112-113)
Navajo also has special prefixes (ho, ha) for subjects and objects that describe
‘areal’ arguments, such as the subjects of weather verbs like nahałtin in (12). The
areal subject in (12) is given in boldface.
(12) nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
‘It is raining.’
The morphophonological shape of subject and object prefixes depends on several
factors. One point of note is that the third-person object marker is covert except
when the subject is also third-person. The examples in (13) demonstrate variation in
the realization of the third-person object marker. As (13a) shows, the object marker
is realized overtly as yi when the verb is marked with a third-person subject. The
sentences in (13b) and (13c) demonstrate that yi is not present when the verb is
marked for a first- or second-person subject. In these sentences, the third-person
object marker is covert.
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(13) a. Mary
Mary
bilasáana
apple
ła’
indef.det
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
‘Mary wants an apple.’
b. Bilasáana
apple
ła’
indef.det
nisin.
3O.1S.att.impf
‘I want an apple.’
c. Bilasáana
apple
ła’
indef.det
ninízin.
3O.2S.att.impf
‘You want an apple.’
Third-person object markers are complicated in another way, as well: yi is not
the only way in which the third-person object can be realized. On some verbs, the
third-person object marker is instead realized as bi. The conditions governing the
shape of the third-person object marker are complex and include sentential word
order. If the subject precedes the object, the verb generally bears the object marker
yi ((14a)); if the object precedes the subject, the object marker bi is generally used
instead ((14b)).8
(14) a. Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
b. Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
biztał.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘The mule kicked the horse.’
Nominal expressions in addition to the subject and object are introduced via
postpositions. Postpositional phrases (the postposition plus object prefixes) may —
8Additional factors conditioning the choice of argument marker include discourse structure and
animacy of nominal arguments. For discussion of object markers as they relate to these factors, I
refer the reader to work by Creamer (1974), Perkins (1978), Platero (1978), Sandoval (1984), Speas
(1990), Willie (1991, 2000), Thompson (1996), and Willie (2000).
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but are not always — written as part of the verb word. (15) gives an example of a
postpositional phrase bich’į’ ‘to him’ written separately from the verb word.
(15) Bich’į’ ’i’deeshniił
3O.to away.3O.1S.move.fut
‘I will cause it (round object) to move to him.’
Regardless of whether they are orthographically linked to the verb word, however,
it appears that postpositional phrases such as the one shown in (15) must occur
adjacent to the verb word (Faltz 2000): it is not possible to insert, e.g., markers of
negation between bich’į’ and the verb in (15). The inability of material to intercede
between postpositional phrases and verbs may indicate that these expressions form a
syntactic unit that is not reflected in the orthography.9
2.2.1.3 Other verbal morphology of interest
This section discusses morphology found on Navajo verbs that neither relates to
Mode nor nominal arguments. In turn, I consider thematic prefixes, classifier prefixes,
and additional adverbial prefixes and particles.
9While postpositional phrases canonically precede the verb word, Young and Morgan (1987)
contains a number of sentences in which postpositional phrases instead follow the verb. This is
shown in (i), where the postpositional phrase bil ‘with him/her/it’ and the noun sitsilí ‘my little
brother’ follow the verb neiits’ǫǫd:
(i) Tsínaabąąs
wagon
bine’d’
3O.behind.from
ch’ééh
in.vain
neiits’ǫǫd,
1plS.rubberneck.impf
sitsilí
1poss.little.brother
bił.
3O.with
‘My little brother and I peered from behind the wagon.’
(YM 1987: d593)
The conditions under which material can appear postverbally are unclear. For discussion of postver-
bal nominal material in other Athabaskan languages, see Rice (1989) on Slavey, Jung (2000) on
Apachean, Thompson (2000) on Koyukon, and Lovick and Tuttle (2014) on Alaskan Athabaskan
languages more generally. The Navajo example in (i) may be particularly interesting since it is
an example of a comitative construction. While other kinds of postverbal material may be able to
be analyzed as afterthoughts, it seems unlikely that a comitative phrase as in (i) can be viewed
as an afterthought, particularly since the plural subject marking on the verb reflects the argument
introduced postpositional phrase. I leave further investigation of such constructions to future work.
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Many verbs bear what Young and Morgan (1980, 1987) refer to as thematic
prefixes. Roughly, thematic prefixes are prefixes that always appear in conjunction
with particular verb stems. Examples of thematic prefixes identified by Young and
Morgan (1987) are given in (16):
(16) a. di: thematic prefix occurring with verbs that relate to actions involving
movement of arms or legs. (YM 1987: d14)
b. ni: thematic prefix relating to the mind, e.g. nisin ‘I think, I want, etc.’
(YM 1987: d656)
While we may be able to make generalizations about the kinds of meaings ex-
pressed by verb words with contain these thematic prefixes — e.g. ‘verbs that relate
to actions involving the arms or legs’ — it does not generally seem possible or desirable
to give lexical entries to thematic prefixes in isolation (Cable 2010).
Another prefix whose contribution is often difficult to characterize in isolation is
the classifier.10 The classifier position is closest to the verb stem and can be filled
by any one of the following four forms: ?, ł, d, or l. For some pairs of verbs, the
choice of classifier seems to reflect the argument structure of the verb. As shown in
(17), alternation between ? and ł correlates with the addition of an argument via
causativization (Hale and Platero 1996; Hale 2000, 2001). I will return to discuss
apparently meaningful uses of the classifier in much more detail in Chapter 5.
10In Athabaskan languages, the classifier prefix does not encode information about the nature of
nominal arguments, e.g. their physical properties. This makes the term distinct from ‘classifier’ as
it is used in descriptions of many languages, e.g. Swahili. For discussion of the historical origins of
the term ‘classifier’ as it is used in Athabaskan studies, see Kibrik (1996).
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(17) a. séłts’il
? = si = sh = ł = ts’il
3O = Mode.perf = 1S = classifier = stem.perf
3O.1S.shatter.perf
‘I shattered it.’
b. sits’il
si = ? = ? = ts’il
Mode.perf = 3S = classifier = stem.perf
3S.shatter.perf
‘It shattered.’
(Hale and Platero 1996: (4))
In many other verb words, however, the choice of classifier is apparently idiosyn-
cratic. For instance, nahałtin ‘it is raining’ in (18) features the classifier ł but does
not involve two nominal arguments. I give the full morphological breakdown in (18),
as well as the simplified gloss.
(18) nahałtin
na = ha = ? = ł = tin
thematic = ArealS = Mode.impf = classifier = stem.impf
ArealS.rain.impf
‘It is raining.’
In contrast with thematic prefixes and classifiers, it is easier to characterize the
semantic contribution of adverbial prefixes. It is fairly easy to find sets of verbs like
(19), which only differ in their choice of leftmost prefix. In the case of these verbs,
the leftmost prefix describes the direction of motion. In the following examples, I
only separate out the adverbial prefixes.
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(19) a. ch’í=nísh’nééh
out.horizontally = 1S.crawl.impf
‘I am crawling out horizontally.’
b. tsíłts’á=nísh’nééh
away.from.fire/water = 1S.crawl.impf
‘I am crawling away from fire or water.’
c. ’ahéé=nísh’nééh
in.circle = 1S.crawl.impf
‘I am crawling in a circle.’
2.2.2 Navajo sentential syntax
This section briefly sketches three topics in sentential syntax in Navajo: (i) word
order, (ii) negation, (iii) conjunction, and (iv) subordination.
First, word order. Navajo is generally described as having default SOV (subject-
object-verb) word order ((20)). Sentences that contain embedded clauses also gener-
ally exhibit SOV word order, as shown in (21). I count the embedded clause as the
object in (21).
(20) Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
S O V
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
(21) Mary
Mary
[Bíl
Bill
dibé
sheep
yiyiisxín]=ígíí
3O.3S.kill.perf=igii
yoodl.
3O.3S.believe.impf
S O V
‘Mary believes that Bill killed the sheep.’
(Schauber 1979: 26)
44
Subject-object inversion (OSV word order) is also attested in Navajo, both for
sentences with nominal objects ((22)) and sentences that contain embedded clauses
instead of nominal objects ((23)).
(22) Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
biztał.
3O.3S.kick.perf
O S V
‘The mule kicked the horse.’
(23) [Bíl
Bill
hooghan
house
góne’
in
yah
into
’ííyáh]=ígíí
3S.go.perf=igii
Mary
Mary
yoodl.
3O.3S.believe.impf
O S V
‘Mary believes that Bill went into the house.’
(Schauber 1979: 46)
Second, negation. Negation in Navajo is a frame consisting of two pieces, doo and
da. In general, negation wraps around the verb word ((24a)). However, negation does
not separate the verb words from otherwise adjacent particles ((24b)), postpositional
phrases ((24c)), or negative polarity items ((24d))
(24) a. Naaltsoos
paper
doo
neg
dzídzááłtsooz
3O.1S.handle.flat.object.perf
da.
neg
‘I didn’t put the paper into the fire.’
(Fernald and Willie 2001: (31)
b. Doo
neg
dah
out,up
dideeshááł
1S.start.go.fut
da.
neg
‘I won’t start out.’
(YM 1987: d716)
45
c. Diné
Navajo
Bináhásdzo
reservation
bikáa’gi
3O.on.loc
tó
water
tsi’nda’iiłáhígíí
intoxicating
doo
neg
bee haz’
3O.with.ArealS.exist
da.
neg
‘Intoxicating beverages are not allowed on the Navajo Reservation.’
(YM 1987: d423)
d. Shizhé’é
1poss.father
doo
neg
ha’át’íída
anything
nayiisnii’
3O.3S.buy.perf
da.
neg
‘My father has not bought anything.’
(Hale and Platero 2000: (1b))
The preferred placement for negation with (at least certain kinds of) clausal em-
bedding is slightly different. The examples in (25) demonstrate that the negation
frame surrounds the embedded clause (bracketed) rather than the verb (nízin in (25a),
ní in (25b)).
(25) a. Alice
Alice
[doo
neg
nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
da]
neg
nízin.
3S.att.￿impf
‘Alice thinks it isn’t raining.’
b. Shizhé’é
1poss.father
[doo
neg
náá’deeshdlł
1S.drink.fut
da]
neg
ní.
3S.say.impf
‘My father says he won’t drink anymore.’
(adapt. YM 1987: d350)
Third, conjunction. Clauses as well as smaller phrases (e.g. nouns) can be con-
joined via Navajo coordinators including dóó ‘and.’ (26) demonstrates the conjunc-
tion of nominal expressions. (27) demonstrates the conjunction of multiple embedded
clauses.
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(26) ’At’ééd
girl
léi’
indef
dóó
and
bimá
3poss.mother
dóó
and
bimá sání
3poss.grandmother
dóó
and
bicheii
3poss.grandfather
nda’alkidígóó
movies.to
naaskai.
3plS.go.perf
‘A girl, her mother, her grandmother, and her grandfather went to the movies.’
(Fernald and Perkins 2006: (2))
(27) [Níyoltsoh
hurricane
nihich’į’
1plO.to
yigáał]=go
3S.move.prog=go
dóó
and
chidí naat’a’í
airplane
naashta’]=go
3O.1S.fly.impf=comp
baa neiséyeel.
3O.about.1S.dream.perf
‘I dreamed about a hurricane coming towards us and flying a plane.’
(Fernald and Perkins 2006: (185))
Finally, subordination of clauses. The most common mode of clausal subordina-
tion is by placing the morpheme =go at their right edge. This mode of subordination
can be used to mark clauses used as temporal adverbial expressions ((28a)), because-
clauses ((28b)), and if-clauses ((28c)).
(28) a. [Shizhé’é
1poss.father
níyáa]=go
3S.come.perf=go
da’diidl.
1plS.eat.fut
‘When my father comes, we’ll eat.’
(Schauber 1979: 224)
b. Ł’
horse
síníoh=go
3O.2S.rope.perf=go
shizhé’é
1poss.father
neidiyoołnih.
3O.3S.buy.fut
‘If you rope a horse, my father will buy it.’
(Schauber 1979: 224)
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c. Mary
Mary
shaaníyáa=go
1O.3S.come.perf=go
Jáan
John
bił hózh.
3O.with.ArealS.good
‘Because Mary came to see me, John is happy (things are good with him).’
(Schauber 1979: 223)
The morpheme =go is not the only morpheme to be found in these environments.
The morphemes (y)ę or =(d)’ also can be used to mark clauses a temporal adverbial
expressions. Both expressions are shown in (29a). In addition, the morpheme =(d)ą
is also found on if-clauses ((29b)).
(29) a. [’Ashkii
boy
nishłín]=ę=d’
1S.be=yee=daa
dóola
bull
shił
1O.with
naalgeed
about.3S.buckride.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘When I was a boy, I used to buckride a bull.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (8d))
b. [Yidzaaz]=d’
3S.snow.impf=daa
doo
neg
’ólta’góó
school.to
deeshááł
1S.go.fut
da.
neg
‘If it snows, I won’t go to school.’
(YM 1987: 307)
The markers (y)ę and =(d)’ both convey some notion of pastness which is not
conveyed by the subordinator =go. I will return to (y)ę when I survey certain Navajo
temporal morphology in section 2.2.4.
The final expression found in subordinate clauses is the particle ńt’éé’. This particle
also conveys a notion of pastness: the action described by the bracketed clause in (30)
was taking place in the time leading up to the action described by the main clause
(‘it began to rain on me’).
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(30) [Kingóó
store.to
’aneeshkał]
1S.herd.prog
ńt’éé’
ntee
shee
1O.with
nikihoníłt.
begin.ArealS.rain.perf
‘As I was herding (sheep) toward the store, it began to rain on me.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (8c))
The particle ńt’éé’ is not only found in subordinate clauses. It is also found in main
clauses, as at the end of (29a). I return to this particle in section 2.2.4 below.
2.2.3 Clausal subordination
This section briefly introduces the morphosyntactic structures associated with
subordinate clauses in Navajo. This section focuses on subordinate clauses which are
embedded by clause-embedding verbs (e.g. know, hear, believe) but also discusses
the use of subordinate clauses in other capacities (e.g. antecedents of conditionals,
relative clauses, etc.). The discussion is divided by the shape of morphology on
the subordinate clause. I first discuss subordinate clauses which bear either =go or
=ígíí. I then turn to subordinate clauses which do not bear any overt subordinating
morphology.
2.2.3.1 Subordinate clauses marked by =go
The first kind of subordinate clauses that I discuss are those marked with =go at
their right edge. I first illustrate with examples of go-marked clauses embedded by
clause-embedding verbs. In each of the examples in (31), =go is obligatorily present:
its deletion from (31a) or (31b) would result in ungrammaticality.
(31) a. [Shil’
1poss.horse
’ałtso
all
dínóonéeł]=go
3S.die.fut=go
baa
3O.about
niséyeel.
1S.dream.perf
‘I dreamt that all my horses would die.’
(Schauber 1979: 242)
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b. [Tó
water
yíląąd]=go
3S.rise.perf=go
baa
3O.about
ntséskees.
1S.think.impf
‘I’m thinking about the water rising.’
(adapt. Perkins and Fernald 2006: (190))
The morpheme =go is not only found on embedded clauses. As Schauber (1979)
discusses, =go also occurs on subordinate clauses like (32). The subordinate clause
in (32a) adds temporal information while the subordinate clause in (32b) gives the
antecedent to a conditional.
(32) a. [Shizhé’é
1poss.father
níyáa]=go
3S.come.perf=go
da’diidl.
1plS.eat.fut
‘When my father comes, we’ll eat.’
(Schauber 1979: 224)
b. [Tł’ízí chh
billy.boat
bich’į’
3O.to
kójít’į]=go
4S.do.this=go
hach’į’ báháchįįh.
3S.get.mad.impf
‘If you do this to a billy boat, he gets mad.’
(YM 1987: d499)
The morpheme =go can also mark verbs that function as a clauses on their own. In
some cases, such go-marked expressions seem to take on conventionalized meanings.
For example, yisk ‘it dawned’ marked by =go is the standard way of expressing
‘tomorrow.’
(33) yisk
3S.dawn.perf
+
+
=go
go
=
=
yiskągo
‘tomorrow,’ ‘when it has dawned’
(Schauber 1979: 227)
In all of the cases seen so far, =go marks a clause consisting of (minimally) a verb.
One case where =go seems not to mark a clause is its use on numerals. For instance,
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the numeral ‘two’ can be variably realized either as naaki or as naakigo (i.e. naaki +
=go).
2.2.3.2 Subordinate clauses marked by =ígíí
The second kind of subordinate clause I discuss bears the marker =ígíí at its right
edge. The sentence in (34) illustrates how an ígíí-marked clause can be embedded by
a clause-embedding verb like yiyíínii’ ‘he hears it.’ Deletion of =ígíí from (34) would
result in ungrammaticality.
(34) Kii
Kii
[naakaii
Mexican
tl’óół
rope
yizhbizh]=ígíí
3O.3S.braid.perf=igii
yiyíínii’.
3O.3S.hear.perf
‘Kii heard that the Mexican braided the rope.’
(Schauber 1979: 31)
The marker =ígíí is not only found on subordinate clauses which are embedded
by other verbs. (35) shows =ígíí being used as a relative clause marker. The clause
’ashkii ’ałhosh ‘the boy is sleeping’ is marked by =ígíí at its right edge.11
(35) [’Ashkii
boy
’ałhosh]=ígíí
3S.sleep.impf=igii
’ałh’.
3S.snore.impf
‘The boy who is sleeping is snoring.’
(Platero 1974: (7))
When =ígíí marks a clause which only contains a verb, the outcome is akin to nomi-
nalization (‘the one who verbs’):
11For discussion of the syntax of relative clauses in Navajo, see Perkins 1974, Platero 1974, and
Willie 1989.
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(36) [tsé
rock
ndeiłkaah]=ígíí.
3O.3S.investigate.impf=igii
‘Petrogeologists’ (Lit. ‘those who investigate the rocks’).
(YM 1987: d731)
Thus far, all of the examples we have seen show =ígíí marking a full clause which
contains (minimally) a verb. There are also cases of =ígíí marking nouns to indicate
definiteness. Compare (37a) with (37b).12
(37) a. ’Atiin
road
nihá
2plO.for
’áhodoolnííł.
ArealS.be.fut
‘We need a road.’
(YM 1987: d768)
b. Nihidá’ák’eh
2plposs.fields
k’ad
now
’atiin=ígíí
road=igii
bee
3O.with
’ałch’áádzo.
3plS.separated
‘Our fields are now separated by the road.’
(YM 1987: d87)
While I will not give a semantics or syntax for =ígíí, I note that it is not strange to
find overlap between the distributions of relative clause markers, definite determiners,
and embedded clause markers (i.e. complementizers). Building on early observations
by Kiparsky and Kiparksy (1970), Schauber (1979) considers a unified treatment of
=ígíí in its full range of uses, discussing similarities in the licensing conditions observed
when =ígíí marks relative clauses and when it marks embedded clauses.
12Note that =ígíí is not obligatory in order to invoke definiteness, cf. (i):
(i) ’Atiin
road
’ałch’ishjí
both.sides.loc
’anít’i’.
3S.fence.extends.impf
‘There’s a fence on both sides of the road.’
(YM 1987: d87)
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2.2.3.3 Unmarked subordinate clauses
The final kind of subordinate clause bears no special morphology (neither =go nor
=ígíí). I refer to these clauses as ‘unmarked.’ Unmarked subordinate clauses can be
embedded by the mental attitude verb nisin and by the verb of speech ní.13
(38) a. Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice thinks it is raining.’
b. Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
ní.
3S.say.impf
‘Alice says it is raining.’
c. Jáan
John
Mary
Mary
[chidí
car
nahidííłnih]
3O.2S.buy.fut
yiłní.
3O.with.3S.say.impf
‘John told Mary to buy a car.’
(Schauber 1979: 23)
The sentences in (38) become ungrammatical if the embedded clause is marked with
either =go or =ígíí. I illustrate with nisin:
(39) Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]*=go/*=ígíí
ArealS.rain.impf=go/igii
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice thinks it is raining.’)
13Verbs which embed unmarked clauses — nisin and ní — can be distinguished from many other
clause-embedding verbs in Navajo by their lack of object marking corresponding to the embedded
clause. Compare the grammatical (ia) with the ungrammatical (ib). The sentence in (ib) could only
be repaired by removing the object prefix yi- from nisin:
(i) a. Kii
Kii
[naakaii
Mexican
tl’óół
rope
yizhbizh]=ígíí
3O.3S.braid.perf=igii
yiyíínii’.
3O.3S.hear.perf
‘Kii heard that the Mexican braided the rope.’
(Schauber 1979: 31)
b. *Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice thinks it is raining.’)
I return to this point in section 3.2.1.
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Given the absence of =go and =ígíí, clauses embedded by nisin and ní above are
indistiguishable from main clauses. Compare the bracketed material in (38a-d) with
the sentences in (40):
(40) a. Nahałtin.
ArealS.rain.impf
‘It is raining.’
b. Mary
Mary
chidí
car
neidiyoołnih.
3O.3S.buy.fut
‘Mary will buy a car.’
c. Chidí
car
nahidííłnih.
3O.2S.buy.fut
‘You will buy a car.’
Given the parallels between main clauses and clauses which I claim to be embedded
by nisin, the careful reader might wonder whether the bracketed clauses in (38) are
truly embedded by nisin. I return to this question in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). To
preview, I will claim that the bracketed clauses in (38) are, indeed, syntactically
embedded by nisin.
2.2.3.4 Selectivity for embedded clauses of a certain shape
Above, we saw examples of go-marked, ígíí-marked, and unmarked clauses em-
bedded by verbs. As Schauber (1979) discusses in detail, certain clause-embedding
verbs are selective with respect to the morphological shape of the clause they em-
bed. That is, certain verbs require the embedded clause to be either go-marked, or
ígíí-marked, or unmarked. Other clause-embedding verbs are not selective, however:
these verbs allow embedded clauses which are go-marked or ígíí-marked. The patterns
of (un)selectivity discussed by Schauber are summarized in the table below.
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Table 2.1. Patterns of clausal embedding
Verb Translation =go =ígíí nothing
nisin ‘think, want, etc.’ * * X
ní ‘say, order, etc.’ * * X
’ádzaa ‘imagine’ X * *
baa neiséyeel ‘dream that’ X * *
shił bééhózin ‘know that’ X X *
yishniih ‘hear that’ X X *
shił yá’át’ééh ‘be happy that’ X X *
shił nizhóní ‘be glad that’ X X *
baa ’ákonisin ‘be aware that’ X X *
baa ntséskees ‘think about’ X X *
yinishdl ‘believe that’ * X *
bi’diit’á ‘be bothered that’ * X *
I leave for future work the very interesting question of why these patterns might
arise.14
2.2.4 Temporality in Navajo
The last topic in Navajo grammar that I take up here is the expression of temporal
meaning. The discussion below focuses on two topics: (i) expressions relating to the
past, and (ii) expressions relating to the future. For a much more detailed discussion
of temporality in Navajo, see Smith et al. (2007).
2.2.4.1 Markers of past
In section 2.2.1, we saw that verbs appear in different Modes that encode in-
formation about the temporal nature of the event described by the verb. We used
Reichenbachian terminology to describe the temporal contribution of Imperfective,
Perfective, and Future Modes (Reichenbach 1947, Klein 1994). The term Event Time
is defined as the time at which the event takes place whereas the term Reference
14For discussion of possible semantic differences in clauses with the same verb (e.g. shił bééhózin)
but different markers on the embedded clause (=go vs. =ígíí), see Schauber 1979.
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Time refers to some temporal point of reference (e.g. the time which the sentence is
about).
The verb in (41) illustrates a verb in the Imperfective Mode. Verbs in this mode
are used when the Event Time contains the Reference Time, i.e. where the event is
going on during the span of time under discussion.
(41) ch’í’níshkh
out.1S.swim.impf
‘I am swimming out (horizontally).’
As Smith et al. (2007) discuss, the default Reference Time is the speech time. Thus,
verbs marked for Imperfective Mode receive, by default, a reading comparable to a
present tense interpretation.
(42) Jáan
John
nídii’nééh.
up.3S.crawl.impf
‘John is getting up.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (19b))
Navajo Imperfective Mode should not be conflated with a present tense, however.
Particles can be added to override this default interpretation. One such particle is
ńt’éé’, which appears to cast the Reference Time into the past. The sentence in (43)
describes an event that was ongoing throughout some Reference Time which was prior
to the time of speech.
(43) Dó́ola
bull.
shił
1O.with
naalgeed
about.3S.buckride.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘I used to buckride a bull.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (8d))
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We already saw ńt’éé’ in our earlier discussion of subordination (section 2.2.2),
where it marked clauses describing a event ongoing during a span of time (e.g. ‘As I
was herding sheep’) prior to the speech time, as in (44).15
(44) [Kingóó
store.to
’aneeshkał]
1S.herd.prog
ńt’éé’
ntee
shee
1O.with
nikihoníłt.
begin.ArealS.rain.perf
‘As I was herding (sheep) toward the store, it began to rain on me.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (8c))
Two other morphemes that Smith et al. (2007) relate to a notion of pastness
are (y)ę and =(d)’. We saw both of these morphemes in our earlier discussion
of subordination, as well. As (45) shows, these morphemes can be used to mark
clauses that function as temporal adverbial expressions. The bracketed clause in (45)
describes a state occurring in a frame of time prior to the speech time.
(45) a. [’Ashkii
boy
nishłín]=ę=d’
1S.be=yee=daa
dóola
bull
shił
1O.with
naalgeed
about.3S.buckride.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘When I was a boy, I used to buckride a bull.’
The morpheme (y)ę is found elsewhere, as well. As (46) shows, it also marks
relative clauses in which the event or state described by the embedding verb occurred
prior to the speech time.
15I label ńt’éé’ a temporal adverbial rather than a tense marker largely because its presence is not
obligatory in order for a past interpretation to arise. For instance, Perfective Mode verbs can —
and do, in typical contexts — describe events taking place in the past:
(i) Shimá
1poss.mother
ch’iyáán
food
ła’
some
bá
3O.for
naháłnii’.
3O.1S.buy.perf
‘I bought some groceries for my mother.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (19d))
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(46) hooghan
hogan
’ííshłaa=yę
3O.1S.build.perf=yee
‘the hogan that I built.’
The same morpheme is also found in postnominal position, as in (47). In this use,
it is translated as ‘the late’ or ‘the aforementioned’:
(47) ’Áko
and.then
télii
burro
yę
yee
hanáánáádzíí’.
again.speak.perf
‘And then the (aforementioned) burro spoke again.’
(YM 1987: d757)
The past markers nt’éé’ and (y)ę will return in our discussion of attitudes of desire
in Navajo (section 3.4). In those constructions, we find the past markers co-occurring
with future-marked verbs, which I turn to now.
2.2.4.2 Future morphology
As discussed in section 2.2.1, verbs can also be marked for Future Mode. Verbs
that are marked for Future Mode are most frequently used to describe events taking
place at some point in time subsequent to the speech time. This is illustrated by (48).
(48) a. Context: You’re telling me about what Alice is going to do next year.
b. Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł.
3S.move.fut
‘Alice will move to California.’
I will refer to verbs like donééł as ‘future-marked,’ which implies a link to future
tense. If we want to claim that the verb in (48b) is marked for future tense, however, it
must be a relative tense in the sense as described by Comrie (1985: 56), such that “the
reference point for location of a situation is some point in time given by the context,
not necessarily the present moment [i.e. the time of speech].” That is, while (48b)
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describes an event occurring subsequent to the speech time, future-marked verbs can
also be used where the Reference Time is a point prior to the time of speech. This
state of affairs is illustrated in (49). Here, the Reference Time is the doctor’s time
of speaking, which is given by the time adverbial ’ashdla’ yikąnid’ ‘five days ago.’
The future-marked verb ’adííłchííł describes an event of birth that occurs after this
Reference Time.
(49) ’Ashdla’
five
yikąnid’
day.past
’azee’ííł’íní
doctor
[naaki
two
yiskągo
day
’adííłchííł]
1S.give.birth.fut
shidiiniid.
1O.3S.say.perf
‘Five days ago, the doctor told me I would give birth in two days.’
Given the relative nature of future-marked verbs, we might follow other authors
and treat Future Mode in Navajo not as a tense but as a marker of prospective
aspect (Kratzer 2011, Matthewson 2014) or, equivalently, as an overt realization of
woll (Abusch 1985, 1988). I maintain the term ‘future-marked’ largely to keep a
connection with the Athabaskanist term ‘Future Mode.’
We also saw in section 2.2.1, stative verbs do not allow multiple Modes. Lacking
a morphological Future Mode, a stative verb like nineez in (50) can be given a future
interpretation if it is followed by the particle dooleeł, sometimes shortened by speakers
to doo.
(50) a. Context: The doctor is examining your baby. Given his growth so far,
the doctor says that your baby is going to be tall when he grows up.
b. Ne’awéé’
2poss.baby
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł.
fut
‘Your baby will be tall.’
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Smith et al. (2007) note that there do not seem to be any discernible semantic
differences between morphological Future Mode and the particle dooleeł. The particle
dooleeł is just like the morphological Future Mode in that it can describe a state
occurring in the future of some point in the past. In later discussion, I treat both
as semantically equivalent markers of futurity. Verbs marked for Future Mode and
verbs followed by dooleeł will both be described as ‘future-marked.’
2.2.4.3 The temporal contribution of Optative Mode
In section 2.2.1, we discussed Optative Mode as a verb form that appeared in
conjunction with particles relating to desires ((51a)) and in isolation to express pro-
hibitive meanings ((51b)):
(51) a. Nahóółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I hope it does not rain.’
b. Tsásk’eh
bed
yik’inaogeeh.
3O.from.3S.fall.opt
‘Don’t let him fall off the bed.’
(YM 1987: d208)
It seems that sentences with Optative-marked verbs and particles like lágo can
describe ongoing events ((52)) or events occurring in the future ((53)).
(52) a. Context: You look outside and see that it is raining. You are not happy
about this because it means you can’t go for a walk. You say:
b. Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I wish it weren’t raining!’
(53) a. Context: You are playing baseball later and don’t want it to rain. You
look outside and see dark clouds gathering on the horizon. You say:
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b. Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I hope it doesn’t rain!’
Optative-marked verbs are not accepted in sentences that express negative desires
about past events, e.g. (54):
(54) a. Context: You just got home from vacation. You see that it has rained a
lot while you were gone, which means that your garden was flooded and
destroyed. You say: I wish it hadn’t rained!
b. #Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
(Intended: I wish it hadn’t rained!’)
Comment: “You’re saying, ‘I hope it doesn’t keep on raining.’”
2.3 Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of aspects of Navajo grammar that will
be key to later discussion of attitude reports and comparative constructions in the
language. Additional detail about these, and other, topics in Navajo grammar will
be addressed in subsequent sections as the need arises.
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PART II: ATTITUDE REPORTS
IN NAVAJO
CHAPTER 3
ATTITUDES OF THINKING AND DESIRING IN
NAVAJO
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an empirically rich description of the morphological, syn-
tactic, and semantic characteristics of Navajo sentences which express attitudes of
‘thinking,’ ‘wanting,’ and ‘wishing’ like those in (1) and (2). Each of the sentences
below contains some form of the Navajo verb nisin in the main clause.1 I refer col-
lectively to such sentences as nisin-sentences. Some nisin-sentences contain (maxi-
mally) one member of a set of special particles, such as sha’shin ((1d)), laanaa ((2d)),
or lágo ((2e)); other nisin-sentences lack one of these particles.
(1) Attitudes of ‘thinking’
a. [Nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it is raining.’
b. [Nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it will rain.’
1As discussed at length in Chapter 2, Navajo verbs change shape for person, number, and tem-
poral orientation (e.g. aspect). Nisin is the imperfective form of the verb marked for a first-person
singular subject. I use nisin to refer collectively to different forms of this verb since this is the form
of all verbs used to organize entries in Young and Morgan’s (1987) dictionary and grammar of the
Navajo language.
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c. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt]
ArealS.rain.perf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it rained.’
d. Hastiin
man
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘The man thinks it will probably rain.’
(2) Attitudes of desiring
a. [Nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I want it to rain.’
b. Sandy
Sandy
[Hoozdodi
California.loc
nighan
2S.live
doo
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wishes you lived in CA (now),’ ‘Sandy wishes for you to live in
CA.’
c. Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’
d. [Níneez
2S.tall
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish you were tall.’ (YM, 1987: d513)
e. Alice
Alice
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo]
hope.not
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice hopes it won’t rain.’
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses key syntactic
characteristics of nisin-sentences as well as key morphological characteristics of nisin
itself. Section 3.3 discusses the semantics and morphosyntactic properties of nisin-
sentences that express attitudes of thinking ((1)). Section 3.4 does the same for nisin-
sentences that express attitudes of desire ((2)). Section 3.5 discusses nisin-sentences
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that are ambiguous between attitudes of thinking and attitudes of desire ((1b), (2a)).
Section 3.6 summarizes the key findings.
As an appendix to this chapter, I present the data in section 3.7. While the
theoretical discussion in subsequent chapters will not focus on these data, I include
them here to illustrate more fully the uses of nisin. Unlike the sentences in (1) and
(2), the sentences discussed in section 3.7 contain the verb nisin but do not contain
an embedded clause.
Before continuing, I would like to note that I will only be concerned here with
attitude reports that contain the verb nisin. The range of meanings expressible by
such sentences is restricted to attitudes of thinking and attitudes of desire. These
are, of course, not the only kinds of attitudes that can be expressed in Navajo. In our
introductory discussion of clausal embedding (section 2.2.3), we saw many examples
of other attitudes. Two examples are repeated below.
(3) a. [Ch’é’étiingóó
entrance.toward
naanée]=go
3S.play.impf=go
shił
1O.with
bééhózin.
3S.know
‘I know that he is playing in the yard.’
Lit: ‘It is known to me that he is playing in the yard.’
b. Kii
Kii
[naakaii
Mexican
tl’óół
rope
yizhbizh]=ígíí
3O.3S.braid.perf=igii
yiyíínii’.
3O.3S.hear.perf
‘Kii heard that the Mexican braided the rope.’
(Schauber 1979: 31)
I will not be concerned here with the analysis of sentences like (3): all focus will be
on nisin-sentences.
3.2 Basic morphosyntactic properties of nisin-sentences
This section gives an overview of general morphological and syntactic characteris-
tics of nisin-sentences. Section 3.2.1 discusses morphological properties of nisin itself.
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Section 3.2.2 discusses syntactic properties of nisin-sentences, including their word or-
der and properties of the clause embedded by nisin. Section 3.7 discusses additional
verbs related to the verb nisin considered here; these additional verbs will be noted
for descriptive purposes but not discussed in depth.
3.2.1 The morphology of clause-embedding nisin
In section 2.2.1, we discussed Modes in the context of Navajo verbal morphology.
The tables below show the surface forms of nisin marked for various subjects (not
all subjects are shown). Table 3.2.1 shows Imperfective Mode and Table 3.2.1 shows
Perfective Mode. The only morphological difference between the two Modes is the
shape of the stem: Imperfective -zin vs. Perfective -z’.2
Table 3.1. Imperfective Mode Paradigm of nisin
Person Verb
1S nisin
2S nínízin
3S nízin
1pl niidzin
4S jinízin
Table 3.2. Perfective Mode Paradigm of nisin
Person Verb
1S niiz’
2S niniz’
3S niiz’
1pl niidz’ ’
4S jiniiz’
2The first-person subject prefix in the Imperfective Mode changes the verb stem from -zin into
-sin.
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All Modes for which nisin can be marked are shown in the table below. The verb
words shown are marked for first-person subjects. Young and Morgan (1987: d650).3
Table 3.3. Modes of nisin (first-person subject)
Mode Surface Form
Imperfective: nisin
Perfective: niizįį’
Future: dinéessįįł
Iterative: nániisdzįįh
Usitative: niisdzįįh
Optative: noossįįh
Key pieces of morphology within nisin include the thematic prefix ni and the stem
in its various forms shown in (3). This thematic prefix is found in all Modes of nisin
and, according to Young and Morgan (1987: d679), relates to mental processes. The
same thematic prefix appears to occur in the verb n(i)tséskees ‘I think, I cogitate.’
Furthermore, the verb stem found in nisin seems to also appear in other verb words
relating to mental processes, including the verb words shił bééhózin ‘I know that’
(literally, ‘with me it is known’) or sohidizin ‘to be said (as a prayer).’
As with other verbs (viz. section 2.2.4), when nisin occurs in Imperfective Mode,
it is by default interpreted as expressing an ongoing state of mind (thinking, desire).
This is illustrated by the translations given for the sentences in (4).
(4) a. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it is probably raining.’
b. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish that it were raining.’
3Young and Morgan (1987: d670) name the (first-person subject-marked) form niissįįh and nissin
as alternative forms of nisin. Phonologically, these verbs are extremely similar to nisin. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, I will treat these verbs as equivalent to nisin.
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The sentences in (5) demonstrate that when nisin instead occurs in Perfective Mode,
its default interpretation is as describing a state of mind held in the past.
(5) a. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
niizįį’.
1S.att.perf
‘I thought it was probably raining.’
b. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
niizįį’.
1S.att.perf
‘I wished that it was raining.’
In addition to using Perfective Mode, attitudes of thinking and desire which held in
the past can also be expressed by using the past particle ńt’éé’ in postverbal position:
(6) a. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nisin
1S.att.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘I thought that it was probably raining.’
b. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nisin
1S.att.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘I wished that it was raining.’
When the verb nisin embeds clauses, it never bears object marking corresponding
to the embedded clause.4
(7) a. *Alice
Alice
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
laanaa]
wishful
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice wishes it were raining.’)
4As Schauber (1979) points out, the verb of speech ní also lacks object marking corresponding to
the embedded clause:
(i) *Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
yiní.
3O.3S.say
(Intended: ‘Alice says it is raining.’)
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b. *Alice
Alice
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice thinks it is raining.’)
The absence of object marking on clause-embedding nisin sets this verb apart from
many other clause-embedding verbs in Navajo. The examples in (8) are repeated
from section 2.2.3.
(8) a. [Tó
water
yíląąd]=go
3S.rise.perf=go
baa ntséskees.
3O.about.1S.think.impf
‘I’m thinking about the water rising.’
(adapt. Perkins and Fernald 2006: (190))
b. Kii
Kii
[naakaii
Mexican
tl’óół
rope
yizhbizh]=ígíí
3O.3S.braid.perf=igii
yiyíínii’.
3O.3S.hear.perf
‘Kii heard that the Mexican braided the rope.’
(Schauber 1979: 31)
Both of the verbs in (8) feature object marking corresponding to the embedded clause.
It is not the case that the verb nisin never bears object-marking, however: rather,
this seems to be a property which only arises when nisin embeds a clause. When nisin
embeds a nominal expression ((9)) rather than a clause, nisin obligatorily bears an
object prefix corresponding to the object.
(9) Mary
Mary
[bilasáana
apple
ła’]
indef.det
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
‘Mary wants an apple.’
I discuss examples like (9) at greater length in the appendix to the chapter (section
3.7).
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3.2.2 On the properties of clauses embedded by nisin
This section investigates the properties of clauses which I have assumed to be
embedded by the verb nisin. I first address in more detail the assumption that nisin
embeds clauses. I then present diagnostics from Schauber (1979) and Speas (2000)
which demonstrate that these embedded clauses should not be analyzed as a quotation
(direct discourse).
3.2.2.1 Evidence for clausal embedding by nisin
In the discussion above, I have tacitly assumed that the clauses like the one shown
bracketed in (10) are embedded by nisin:
(10) [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
(sha’shin)]
probably
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it is (probably) raining.’
This assumption requires a bit more motivation. we saw above that clauses em-
bedded by nisin (e.g. (9)) are syntactically indistiguishable from main clauses. Fur-
thermore, clauses embedded by nisin do not even bear any subordinating morphology
(e.g. =go, =ígíí (section 2.2.3). I repeat illustrative examples of marked embedded
clauses below:
(11) a. [Ch’é’étiingóó
entrance.toward
naanée]=go
3S.play.impf=go
shił bééhózin.
3O.1S.know.impf
‘I know that he is playing in the yard.’
b. Kii
Kii
[naakaii
Mexican
tl’óół
rope
yizhbizh]=ígíí
3O.3S.braid.perf=igii
yiyíínii’.
3O.3S.hear.perf
‘Kii heard that the Mexican braided the rope.’
(Schauber 1979: 31)
Furthermore, we saw in section 3.2.1 that unlike the clause-embedding verbs in
(10), nisin never bears object marking corresponding to the (purportedly) embedded
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clause. That is, there is no morphological marking on the verb nisin in (10) to indicate
that nisin stands in any kind of grammatical relation with the bracketed clause.
Before continuing, then, we should motivate the assumption that nisin can embed
clauses by ruling out an alternative hypothesis in which (10) contains two paratactically-
related clauses: the bracekted clause and the clause containing (only) nisin.
There are several pieces of evidence which point away from this alternative hy-
pothesis. First, the word order of nisin-sentences with overt subjects. In Navajo,
nisin-sentences with overt subjects exhibit the same default SOV word order as sen-
tences with nominal subjects and objects (section 2.2.2):
(12) a. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt]
ArealS.rain.perf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
S O V
‘Kii thinks it rained.’
b. Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiyiiłts.
3O.3S.kick.perf
S O V
‘The horse saw the mule.’
If nisin in (12a) stood in a paratactic relation with the bracketed clause, it is unclear
why Kii, the subject of nisin, should occur to the left of the bracketed clause. After
all, Kii cannot possibly be the subject of the bracketed verb nahóółt ‘it rained.’ If
the bracketed clause is syntactically embedded by nisin, however, the position of the
subject makes sense: it occurs where we expect to find subjects in relation to objects
of verbs.
A second piece of evidence that clauses shown bracketed above are embedded by
nisin comes from data like (13), first discussed by Willie (1989) and discussed by
Speas (2000). Willie demonstrates that in Navajo, coference is not possible between
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a third-person subject on the verb in the bracketed clause and a third-person subject
on nisin:
(13) [Ndoolnish]
Kii
nízin.
3S.work.fut 3S.att.impf
‘S/hei thinks s/hei/j will work.’
(adapt. Willie 1989: 511)
By contrast, Navajo clauses whch actually stand in a paratactic relation (e.g. (14))
allow coreference between third-person subjects in adjacent clauses:
(14) Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná.
3S.move.perf
’Akdi
there.loc
bił yá’át’ééh.
3O.with.3S.be.good
‘S/hei moved to Flagstaff. S/hei/j likes it there.’
Thus, if the bracketed clause in (13) stood in a paratactic relation with nisin, it is
not clear why (13) and (14) should differ in their coreferential possibilities.
I will conclude, then, that we were correct to assume that nisin can embed clauses.
However, this conclusion does not explain the morphosyntactic differences between
nisin-sentences and other examples of clausal embedding in Navajo. I have not offered
any answer as to why nisin lacks object marking corresponding to the embedded
clause, or why clauses embedded by nisin lack overt subordinating markes =go and
=ígíí. We must leave consideration of these questions to future investigation.
3.2.2.2 Clauses embedded by nisin are not quotations (direct discourse)
Although the evidence discussed above seems to indicate that nisin embeds clauses,
Schauber (1979) and Speas (2000) observe that these embedded clauses exhibit prop-
erties reminiscent of quotations (direct discourse). In comparison with indirect dis-
course ((15a)), direct discourse ((15b)) behaves less like it is truly embedded by the
verb of speech. One contrast between indirect and direct discourse is in the behav-
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ior of indexical expressions, such as the first-person pronoun. In indirect discourse
((15a)), the first-person pronoun is interpreted as referring to the speaker of the entire
utterance (i.e. not Mary). In direct discourse ((15b)), by contrast, the first-person
pronoun is interpreted as referring to the subject of the verb of speech (i.e. Mary).
(15) a. Mary says/said (that) I bought a book. Indirect discourse
b. Mary says/said, “I bought a book.” Direct discourse
As Schauber (1979) and Speas (2000) observe, Navajo ní-sentences ((16)) as well
as nisin-sentences ((17)) permits the first-person subject on an embedded verb to refer
either to the speaker of the entire utterance (i.e. not John) or to the subject of the
verb ní/nisin (i.e. John). That is, a nisin-sentence like (16) allows both an indirect
discourse-like interpretation as well as a direct-discourse-like interpretation.5
(16) Jáan
John
[chidí
car
naháłnii’]
3O.1S.buy.perf
ní.
3S.say.impf
(ii) ‘Johni says Ispeaker bought a car.’ Indirect discourse-like
(i) ‘Johni says Ii bought a car.’ Direct discourse-like
(Speas 2000: (1), from Schauber 1979: 19))
(17) Jáan
John
[chidí
car
nahałnii’]
3O.1S.buy.perf
nízin
3S.att.impf
(i) ‘Johni thinks Ispeaker bought a car.’ Indirect discourse-like
(ii) ‘Johni thinks Ii bought a car.’ Direct discourse-like
(Schauber 1979: 19)
5Parallel behavior is also exhibited by embedded second-person pronouns (Schauber 1979, Speas
2000).
73
Ní- and nisin-sentences behave like examples of direct discourse in another way, as
well. Recall from above that embedded third-person subjects cannot be interpreted
as coreferent with a third-person subject of nisin ((18)).
(18) [Ndoolnish]
Kii
nízin.
3S.work.fut 3S.att.impf
‘S/hei thinks s/hei/j will work.’
(adapt. Willie 1989: 511)
In English, examples of indirect discourse permit coreference between third-person
pronouns in the main and embedded clauses ((19a)). By contrast, examples of di-
rect discourse ((19b)) behave like the Navajo sentence in (18): the main clause and
embedded third-person pronouns cannot be coreferent.6
(19) a. Shei says/said that shei/j bought a book.
b. Shei says/said, ‘Shei/j bought a book.’
Thus, there are certain notable similarities between nisin- and ní-sentences in Navajo
and examples of direct discourse in English.
In spite of initial appearances, however, Speas (2000) argues that the ‘direct
discourse-like’ interpretations of ní- and nisin-sentences should not be analyzed as
true cases of direct discourse. Speas studies in detail the properties of ní-sentences
like (18) to make this point. In the following paragraphs, I step through two key
examples presented by Speas (2000) in favor of the second hypothesis. I present
examples of nisin-sentences which make the same points. The observations about
nisin-sentences come from original fieldwork (in the case of (21)) or from observations
originally due to Schauber (1979) which I replicated in fieldwork (in the case of (24)
and (25)).
6I thank Angelika Kratzer (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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First, Speas (2000) discusses examples of ní-sentences that demonstrate that clause
embedded by ní does not have to replicate perfectly what was originally said. This
sets such clauses apart from true examples of direct discourse quotes. Among the
examples she considers is (20), in which the bracketed clause in the ní-sentence (20d))
contains a deictic term, yiskągo ‘tomorrow,’ which was not used — and could not
have been used — in the original utterance ((20b)). Yiskągo in (20d) is evaluated
with respect to the perspective of the speaker of the utterance in its entirety rather
than the perspective of Kii.
(20) a. Context, part 1: On Wednesday I talk with Kii, and Kii says:
b. Damóo
Sunday
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
deeshá.
1S.go.fut
‘I will go to Flagstaff on Sunday.’
c. Context, part 2: On Saturday, I talk to you, and I say:
d. Kii
Kii
[yiskągo
tomorrow
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
deeshá]
1S.go.fut
ní.
3S.say.impf
‘Kii says he is going to Flagstaff tomorrow.’
Lit: Kii says, IKii will go to Flagstaff tomorrow.
(Speas 2000: (11))
I adapted Speas’s materials for use in elicitation sessions and found that nisin-
sentences exhibit the same behavior. The bracketed clause in the nisin-sentence
((21d)) contains a deictic term yiskągo ‘tomorrow’ that is evaluated relative to the ut-
terance perspective. That is, Kii’s desire on Wednesday was not that I go to Flagstaff
tomorrow.7
7I changed the choice of verb of motion from deeshá ((20)) to deeshááł ((21)) on the suggestion
of consultants. Nothing hinges on this.
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(21) a. Context, part 1: On Wednesday I talk with Kii about what he wants to
do on the upcoming weekend. Kii says:
b. Damóo
Sunday
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
deeshááł.
1S.go.fut
‘I will go to Flagstaff.’
c. Context, part 2: On Saturday, I am talking to you about Kii. I say:
d. Kii
Kii
[yiskągo
tomorrow
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants to go to Flagstaff tomorrow.’
Lit: Kii nízin, IKii will go to Flagstaff tomorrow.
The sentence in (21d) exhibits ‘local perspective’: the embedded first-person subject
refers to the attitude holder, Kii. However, the sentence in (21d) contains an adverb
(yiskągo ‘tomorrow’) that was not in Kii’s original utterance in (21a). Thus, the
bracketed material in (21d) cannot be an example of direct discourse.
The second kind of evidence discussed by Speas (2000) builds from work by
Schauber (1979), who observed that wh-expressions can be extracted from clauses
embedded by ní. In (22a), the wh-expression háadilá has moved out of the bracketed
clause, past the subject (Kii) of the main clause verb of speech (yiłní).
(22) Háadilái
where.loc.q
Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
ti dínílnish]
2S.work.fut
yiłní.
3O.to.3S.say.impf
‘Where did Kii tell Mary to work?’
Lit: ‘Where did Kii say to Maryj youj work.’
(Speas 2000: (8a), Schauber 1979: (41))
The availability of extraction is another strike against a direct discourse account.
Authors including Partee (1973), Schlenker (1999), Speas (2000), and Anand and
Nevins (2004) have observed that direct discourse behaves like an impermeable chunk
of structure that cannot interact grammatically with the embedding clause. In En-
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glish, wh-movement is not permitted out of direct discourse complements ((23a)) but
is licit out of indirect discourse complements ((23b)):
(23) a. *Whoi does she say, “I like ti.”?
b. Whoi did she say that she likes ti?
(Speas 2000)
We find parallel observations made by Schauber (1979) for nisin-sentences. Schauber
gives the following example to demonstrate that wh-extraction is possible from nisin-
sentences.
(24) Ha’át’íísh
wh.q
Jáan
John
[ti nahideeshnih]
3O.1S.buy.fut
nízin?
3S.att.impf
‘What does John want to buy?’
(Schauber 1979: (42))
I replicated data like (24) using the context in (25a). The elicited sentence in (25b)
demonstrates that wh-extraction is also possible out of nisin-sentences that express
thinking:
(25) a. Context: At the picnic, Kii ate a hamburger bun that had a brown patty
on it. Kii thought he ate beef, but he actually ate a mushroom! He still
thinks he ate beef. You know that Kii ate a mushroom, but aren’t sure
what he thinks he ate. You say:
b. Ha’áti’íílái
wh.qi
Kii
Kii
[ti yíy’]
3O.1S.eat.perf
nízin?
3S.att.impf
‘What does Kii think that he ate?’
In the sentence in (25b), the first-person of the verb in the bracketed clause yíy’
refers to Kii: thus, the embedded clause exhibits what we have referred to as local
perspective. It is from this clause which I claim the wh-expression ha’át’íílá has been
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extracted. In the bracketed clause, ha’át’íílá functions as the object of the verb yíy’
‘I ate it.’ Looking at (25b), we can tell that ha’át’íílá has moved into the main clause
because it occurs to the left of Kii, which must have originated at the subject of the
main clause. In turn, we know that Kii originated in the main clause because it could
not have originated in the embedded clause. If it had, it would share the clause with
a verb marked for a first-person subject. As shown in (26), this is an ungrammatical
configuration:
(26) *Kii yíy.
Kii 3O.1S.eat.perf
(Intended: ‘Kii ate it.’)
To summarize, I have used the reasoning and diagnostics developed by Speas
(2000) to demonstrate that — as Speas did for ní-sentences — the verb nisin is
capable of embedding clauses. Furthermore, despite interesting behaviors on the part
of indexical expressions, clauses embedded by nisin cannot be obligatorily treated as
direct discourse (quotes). In later discussion of nisin-sentences, I will consider only
structures in which clauses shown bracketed above are syntactically embedded by
nisin.8;9
8The fact that the bracketed clauses in nisin-sentences do not have to be treated as direct discourse
does not mean, however, that they should never be treated as cases of direct discourse: perhaps the
‘direct discourse-like’ examples which I discussed above are string ambiguous with actual direct
discourse structures. If this were an available alternative structure in Navajo, we would predict
them to be infelicitous and ungrammatical, respectively, in the contexts given in (21) and (25).
9This does not, of course, answer the question of how the ‘direct discourse-like’ interpretations
arise for ní- and nisin-sentences in the first place. The phenomenon exhibits the hallmarks of ‘in-
dexical’ shift, in which embedded indexicals can be evaluated relative to some more local context of
utterance, i.e. the one introduced by a verb of speech. Indexical shift has been discussed in depth for
a number of languages, including Slave (Rice 1986), Amharic (Schlenker 2003), Zazaki (Anand and
Nevins 2004), Uyghur (Shklovsky and Sudo 2013), Turkish (Özyildiz 2013), Korean (Park 2014),
and Nez Perce (Deal 2014).
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3.2.3 Summary
The foregoing discussion has highlighted key morphological and syntactic proper-
ties of nisin-sentences. In the next sections, we will examine the morphosyntactic and
semantic characteristics of attitude reports that contain nisin. I begin with attitudes
of thinking in section 3.3 and continue with attitudes of desire in section 3.4.
3.3 Attitudes of thinking
This section investigates nisin-sentences which are felicitous in contexts in which
the subject of nisin thinks that the world is a certain way (i.e. the world is consistent
with the proposition (set of possible worlds) determined by the embedded clause).
(27) a. Hastiin
man
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘The man thinks it must be going to rain.’
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is raining.’
c. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt]
ArealS.rain.perf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it rained.’
d. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
The discussion below divides the sentences in (27) into two sets. First, nisin-
sentences that contain a particle (sha’shin) in the embedded clause ((27a)). When we
discuss nisin-sentences that contain sha’shin in the embedded clause, we will also see
that sha’shin can occur in main clauses. Second, nisin-sentences that do not contain
any particles in the embedded clause ((27b-d)). Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 survey each
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set of sentences in turn. In addition, section 3.3.2 compares the meanings of nisin-
sentences with and without the particle sha’shin.
3.3.1 ‘Thinking’ with particles
This section 3.3.1 explores nisin-sentences that contain the particle sha’shin in the
embedded clause. I demonstrate that sha’shin not only occurs in clauses embedded by
nisin but in main clauses as well. I argue that in both environments, sha’shin makes
a contribution similar to English epistemic modals probably or must.
I start with the sentences in (28), in which sha’shin is embedded by nisin.
(28) a. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
b. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt
ArealS.rain.perf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must have rained.’
c. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be going to rain.’
As suggested by the translations shown above, the sentences in (28) were judged to
be felicitous in contexts which dealt with thoughts about present ((29)), past ((30)),
and future ((31)) matters.
(29) a. Context: Kii is inside in a windowless room so he does not know what
the weather is like. He hears a pattering sound on the roof.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
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(30) a. Context: Kii was out of town yesterday and does not know what the
weather was like. Upon returning home, Kii notices that the flowers and
grass looks fresher, as though it has recently rained.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt
ArealS.rain.perf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must have rained.’
(31) a. Context: Kii looks outside and sees dark clouds in the distance. The air
smells like rain is on the way.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be going to rain.’
A brief aside: later on, we will see that some nisin-sentences can express attitudes
of desire (section 3.4). However, no nisin-sentence that contains sha’shin can express
desire. The sentences in (29) — (31) are never felicitous in contexts targeting such
meanings:
(32) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. He wants it to rain.
b. #Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be going to rain.’
Comment: “He’s predicting that it’s going to rain.’’
Returning to the contribution of sha’shin, I observe that the contexts in (29) —
(31) have a key property in common: Kii is drawing a conclusion on the basis of
indirect or inferential evidence. That is, Kii thinks what he does on the basis of
evidence of it raining (the aftermath of rain, the signs of rain to come) but Kii has
not himself witnessed the rain.
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If we try to use sha’shin in a context in which Kii has direct evidence that
it is raining, the result is infelicitous. In the context in (33a), Kii sees it raining.
Consequently, the sentence with sha’shin is infelicitous:
(33) a. Context: Kii looks outside and sees it raining.
b. #Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
possibly
nízin.
3S.att.impf
#‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
The particle sha’shin is also found in main clauses. When it occurs in main clauses,
the conditions on the use of sha’shin seem to be the same. Pairs of examples like (34)
and (35) demonstrate that main clause occurences of sha’shin are only felicitous in
contexts in which, for example, the truth of it raining is concluded on the basis of
indirect or inferential evidence ((34)). Infelicity results if direct evidence is available
((35)).
(34) a. Context: You see people coming in wearing wet clothes and carrying
umbrellas. You haven’t looked outside so you don’t know for sure whether
it is raining. You say:
(Context from von Fintel and Gillies 2010)
b. Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin.
probably
‘It must be raining,’ ‘it’s probably raining.’
(35) a. Context: You look outside and see rain falling. You say:
b. #Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin.
probably
#‘It must be raining,’ #‘It’s probably raining.’
Removing sha’shin from (35) would render the sentence felicitous:
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(36) a. Context: You look outside and see rain falling. You say:
b. Nahałtin.
ArealS.rain.impf
‘It is raining.’
Observe that the English translations of sentences with sha’shin were also marked
as infelicitous when direct evidence was available in the context. The expressions
sha’shin and must (under its epistemic, or knowledge-oriented, interpretation) both
impose a requirement of ‘indirectness’ on the evidence available in the context. This
observation is developed in detail for sentences with Englishmust by authors including
Westmoreland (1998), Drubig (2001), and von Fintel and Gillies (2010). The link
between sha’shin and indirectness of evidence will be confirmed in discussion below.
When we turn below to expressions of ‘thinking’ without particles, we will see that
removing sha’shin from sentences like (33b) and (35b) results in felicitous sentences
in the presence of ‘direct evidence.’10
Before moving on, I make a final observation: in sentences with sha’shin the
presence vs. absence of nisin is key to determining whose indirect evidence we are
interested in. In main clauses with sha’shin, we are interested in the speaker’s evidence
10We should be careful not to confuse ‘direct evidence’ with logical certainty. The example in (i)
demonstrates that sha’shin is felicitous in context where the evidence is conclusive but still indirect
in nature: the speaker in (i) has not seen the pebble.
(i) a. Context: You are playing a game with three cups. Mary asks you to figure out which
cup is hiding the pebble. You have already asked her to turn over Cup 1 and Cup 2:
the pebble wasn’t under either one of them.
b. Díí
this.one
tsé
rock
biyaa
3O.under
si’
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin.
probably
‘It must be under this one.’
Comment: “Sha’shin is good because that one is the only one left.”
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and thoughts.11 By contrast, when sha’shin is embedded by nisin, it is the subject of
nisin whose evidence and knowledge is important.
This point is illustrated by (37). Here, even though the speaker — who is not
the subject of nisin in (37b) — is certain that it is raining, sha’shin is still felicitous
because Kii, the subject of nisin, only has indirect evidence that it is raining.
(37) a. Context: I have just come inside, where I saw it is raining. My friend Kii
has been inside this windowless room all day and does not know that it
is raining. He sees the my clothes look damp. I report Kii’s thinking to
you, saying:
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
When sha’shin is embedded by nisin, we can further observe that it is only the
subject of nisin whose evidence is taken into account. The speaker’s evidence is never
relevant. The following context-sentence pair demonstrates that sha’shin cannot be
used in a nisin-sentence where the subject of nisin has direct evidence but the speaker
only has indirect evidence.
(38) a. Context: Kii just came in from the outside, so he knows what the weather
is like. Kii sees that I have been inside all day, but overhears me saying
that I’ve noticed that everyone has wet clothes, so it must be raining. I
report Kii’s thinking to you, saying:
11A topic that merits further investigation here is whether it is only the speaker whose evidence
and knowledge is relevant. For discussion of main clause epistemic modals in English that permit
other perspectives, see von Fintel and Gillies 2011).
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b. #Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Kii thinks the following: Given my evidence about the world,
it must be raining.’)
The same is true for English epistemic modals embedded by verbs like think.
Speas (2004), Hacquard (2006), and Stephenson (2007) observe that the modal might
in (39) takes into account the evidence available to Dave. This sentence could be
uttered even if, for instance, the speaker is completely certain that Sandy is stupid.
(39) Dave thinks Sandy might be stupid.
(adapt. Hacquard 2006: (206b))
On the basis of the data seen so far, I make the following generalizations for
Navajo. In the following generalizations,  stands in for the proposition embedded
by sha’shin and, as in the main text nisin is intended to stand in for the verb marked
for any subject.
(40) Main clauses and nisin-sentences with sha’shin:
a.  sha’shin: given the indirect evidence available to the speaker,  must
be true.
b. [  sha’shin ] nisin: given the indirect evidence available to the subject of
nisin,  must be true.
3.3.2 ‘Thinking’ without particles
Nisin-sentences can also express attitudes of ‘thinking’ when they do not contain
sha’shin:
(41) a. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is raining.’
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b. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt]
ArealS.rain.perf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it rained.’
c. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
I will refer to sentences like (41) as ‘particleless’ nisin-sentences. Like nisin-
sentences that contain sha’shin, the particleless nisin-sentences in (41) can concern
the present ((41a)), past ((41b)), or future ((41c)).
We saw earlier that nisin-sentences with sha’shin could only express attitudes of
thinking. When we turn to particleless sentences like (41), we find that temporal
morphology on the embedded verb is key to determining whether the sentence unam-
biguously expresses an attitude of thinking or not.The sentences in (41a) and (41b)
contain embedded verbs marked for imperfective and perfective aspect, respectively.
These sentences are infelicitous in contexts targeting desires, like the one in (42):
(42) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. It has been very dry recently and rain is badly
needed. Kii has not been outside yet today, but his desire is for it to be
raining right now.
b. #Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Kii wants it to be raining.’)
By contrast, particleless nisin-sentences that embed a future-marked verb ((41c))
are ambiguous between expressing attitudes of thinking and attitudes of desire. As
shown by the following duo of context-sentence pairs, the same sequence of Navajo
words is felicitous in contexts that concern thoughts about the future ((43)) and in
contexts that concern desires about the future ((44)):
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(43) a. Context: Kii looks outside and sees dark clouds in the distance. The air
smells like rain is on the way. Kii has to drive this afternoon, however, so
he does not want it to rain.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
(44) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. It has been very dry recently and rain is badly
needed. Kii’s desire is for it to rain. He looks at the sky and sees it is
clear, however, so he doesn’t think it will rain.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
I return in section 3.5 to discuss this ambiguity at greater length.
We are now in a position to compare and contrast particleless nisin-sentences
expressing attitudes of ‘thinking’ with those that contain sha’shin. We find that there
are contexts in which both particleless sentences and nisin-sentences with sha’shin are
accepted.
One such context is shown below, repeated from earlier discussion. Here, the
subject of nisin, Kii, has indirect evidence that it is raining: he has not seen that it
is raining, however. In this context, sha’shin is felicitous ((45b)) as is a particleless
nisin-sentence ((45c)).
(45) a. Context: Kii is inside in a windowless room so he does not know what
the weather is like. He hears a pattering sound on the roof.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
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c. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is raining.’
However, there is not total overlap between sentences with and without nisin. The
following context illustrates the infelicity of nisin-sentences with sha’shin ((46b)) where
the attitude holder has direct evidence. By contrast, consultants found particleless
nisin-sentences ((46c)) to be felicitous in the same context.
(46) a. Context: We are all talking about where Mary is. I do not know. Kii says
he saw Mary at her home just a moment ago. I report Kii’s thinking to
you, saying:
b. #Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
#‘Kii thinks Mary must be at home.’
Comment: “If he actually saw her, then I’d say [(46c)].”
c. Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá]
3S.sit.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
¿Kii thinks Mary is at home.’
Comment: “You’re reporting that’s what he’s thinking, it’s okay.”
Note that the English translations make a slightly different cut. As in Navajo, it is the
case that the sentence with epistemic must is infelicitous in the context shown. Both
sha’shin and English epistemic must appear to impose a requirement of indirectness
on the evidence used (Westmoreland 1998, Drubig 2001, von Fintel and Gillies 2010).
However, the English translation in (46c) also sounds odd to at least some speakers.
I indicate this oddness with the ‘?’ diacritic. The use of think seems to imply
uncertainty which is not consistent with the context. By contrast, the Navajo sentence
with nisin in (46c) was judged felicitous by speakers. I will set aside this mismatch
between English and Navajo for now; I return to it in section 4.3.3.
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In section 3.3.1, we saw examples that demonstrated that main clauses with and
without sha’shin show the same contrast. (47b) (repeated from above) is infelicitous
in a context in which the speaker has direct evidence that it is raining. Removing
sha’shin ((47c)) produces a sentence that is felicitous in the same context:
(47) a. Context: You look outside and see rain falling. You say:
b. #Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin.
probably
#‘It must be raining,’ #‘It’s probably raining.’
c. Nahałtin.
ArealS.rain.impf
‘It is raining.’
I summarize the contrast between nisin-sentences with, and without, sha’shin in
(48):
(48) The link between sha’shin and indirect evidence:
a. Contexts in which the attitude holder uses indirect or inferential evidence
to conclude that  is true: both nisin-sentences with and without sha’shin
are felicitous.
b. Contexts in which the attitude holder has direct evidence for the truth of
: only particleless nisin-sentences are felicitous.
3.4 Attitudes of desire
This section investigates nisin-sentences in which the attitude holder expresses an
attitude of desire. Each of the sentences in (49) can be felicitously used in contexts
targeting desires.
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(49) Attitudes of desire
a. [Níneez
2S.tall
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish you were tall.’
b. Alice
Alice
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo]
hope.not
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice hopes it won’t rain,’ ‘Alice wishes it wouldn’t rain.’
c. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
d. Sandy
Sandy
[Hoozdodi
California.loc
nighan
2S.live
doo
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wishes you lived in CA (now),’
‘Sandy wishes for you to live in CA.’
e. Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’
Just as we did for nisin-sentences expressing attitudes of ‘thinking,’ we will di-
vide the sentences in (49) into two sets. First, nisin-sentences that contain a particle
(laanaa, lágo) in the embedded clause ((49a,b)). As we did for sha’shin above, it will
be shown that both of these particles also occurs in main clauses. Second, ‘parti-
cleless’ nisin-sentences ((49c-e)). These sentences each contain a future-marked verb
in the embedded clause. In sentences (49d) and (49e), the embedded clauses also
each contain morphemes associated with the expression of past temporality, first in-
troduced in section 2.2.4. When we discuss the truth conditions of (49d) and (49e),
we will consider how particleless nisin-sentences with past markers differ from those
without past markers.
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Before we begin, a signpost. The reader will notice that different English attitude
verbs (generally, wish vs. want) were offered in translations for the sentences in (49). I
return briefly in section 3.4.3 to discuss what this choice of translation might indicate.
3.4.1 Desires with particles
This section explores nisin-sentences and main clauses that contain the particles
laanaa or lágo.
3.4.1.1 Desires with laanaa
I begin with the particle laanaa, which can be found both in nisin-sentences ((50))
and in main clauses ((51)).12 The particle laanaa is licit with verbs marked for any
Inflectional Mode. The examples below show laanaa used felicitously with verbs in
Imperfective (Next[a]), Future ((50b), (51a))13, Perfective ((50c), (51b)), Optative
((50d), (51c)), and Progressive ((50e)) Modes.
(50) a. [Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.be.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish Mary were at home.’
12Young and Morgan (1987: d514) identify a second particle, le’ which they suggest is can be used
interchangeably with laanaa. I set aside discussion of le’ here.
13This seems to be one place where the choice between Future Mode and the future particle dooleeł
is important, at least for a subset of consultants. While it was accepted by two consultants, one
consultant strongly rejected the sentence in (ib), where laanaa follows dooleeł. The alternatives in
(ic) and (id) were suggested. I leave open the question of why laanaa should not be able to co-occur
with dooleeł.
(i) a. Context: I hope that my son grows up to be tall. I’m telling you this.
b. *Shiyáázh
1poss.child
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł
fut
laanaa.
wishful
(Intended: ‘I wish my son would be tall (in the future).’
c. [Shiyáázh
1poss.child
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł]
fut
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I want my son to be tall.’
d. Shiyáázh
1poss.child
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł
fut
yę
yee
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish my son would be tall.’
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b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it would rain.’
c. Sandy
Sandy
[ch’ééh jiyáán
watermelon
daneest’
3plS.ripe.perf
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wishes the watermelons were ripe (had ripened).’
d. [Shik’éí
1poss.relatives
ła’
indef.det
daostse’
3plO.1S.see.opt
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I hope to see some of my relatives.’
(adapt. YM 1987: d308)
e. [’Eesh’į
1S.see.prog
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish that I could see.’
(adapt. YM 1987: d513)
(51) a. Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa.
wishful
‘I wish it would rain.’
b. ’Add’
yesterday
nahóółt
ArealS.rain.perf
laanaa.
wishful
‘I wish it had rained.’
c. K’ídóshnííh
1S.stretch.arms.opt
laanaa.
wishful
‘I wish I could stretch my arms.’
(YM 1987: d507)
Regardless of whether laanaa is embedded or not, each of the sentences shown above
expresses a desire. None of the sentences above can be used felicitously in a context
where the subject of nisin ‘thinks’ that some proposition is true.
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As is suggested by the translations of the sentences in (50) and (51), the presence
of nisin is key to determining whose desires are being expressed. I will make the
following generalization, which runs parallel to observations made for sentences with
sha’shin.
(52) Main clauses and nisin-sentences with laanaa:
a.  laanaa: if the desires of the speaker are met,  is true.
b. [  laanaa ] nisin: if the desires of the subject of nisin are met  is true.
I designed the following context to test whether a main clause with laanaa can ever
express what is thought by an individual other than the speaker. The context was
constructed to make Kii’s desires particularly salient. Even in this context, however,
the main clause with laanaa in (53b) could only express the speaker’s desires:
(53) a. Context: Kii is a farmer concerned about his crops. He hopes that the
temperature goes down, that the wind becomes less strong, and:
b. #Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa.
wishful
(Intended: ‘Kii hopes it will rain.’)
Comment: “You’re the one who is wanting it to rain.”
The consultant’s comment and judgment about (53b) indicates that even in a context
where Kii’s desires are particularly salient, a main clause with laanaa cannot express
the desires of anyone except the speaker.
I designed the following context to test whether a sentence in which laanaa is
embedded by nisin can express the desires of the subject of nisin. I constructed the
context in (54) to make salient what is thought by my mother and what is desired
(or, at least, perceived to be desired) by the speaker: the desires of my mother are
not under discussion. I asked consultants about the sentence in (54b).
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(54) a. Context: I’m a farmer in California. My crops are drying up. My mother
thinks I want it to rain. (She’s actually wrong: if my crops die, I will get
insurance money). I say to you, My mother thinks I want it to rain.
b. #Shimá
1poss.mother
[nahodoołtį̨́ˊł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘My mother thinks I want it to rain.’)
Comment: “You’re saying that the mother wants it to rain.”
As the consultant’s comment and judgment for (54b) demonstrates, laanaa cannot
‘pick up’ the speaker’s desires. The sentence as given can only express the desires
of my mother, the subject of nisin. Consultants reported that a meaning consistent
with the context in (54a) could only be expressed by a sentence like (55b). Here, an
additional nisin has been inserted to the right of laanaa. This new, closer nisin bears
a first-person subject, which refers to the speaker.
(55) a. Context: Same as (54a).
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
[[nahodoołtį̨́ˊł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa]
wishful
nisin]
1S.att.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘My mother thinks I want it to rain.’
Summarizing, it seems that laanaa is quite like sha’shin in two respects. First, it
is correlated with a particular kind of desire: just as sentences with sha’shin could
only express an attitude of ‘thinking,’ sentences with laanaa can only express desires.
Second, the ‘perspective’ of both sha’shin and laanaa depends on the presence of nisin.
When embedded by nisin, sentences with sha’shin and laanaa express what is thought
and what is desired, respectively, by the subject of (the closest) nisin. When sha’shin
and laanaa instead occur in main clauses, the sentence expresses what is thought and
what is desired, respectively, by the speaker.
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3.4.1.2 Negative desires with lágo
The second particle I will investigate is lágo. Sentences with lágo express a desire
that the state of affairs described by the embedded clause not be true. Like laanaa
and sha’shin, we find lágo both in nisin-sentences ((56)) and in main clauses ((57)).
The verb embedded in the clause with lágo is necessarily marked with Optative Mode
morphology.14;15
(56) Kii
Kii
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo]
hope.not
nízin.
3S.att
‘Kii hopes it won’t rain.’
(57) Chidí
car
bikee’
3poss.tire
’ił ’adaalkaałí
nail
ła’
indef.det
baa ’oojííł
3O.3S.pierce.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I hope no nail pierces any of our tires.’
(YM 1987: d474)
14Main clauses with lágo are also translated by Young and Morgan (1987) as prohibitives, e.g. (i):
(i) ’Ádóógish
2S.cut.self.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘Don’t cut yourself!’
(YM 1987: d32)
15 Navajo seems to have a second particle pronounced lágo which does not convey negative desire.
Instead, this second lágo occurs in sentences expressing discovery, as in (i):
(i) Tł’óo’di
outside
doo
neg
deesk’aaz
3S.cold.impf
da
neg
lágo
discovery
biniinaa
so
shi’éétsoh
1poss.coat
’ádaa ńdiistooz.
3O.1S.take.back.off.perf
‘I found out that it wasn’t cold outside so I took my coat back off.’
(YM 1987: d617)
This lágo conveying discovery seems to be transparently decomposable into the subordinator =go
(section 2.2.3) and the particle lá, which Young and Morgan (1987: d513) describe as conveying
“emphasis and discovery,” as in (ii), as a mirative particle might:
(ii) Tł’óo’di
outside
deesk’aaz
3S.cold.impf
lá.
discovery
‘I see that it’s cold out.’
(YM 1987: d513)
I see no clear way to relate meanings of negative desire and mirativity. I will assume Navajo has
two unrelated morphemes both pronounced lágo.
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I will make the following generalization:
(58) Main clauses and nisin-sentences with lágo:
a.  lágo: if the desires of the speaker are met,  is false.
b. [  lágo ] nisin: if the desires of the subject of nisin are met,  is false.
This generalization is essentially identical to the ones already made for sha’shin
and laanaa. The only difference is the kind of attitude expressed by sentences that
contain lágo. While the sentences in (56) and (57) both express desires, they express
desires that the state of affairs described by the embedded clause not hold. Note
that there is no negation (doo...da, section 2.2.2) in either (56) or (57). Instead, the
presence of lágo seems to introduce the ‘negativity’ of the desire. To reflect this
inherent negativity, I gloss lágo as ‘hope.not’ in the sentences given above.16
As the generalization in (58) states, the identity of the individual whose desires are
expressed by a sentence with lágo depends on whether lágo occurs in a main clause
or is embedded by nisin. When lágo occurs in a main clause, the sentence expresses
the desires of the speaker. This point is demonstrated using a context modeled on
the one used to investigate main clauses with laanaa. Even though Kii’s desires are
salient in the context, the main clause in (59b) can only express the speaker’s desires
and not those of Kii.
(59) a. Context: Kii is playing baseball tomorrow. He hopes that the temperature
decreases, that the wind does not blow hard, and:
16We can come close to the meanings attributed to nisin-sentences if we add negation to a sentence
with our ‘positive desire’ particle, laanaa:
(i) Kii
Kii
[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da
neg
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes that it wouldn’t rain.’
‘Kii hopes it doesn’t rain.’
96
b. #Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
(Intended: ‘Kii hopes it doesn’t rain.’)
Comment: “You mean that you don’t want it to rain.”
I close the discussion of lágo by commenting on the temporal orientation of the
desires expressed by such sentences. As was noted above, the particle lágo can only
occur with verbs in the Optative Mode. It appears that the combination of Optative-
marked verbs and the particle lágo can only readily express negative desires about
events in the present ((60)) or about events in the future ((61)).
(60) a. Context: You look outside and see that it is raining. You are not happy
about this because it means you can’t go for a walk. You say:
b. Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I wish it weren’t raining!’
(61) a. Context: You are playing baseball later and don’t want it to rain. You
look outside and see dark clouds gathering on the horizon. You say:
b. Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
‘I hope it doesn’t rain!’
I found that sentences with Optative-marked verbs and lágo were not accepted in
contexts that concern negative desires about past events:
(62) a. Context: You just got home from vacation. You see that it has rained a
lot while you were gone, which means that your garden was flooded and
destroyed. You say: I wish it hadn’t rained!
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b. #Nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo.
hope.not
(Intended: I wish it hadn’t rained!’)
Comment: “You’re saying, ‘I hope it doesn’t keep on raining.’”
3.4.2 Desires without particles
This section considers nisin-sentences that express desires but which do not contain
particles like laanaa or lágo. We will consider three kinds of such ‘particleless’ nisin-
sentences, exemplified below.17
(63) a. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
b. Sandy
Sandy
[Hoozdodi
California.loc
nighan
2S.live
doo
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wishes you lived in CA (now).’
‘Sandy wishes for you to live in CA.’
c. Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’
A note before beginning. In our discussion of expressions of desire that contained
particles, I contrasted nisin-sentences with sentences without nisin. In this section,
17Young and Morgan give one sentence in which the particle laanaa occurs with a desire of the
shape in (63b):
(i) [T’áadoo
not
yéigo
very
chidí
car
bił
3O.with
ndaajeeh
4S.move.impf
dooleeł=ę
fut=yee
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish they wouldn’t drive so fast!’
(YM 1987: d655)
Although this sentence was given in Young and Morgan (1987), consultants that I asked about
sentences of this shape did not find them particularly well-formed. I leave to future work further
investigation of such constructions and will not consider them below.
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I focus purely on nisin-sentences. While nisin can be removed from the sentences in
(63), the meaning expressed is no longer one of strictly desire but, rather, of a broader
notion of goals and priorities. Given this complication, I wait to explore the truth
conditions of nisin-less counterparts to (63) in Chapter 5 (section ??).
3.4.2.1 Desires of the shape [-fut] nisin
I first examine sentences like (64):
(64) Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
The key morphological and semantic characteristics of sentences like (64) are sum-
marized below:
(65) Characterization of sentences of the shape [ -fut] nisin:
a. Expresses a desire for  that is held by the subject of nisin.
b.  is desired to hold after the time of the desire.
c. Ambiguous with thoughts about the future.
We already briefly discussed characteristic (65c) in section 3.3.2 and will discuss
it at much greater length in section 3.5. I set aside this characteristic for now to focus
instead on the importance of future morphology to particleless desires.
A desire interpretation arises for particleless nisin-sentences only if the embedded
clause contains a verb marked for Future Mode ((64)) or, if Future Mode is not
available for the verb in question (section 2.2.1), then the postverbal future particle
dooleeł:
(66) Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł]
fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sally wants her son to be tall’ (i.e., to grow up tall).
99
If the embedded clause does not contain a future-marked verb, a desire meaning
cannot arise. This is demonstrated by the infelicity of the nisin-sentence in (67b)
in the context given in (67a). The embedded clause in (67b) contains only a verb
that is marked for Imperfective Mode; in the absence of future marking, no desire
interpretation is possible. (The same point holds for verbs in Modes other than
Future, including Perfective.)
(67) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. It has been very dry recently and rain is badly
needed. Kii has not been outside yet today and doesn’t know what the
weather is like, but his desire is for it to be raining right now.
b. #Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Kii wants it to be raining.’)
Can only mean: ‘Kii thinks it is raining.’
This sets particleless nisin-sentences apart from those that contain laanaa. As we
saw earlier, sentences with laanaa can express desires about the present. I repeat the
relevant example in (68):
(68) [Níneez
2S.tall
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish you were tall.’
The future morphology crucial for licensing a desire interpretation still seems
to make its familiar temporal contribution. As the characterization in (65) noted,
sentences of this shape can only express desires about the future, relative to the time
of the desire. This point is illustrated by the infelicity of (69b) in the context in
(69a), which concerns Sally’s desires for her son’s appearance at the present time. As
the consultant’s comment suggests, however, the sentence in (69b) can only express
Sally’s desires for her son in the future.
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(69) a. Context: You are talking to a woman (Sally) who gave her infant son up
for adoption 20 years ago. It was a closed adoption and Sally has not
seen her son since the adoption, so she has no idea what her son looks
like. You and Sally are talking about what Sally wants for her son to be
like at the present time. You report to me Sally’s feelings.
b. #Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
k’ad
now
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł]
fut
nízin.
3S.att
(Intended: ‘Sally wants her son to be tall now.’)
Comment:“It’s about the future. She wants him to grow up tall.”
A meaning consistent with the context in (69a) could be expressed by a sentence
with laanaa ((70)) or by a variety of particleless nisin-sentence that we return to in
the next section.
(70) a. Context: Same as (69a).
b. Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
ka’d
now
nineez
3S.tall
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sally wants/wishes her son were tall now.’
Note that the futurity of the desired state of affairs is determined relative to the
time of the desire. To illustrate, consider sentences like (71b) in the context in (71a).
(71) a. Context: Yesterday, Kii wanted it to rain. Now, he has changed his mind
and no longer wants it to rain.
b. Yiskągo
yesterday
Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin
3S.att.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘Kii wanted it to rain yesterday.’
In (71b), nisin is followed by the past marker ńt’éé’. As the context in (71a) makes
clear, Kii’s experienced a desire in the past (yesterday). His desire at that past time
was for it to rain in the future (e.g., for it to rain today).
101
The temporality of desires expressed by sentences of the shape [-fut] nisin is
depicted in the simple diagram in (72). The desired state of affairs  can hold at
any point after the time of the desire, but cannot overlap with the time of the desire.
The time of the desire may be the speech time or some other contextually-determined
time, as in (71).
(72) :::           
desirez}|{             :::| {z }

3.4.2.2 Desires of the shape [-fut yę] nisin
I now turn to sentences of the shape in (73), where the embedded clause contains
both a future-marked verb and the morpheme yę, which we will see is sometimes
pronounced =ę and adjoined to the preceding verb.
(73) Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att
(i) ‘Sally wishes for her son to be tall (now).’
(ii) ‘Sally wishes for her son to be tall (in the future).’
The key morphological and semantic characteristics of nisin-sentences of this shape
are summarized below:
(74) Characterization of sentences of the shape [ -fut yę] nisin:
a. Expresses a desire for  that is held by the subject of nisin.
b.  is desired to hold either at the time of the desire, or after the time of
the desire.
c. Unambiguously express desires.
I refer to the sentences of the shape in (73) as ‘particleless’ nisin-sentences because
the embedded clause does not contain a particle like laanaa or sha’shin. We first saw
the morpheme yę when we discussed markers of past temporal meaning in Navajo
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(section 2.2.4). I followed Smith et al. (2007) in thinking of yę as being somehow
associated with past temporal meaning in Navajo. As we observed there, yę occurs on
relative clauses in which the event or state described by the embedding verb occurred
prior to the speech time (Platero 1974).
(75) hooghan
hogan
’ííshłaa=yę
3O.1S.build.perf=yee
‘the hogan that I built.’
When yę occurs in nisin-sentences, it no longer seems to function as a relative
clause marker. Nor does it obviously retain a semantics relating to past temporality.
As (74) states, desires expressed via nisin-sentences that embed yę as well as a future-
marked verb express either desires about the present (i.e., the desired state of affairs
overlaps with the time of the desire), or desires about the future (i.e the desired state
of affairs holds after the time of the desire).18
Since sentences of the shape [-fut yę] nisin can express desires about the future,
we can use them felicitously in contexts that were also compatible with sentences of
the shape [-fut] nisin. Both (76b) (with yę) and (76c) (without yę) were judged
to be acceptable in the following context:
(76) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. It has been very dry recently and rain is badly
needed. Kii’s desire is for it to rain. He looks at the sky and sees it is
clear, however, so he doesn’t think it will rain.
18There is crosslinguistic precedent for using past morphology in desires, even when the desire
is about the future or present. For example, Iatridou (2000) demonstrates that Modern Greek
expresses wishes — informally, desires that are not realized and not expected to be — using the
verb translated as want in concert with past morphology in the embedded clause. I set aside for
future discussion the formal analysis of past morphology in Navajo wishes and its possible relation
with Iatridou’s observations from Greek.
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b. Kii
Kii
[yiskągo
tomorrow
nahodoołtł=ę]
ArealS.rain.fut=yee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain tomorrow.’
c. Kii
Kii
[yiskągo
tomorrow
nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain tomorrow.’
However, sentences like (76b) can also be used to express desires about the present,
which we saw earlier was not possible for sentences like (76c). We saw the context in
(77a) in our earlier discussion of sentences like (76b); we saw that such nisin-sentences
are infelicitous in contexts like this one. However, the addition of yę to the embedded
clause results in a nisin-sentence ((77b)) that was accepted in the context as given.
(77) a. Context: You are talking to a woman (Sally) who gave her infant son up
for adoption 20 years ago. It was a closed adoption and Sally has not
seen her son since the adoption, so she has no idea what her son looks
like. You and Sally are talking about what Sally wants for her son to be
like at the present time. You report to me Sally’s feelings.
b. Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
k’ad
now
nineez
3S.tall
dooleeł
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att
‘Sally wishes for her son to be tall (now).’
Comment: “You’re talking about ‘now,’ so you have to use yę here.”
The temporality of desires expressed by sentences of the shape [-fut yę] nisin
is depicted in (78).  can hold at any point at, or after, the time of the desire.
(78) :::           
desirez}|{             :::| {z }

As before, the time of the desire may either be concurrent with the speech time or
may be some other contextually-provided point in time, e.g. yesterday as in (79):
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(79) a. Context: Yesterday, as Kii was walking to school, the sun was very hot.
He wished then that it was raining.
b. Yiskągo
yesterday
Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
yę]
yee
nízin
3S.att.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘Yesterday, Kii wished that it was raining.’
The only kind of desire meaning that is unavailable to sentences of the shape
[-fut yę] nisin is a desire for the past to have transpired differently. The following
context-sentence pair illustrates. The context in (80a) concerns the speaker’s desire
for her grandfather to have moved to California at some point in the past (prior to
his death). In this context, the sentence in (80b) was judged to be unacceptable:
consultants reported that this sentence made it sound like he was still alive such that
he could move to California at some point in the future.
(80) a. Context: Last year, my grandfather had a chance to move to California,
but he didn’t. It was his dream to move there. He died earlier this year.
I tell you,
b. #[Shicheii
1poss.grandfather
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
yę]
yee
nisin.
1S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘I wish my grandfather had moved to California.’)
‘I wish my grandfather would move to California.’
Comment: “Sounds like he’s still alive.”
In the next section, we will consider the kind of nisin-sentence that expresses the
desire invoked in (80a).
3.4.2.3 Desires of the shape [-fut ńt’éé’] nisin
Finally, I turn to sentences of the shape in (81), where the embedded clause
contains both a future-marked verb and the morpheme ńt’éé’.
105
(81) Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’
The key morphological and semantic characteristics of nisin-sentences of this shape
are summarized below:
(82) Characterization of sentences of the shape [ -fut ńt’éé’] nisin:
a. Expresses a desire for  that is held by the subject of nisin.
b. In order for  to hold, past (relative to time of the desire) would have
had to transpire differently.
c. Unambiguously express desires.
Like the sentences examined in the two previous sections, future morphology is
obligatory in sentences like (82) in order for a desire interpretation to arise. In (83), I
have replaced the future-marked verb with one marked instead for Imperfective Mode.
As is shown by consultants’ comments, the resulting sentence can only express Mary’s
thoughts, not her desires.
(83) Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
dinééh
3S.move.impf
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Cannot mean: ‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’)
Can only mean: ‘Mary thinks that Alice was moving to California.’
In addition to Future Mode, the past particle ńt’éé’ is key. The particle ńt’éé’ was
discussed earlier in section 2.2.4. In main clauses, this particle occurs postverbally
to indicate that the action described took place in the past, relative to the time of
speech. (84) illustrates:
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(84) Dó́ola
bull
shił
1O.with
naalgeed
about.3S.buckride.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee
‘I used to buckride a bull.’
(Smith et al. 2007: (8d))
Some of the ‘pastness’ of ńt’éé’ is retained in sentences of the shape in [ -fut
ńt’éé’] nisin. In the previous section, we saw that desires that contained the particle
yę could not be used in contexts like (85a), where the speaker’s desire is for her
grandfather to have moved to California at some point in the past (prior to his
death). By contrast, the sentence with ńt’éé’ in (85b) was judged to be acceptable in
the context.
(85) a. Context: Last year, my grandfather had a chance to move to California,
but he didn’t. It was his dream to move there. He died earlier this year.
I tell you,
b. [Shicheii
1poss.grandfather
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish my grandfather had moved to California.’
Comment: “You’re saying you want him to have moved over there.”
The context in (85a) was designed such that the desired event — the moving of
the, now deceased, grandfather to California — could only have occurred prior to the
present time of the desire. However, this is not the only situation in which sentences
of the shape [ -fut ńt’éé’] nisin are felicitous. In the following context, the speaker
desires Jane to take the train tomorrow. But even though the desired event would
transpire after the time of the desire, ńt’éé’ is still used ((86b)):
(86) a. Context: Our friend Jane left this morning on a train. Because of bad
weather, the train got stuck in snow. The weather is supposed to be good
tomorrow, though. You tell me,
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b. [Jane
Jane
yiskągo
tomorrow
’índa
then
kǫ’ na’ałbąąsii
train
biih’
3O.on
jidoolwoł
4S.move.rapidly.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish that Jane had taken the train tomorrow.’
I illustrate the temporality of desires expressed by sentences of the shape [-fut
ńt’éé’] nisin is depicted in (87). Two times are relevant: the time of the desire and
some time in the past, from which point on, things transpired in a particular way. 
came to hold during the interval shown.19
(87) :::    
past timez}|{         desirez}|{             :::| {z }

This description may be an oversimplification, but will be sufficient for the present.
Future work should consider questions including the following. First, in the contexts
we have seen so far, the desired state of affairs would only hold if events transpired
differently from the way they actually transpired. That is, the wishes shown above
are all counterfactual. Is this a necessary condition for the felicitous use of sentences
of the shape [-fut ńt’éé’] nisin? Second, and relatedly, can the analysis of these
19As we saw in other sections, the time of the desire can either correspond to the speech time or
correspond to some other contextually salient time. In the following context, the desire in question
held at some past time — when you, the speaker, were between 10 and 20 years old. The desire
you held during that span of time was for things to have transpired differently: to have moved to
Albuquerque when you were 10.
(i) a. Context: When you were 10, your parents had the chance to move with you to Albu-
querque, but they chose to stay in Tsaile. For 10 years after that, you wished that you
had moved to Albuquerque. Now, however, you are glad that your family stayed in
Tsaile. You’re telling me about the wishes you had when you were a teenager. You tell
me, I wished we had moved to Albuquerque. Now, I am glad we did not move.
b. [Bee’eldííldahinilgóó
ABQ.to
dii’nééł
1plS.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nisin
1S.att.impf
ńt’éé’.
ntee...
‘I wanted us to move to Albuquerque, (but now I’m glad we didn’t go).’
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desires be meaningfully related to previous work on subjunctive (or counterfactual)
conditional constructions like those in (88)?
(88) a. If Roman had come to the party tomorrow, it would have been a grand
success.
b. If Roman had left before noon, he would have arrived in time.
(von Fintel 2012: (34c), (36b))
The literature on these (and related) constructions includes Iatridou (2000), Ogihara
(2000), Ippolito (2002, 2013), and Arregui (2005, 2009).
3.4.3 A note on ‘wishing’ vs. ‘wanting’ in Navajo
The reader will most likely have noticed that consultants used different English
verbs in translations for nisin-sentences. Particleless nisin-sentences of the shape in
(89a) were consistently translated with English verb want while sentences of the shape
in (89b-e) were consistently translated into English with wish. While translations can-
not be taken as direct evidence about meaning (Matthewson 2004), they can provide
the researcher with partial clues: what, if anything, does variation in translation for
sentences in (89) suggest?
(89) a. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
b. [Níneez
2S.tall
laanaa]
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish you were tall.’
c. Alice
Alice
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo]
hope.not
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice hopes it won’t rain,’ ‘Alice wishes it wouldn’t rain.’
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d. Sandy
Sandy
[Hoozdodi
California.loc
nighan
2S.live
doo
fut
yę]
yee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wishes you lived in CA (now),’
‘Sandy wishes for you to live in CA.’
e. Mary
Mary
[Alice
Alice
Hoozdogóó
California.to
donééł
3S.move.fut
ńt’éé’]
ntee
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wishes Alice had moved to California.’
Previous authors have observed that English wish-sentences and want-sentences differ
in their intuitive meanings but it has proved complex to pin down these differences.
An early observation by Heim (1992) is that wish is felicitous where the situation
desired by the attitude holder is incompatible with the attitude holder’s thoughts.
By contrast, Heim initially explores the possibility that want can only be used felici-
tously if the desired state of affairs is compatible with the attitude holder’s thoughts.
However, as was originally observed by Heim (1992) and subsequently discussed by
other authors (Villalta 2008, Rubinstein 2012, Anand and Hacquard 2013), this is
not the correct characterization of sentences with want, which can, in fact, express
desires known to be unrealistic. Heim illustrates with the following example:
(90) I want this weekend to last forever. (But I know, of course, that it will be over
in a few hours.)
(Heim 1992: (42))
Navajo sentences in (89) also defy characterization in these terms. I found that
a sentence of the shape in (89a) could be used felicitously in the following context,
where it is established that the desired state of affairs is not a realistic possibility.
That is, Navajo sentences translated with want can be used felicitously to express
unrealistic hopes.
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(91) a. Context: Ron is required to teach two days a week every semester. His
wife knows this. Ron his asking his wife for her preferences about when
he should teach next semester. She says to him,20
b. [Doo
neg
ndíílnish
2S.work.fut
da]
neg
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I don’t want you to work.’
However, there was a tendency for consultants to comment about ‘unlikeliness’ for
desires expressed with laanaa ((92a)) or with a combination of future-marked verbs
with past marker yę ((92b)), both of which were also translated with wish. No such
comments were offered for sentences of the shape in (92c), which were translated with
want.
(92) a. Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
nineez
now
dooleeł
3S.tall
yę]
fut
nízin.
yee 3S.att.impf
‘Sally wishes her son would grow up to be tall.’
Comment: “Sally doesn’t think it’s going to happen. Maybe the parents
were short.”
b. Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
nineez
now
dooleeł
3S.tall
laanaa]
fut
nízin.
wishful 3S.att.impf
‘Sally wishes her son would grow up tall.’
Comment: “She’s just wishing here. She isn’t sure it’s going to happen.”
c. Sally
Sally
[biyáázh
3poss.child
nineez
now
dooleeł]
3S.tall
nízin.
fut 3S.att.impf
‘Sally wants her son to grow up tall.’
There is another truth-conditional property that can be more reliably correlated
with the choice of translation, however. We saw earlier that sentences of the shape in
20Context from Scheffler (2008).
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(89a)/(93)— i.e. sentences translated with want — cannot be used to express, e.g.,
Kii’s desire that it currently be raining. Kii’s desire in (93) can only be for it to rain
in the future.
(93) Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
By contrast, we have seen that the sentences in (89b) through (89e) were all felic-
itous in contexts in which the desired state of affairs overlaps with, or even precedes
(in the case of (89e)), the time of the desire.
It is not immediately clear to me what, if anything, we learn from the correlation
between the temporal orientation of the desire and the manner of translation into
English. Sentences with the English verb want can be used to express desires about
the present (i.e. the desired state of affairs overlaps with the time of the desire), as
in (94):
(94) a. Context: My younger brother sometimes skips school. He said he was
going to school several hours ago, but I don’t know if he really went or
not. I say:
b. I want my younger brother to be at school right now.
I leave for future exploration the precise contrasts between the desires exemplified
above.
3.5 Ambiguous nisin-sentences
This section examines in greater detail the truth conditions of nisin-sentences like
(95). This sentence contains a future-marked verb in the embedded clause and no
additional morphology (i.e. particles, additional temporal markers).
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(95) Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
At various points in previous discussion, we have seen that sentences like (95) are
felicitous both in contexts targeting thoughts about the future ((96)) and in contexts
targeting desires about the future ((97)):
(96) a. Context: Kii looks outside and sees dark clouds in the distance. The air
smells like rain is on the way.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
(97) a. Context: Kii is a farmer. It has been very dry recently and rain is badly
needed. Kii’s desire is for it to rain.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain.’
This section defends the claim that nisin-sentences exhibit ambiguity. That is, I
claim that a phonological string of the shape in (95) can map onto two distinct sets
of truth conditions: one consistent with an attitude of thinking and one consistent
with an attitude of desire.
An alternative hypothesis would be one of vagueness. Under this alternative hy-
pothesis, a string like (95) has a constant set of truth conditions that are defined to
be weak enough to simultaneously encompass both attitudes of thinking and atti-
tudes of desire. Under this hypothesis, we might explain away the multiple English
translations for such Navajo sentences as the result of a mismatch between the kinds
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of meanings expressible by attitude reports in each language: since English does not
have such underspecified attitude reports, consultants would be forced to pick what-
ever attitude (thinking or desiring) was most salient in the discourse to form their
English translation.
In this section, I apply two classic tests from Zwicky and Sadock (1975) developed
to diagnose ambiguity in English. After introducing the tests using English data, I
demonstrate that Navajo sentences like (95) pattern like ambiguous expressions.
3.5.1 Test of Contradiction
The first test due to Zwicky and Sadock (1975) is the Test of Contradiction. I
illustrate with an example from Kennedy (2011), who demonstrates that the English
utterance Sterling’s cousin was funny passes the Test of Contradiction because it can
be both asserted and denied for a particular state of affairs, as in (98):
(98) Sterling’s cousin used to make people laugh with everything she did, though
she was never in any way strange or unusual. Sterling’s cousin was funny
without being funny.
(adapt. Kennedy 2011: (4))
The italicized sentence above does not express a contradiction because Sterling’s
cousin was funny can express either that Sterling’s cousin is amusing and causes
laughter, or that she is strange and unusual. Sterling’s cousin can be funny in one
sense without also being funny in the other sense.
Parallel results for certain nisin-sentences are seen in context-sentence pairs like
(99). The context in (99a) establishes that the attitude holder (Kii) believes that it
will rain but does not want it to rain. In this context, the conjoined sentences in
(99b) are felicitous:
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(99) a. Context: Kii is supposed to help his father put up a fence this afternoon.
If it rains, Kii will not have to work. So, Kii wants it to rain. However,
Kii looks outside and sees that the sky is clear so he believes it is not
going to rain.
b. [Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin]
3S.att.impf
’ákondi
but
[[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da]
neg
nízin].
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain but he thinks it won’t.’
The structure of (99b) might initially suggest a contradiction since it has the shape
[ nízin but : nízin]. However, (99b) was volunteered by consultants and judged
felicitous and noncontradictory in contexts like (99): the first conjunct expresses
Kii’s desire while the second conjunct expresses Kii’s (conflicting) thought.
Strings like Kii nahodoołtł nízin are completely string ambiguous. When the con-
text in (99a) was presented to the first consultant, she volunteered the sentence in
(99b). Another consultant heard the sentence in (99b) but not the context in (99a).
She gave the following comment, which indicates that the order of attitudes expressed
is reversible.
(100) “That’s funny - I thought you were saying ‘Kii thinks it’s going to rain but
he doesn’t want it to.’”
When given contexts like(99a), consultants also offered sentences like (101), in
which embedded clauses contain morphology that forces a particular interpretation
for the nisin-sentence, such as sha’shin in expressions of thinking, and yę or laanaa
in expressions of desire.
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(101) a. [Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa
wishful
nízin]]
3S.att.impf
’ákondi
but
[[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da
neg
sha’shin]
probably
nízin].
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it would rain but thinks it probably won’t happen.’
b. [Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
yę
yee
nízin]]
3S.att.impf
’ákondi
but
[[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da
neg
sha’shin]
probably
nízin].
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it would rain but thinks it probably won’t happen.’
3.5.2 Test for Identity of Sense
A second test given by Zwicky and Sadock (1975) is the Test for Identity of
Sense. Among the structures that they consider as part of this test are conjunction
structures as in (102).
(102) Morton and Oliver tossed down their lunches.
(Zwicky and Sadock 1975: (61))
Building on early observations by Chomsky (1957), Zwicky and Sadock observe that
in order for conjunction to be licensed in a sentence like (102), Morton and Oliver
must have participated in the same sort of action. As background, Zwicky and Sadock
observe that (at least in their English), a phonological string like (103) is associated
with the two distinct meanings shown below:
(103) Oliver tossed down his lunch.
(i) that Oliver ate very quickly (i.e. Oliver bolted down his lunch)
(ii) that he threw his lunch to the ground.
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Conjunction is only felicitous in (102) if Morton and Oliver both ate rapidly or
both threw their food to the ground. A mixed interpretation in which Morton ate
quickly but Oliver threw his food down is not available for (102).
The results of targeted elicitation demonstrate that the same restriction is found
for certain Navajo nisin-sentences. As we have seen, a sentence like (104) can, on
its own, be felicitous either in a context which concerns thoughts or a context which
concerns desires.
(104) Kii
Kii
[Obama
Obama
hodínóołnééł]
3S.win.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(i). ‘Kii thinks Obama will win.’
(ii) ‘Kii wants Obama to win.’
In the following context, one man (Ron) thinks Obama will win but does not want
him to. The other man (Kii) wants Obama to win but does not think he will. In
this context, the mental attitude attributed to Ron dóó Kii cannot be described with
a single nisin-sentence.
(105) a. Context: It is 2012 before the presidential election. Given the evidence
he’s seen, Ron thinks that Obama will win. However, Ron doesn’t want
Obama to win. Ron’s friend Kii really wants Obama to win, but he
firmly believes that Obama will not win.
b. #Ron
Ron
dóó
and
Kii
Kii
[Obama
Obama
hodínóołnééł]
3S.win.fut
nízin.
3S.att
(Intended: ‘Ron and Kii have some feeling about Obama winning’)
Comment: “They want for him to win. One doesn’t think and the other
one want. I don’t think you can have ‘think’ and ‘want’ in the same
sentence. One’s going to win out over the other.”
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Consultant comments indicated that (105b) is only felicitous if Ron and Kii ex-
perience the same sort of mental attitude toward Obama winning: either they both
believe he will win, or they both want him to win. As in the English sentence
in (102), a mixed interpretation is not possible. We can compare the infelicitous
context-sentence pair in (105) with the felicitous pair in (106). Here, both of the
conjoined subjects share the same sort of feeling towards Obama winning. The target
sentence in (106b) is felicitous in such a context.
(106) a. Context: It is 2012 before the presidential election. Given the evidence
they have seen, Ron and Kii both think that Obama will win.
b. Ron
Ron
dóó
and
Kii
Kii
[Obama
Obama
hodínóołnééł]
3S.win.fut
nízin.
3S.att
‘Ron and Kii think Obama’s going to win.’
A second felicitous context-sentence pair can be constructed where both of the sub-
jects share a desire.
3.5.3 Constraints on ambiguity
While nisin-sentences of the shape [ FUT nisin] are ambiguous, their range of
ambiguity is not unbounded: such sentences cannot report attitudes of ‘wanting’
it to be the case that the proposition is false. That is, the sentence in (107b) is
infelicitous in the context shown, where the attitude holder’s desire is for it not to
rain. This type of attitude can be conveyed if the particle lágo is included in the
embedded clause ((107c)) or if negation is overtly indicated ((107d)).
(107) a. Context: Kii has a baseball game today. He really wants to play. If it
rains, the game will be canceled. You tell me how Kii feels, saying:
b. #Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Kii wants it not to rain.’)
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c. Kii
Kii
[nahółt’
ArealS.rain.opt
lágo]
hope.not
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii hopes it does not rain.’
d. Kii
Kii
[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da]
neg
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Kii wants it not to rain.’)
An adequate analysis of nisin-sentences will explain why particleless nisin-sentences
containing future-marked embedded verbs can express either thinking or desire but
not other conceivable mental attitudes.
3.6 Chapter summary
Thus far, we have seen that attitude reports containing nisin can express a variety
of attitudes of thinking and desire. We have seen, furthermore, that the attitude
expressed by nisin-sentences is correlated with the morphosyntactic shape of the em-
bedded clause. The following table summarizes the key findings to this point. When
the embedded clause is marked with ‘any,’ this indicates that the embedded verb can
be in Imperfective, Perfective, or Future Inflectional Form. If an embedded verb can
also be marked for Optative Inflectional Form, I indicate that separately.
Table 3.4. Summary of morphological forms and meanings of nisin-sentences
Thinking
a. [ IMPF;PERF ] nisin Thinking
b. [ any sha’shin] nisin Thought based on indirect evidence
Desire
c. [ any;OPT laanaa] nisin Desire
d. [ OPT lágo] nisin Negative desire about present or future
e. [ FUT yę] nisin Desire about present or future
f. [ FUT ńt’éé’] nisin Desire about past
Ambiguous g. [ FUT ] nisin Thought or desire about future
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In the next chapter, I focus on the following aspect of nisin-sentences: despite
seeming to contain the same verb, some nisin-sentences express beliefs while others
express desires. I present new data from Navajo to demonstrate that this apparent
difference in meaning should be attributed to material in the embedded clause rather
than to nisin itself. I further argue that this material is also found in main clauses. I
consider the semantic relationship between this material as it occurs in main clauses
and in nisin-sentences.
3.7 Appendix: Verbs related to the nisin of interest
The discussion above focused on the morphology, syntax, and semantics of sen-
tences in which the verb nisin embeds a clause. However, these data may only be a
subset of a broader ‘family’ of verbs related to nisin. Members of this family bear cer-
tain morphological or semantic components in common with clause-embedding nisin
but differ in other respects, to be clarified below.
I include the following data in the interest of presenting fuller documentation of
nisin. These data will not be incorporated into the discussion in Chapter 4.
3.7.1 ’Ákwíinisin: ‘Feeling’ that way
The first member of the ‘nisin-family’ I would like to highlight is shown in (108).
The translations shown are taken from Young and Morgan’s (1987: 60) entry for the
verb.
(108) ’ákwíinisin.
thus.1S.att.impf
‘I look at it that way, I think about it in that way.’
The verb in (108) differs minimally from our familiar clause-embedding nisin in the
presence of the adverbial prefix ’ákwii ‘thus.’
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The verb in (108) seems to be permitted both to describe attitudes of belief
and attitudes of desire. Consultants were able to use the verb in (108) in context-
conversation pairs like (109) and (110). The context-conversation pair in (109) was
designed to determine whether ’ákwíinisin can be used in a context where the speaker
holds the same belief as one previously mentioned. The felicity of (109c) in the context
shown demonstrates that ’ákwíinisin can express a meaning of this kind.
(109) a. Context: Kii and Sandy are having a conversation about the weather.
Kii says he thinks it will probably rain. Sandy says she thinks so, too.
b. Kii: Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
sha’shin
probably
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it will probably rain.’
c. Sandy: ’Aoo’,
yes
shí
1pro
do’
also
’ákwíinisin.
thus.1S.att.impf
‘Yes, I think so, too.’
The context-conversation pair in (110), by contrast, was designed to determine
whether ’ákwíinisin can be used in a context where the speaker holds the same desire
as one previously mentioned. The felicity of (110c) in the context shown demonstrates
that ’ákwíinisin can also express a meaning of this kind.
(110) a. Context: Kii and Sandy are having another conversation about the
weather. Kii says he wishes it would rain. Sandy says she wants it
to, too.
b. Kii: Nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa
wishful
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I wish it would rain.’
c. Sandy: ’Aoo’
yes
shí
1pro
do’
also
’ákwíinisin.
thus.1S.att.impf
‘Yes, I also want that.’
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3.7.2 Yinízin: Wanting objects
Above, I observed that a property of nisin as a clause-embedding verb is that it
lacks object marking corresponding to the embedded clause:
(111) *Alice
Alice
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice thinks it will rain,’ ‘Alice wants it to rain.’
But it is not the case that we never find the object prefix yi in use with nisin. The
following example shows that sentences that express desire for an entity contain the
verb yinízin.
(112) Mary
Mary
[bilasáana
apple
ła’]
indef.det
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
‘Mary wants an apple.’
Deletion of the object prefix from the verb in (112) results in ungrammaticality.21
(113) *Mary
Mary
[bilasáana
apple
ła’]
indef.det
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Mary wants an apple.’)
21I have been careful to use third-person subject forms of nisin here. The morphology of third-
person object marking in Navajo creates some complication here. The third-person object marker is
only overtly realized (as yi) when the subject is also first-person. As a result, the forms of nisin with
first- and second-person subjects look the same regardless of whether they take an embedded clause
((ia)) or a nominal expression ((ib)) as the object of the attitude. (i) illustrates for the first-person
subject form of nisin.
(i) a. [Bilasáana
apple
ła’]
indef.det
nisin.
3O.1S.att.impf
‘I want an apple.’
b. [Nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I think it will rain,’ ‘I want it to rain.’
I will, however, assume that the verb nisin in (ia) — but not (ib) — actually bears a covert object
marker. I make this claim given the overt presence of the object marker in sentences like (112).
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The use of a nominal object also limits the kinds of attitudes that can be expressed
(Willie 1996). Sentences that contain the verb yinízin cannot express belief, but only
desire. This point is demonstrated by the following context-sentence pair and the
comments shown. One consultant suggested the sentence in (114c) as a grammatical
alternative; the verb yinízin was replaced with the verb yoodl ‘s/he believes it.’
(114) a. Context: There’s a story going around that Ted is from Canada. A lot
of people are convinced this story is true, including Alice. I tell you,
b. #Alice
Alice
hane’
story
yinízin.
3O.3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Alice believes the story.’
Comment: “It sounds like you’re saying she wants the story. Maybe like
she wants to hear it.”
c. Alice
Alice
hane’
story
yoodl.
3O.3S.believe.impf
‘Alice believes the story.’
3.7.3 ‘Idiomatic’ verb words formed with nisin
In section 2.2.1, I discussed how certain particles or postpositional phrases seem
to be particularly tightly associated with certain verbs. The verb nisin occurs with
a number of particles, nouns, and postpositional phrases to express a wide array of
meanings. I give a small sample of these meanings below; many more can be found
in Young and Morgan (1987: d655).
(115) a. Baa
3O.about
’įįh
value
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I am fond of it’
b. Dloh
laughter
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I feel like laughing.’
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c. Dichin
hunger
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I feel hungry’
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CHAPTER 4
BUILDING ATTITUDES IN NAVAJO
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I showed that nisin-sentences can be used to convey a
number of distinct attitudes, which I characterized as attitudes of ‘thinking,’ ‘want-
ing,’ and ‘wishing’. The choice between these distinct attitudes is in part — and
sometimes entirely — determined by the makeup of the embedded clause. In this
chapter, I will argue that we should take seriously what the surface tells us: a single
embedding verb, nisin, occurs in different attitude reports. This verb does not deter-
mine the attitude: rather, the attitude is determined by the embedded clause. The
role of nisin is limited to introducing the holder of the attitude and the time at which
it is held.
Before making this argument, however, I first try to reduce nisin-sentences to a
more familiar state of affairs in which, despite appearances, nisin still determines what
attitude is reported. Section 4.2 considers two accounts of this shape. I demonstrate
that such an account of nisin-sentences not only stands at odds with independent
observations about Navajo and Athabaskan grammar but also fails to capture the
full range of interpretations attested for nisin-sentences.
In the second part of the chapter, I seek to identify the components of meaning
that are contributed by clauses embedded by nisin. To do so, I explore the seman-
tics of these clauses’ unembedded counterparts. I argue that the meanings of these
clauses when they stand alone can be systematically related to the meanings I at-
tribute to nisin-sentences. Thus we see that unlike English, which has specialized
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constructions to report attitudes of, e.g., ‘wanting’ vs. ‘thinking,’ Navajo uses a se-
mantically bleached verb (nisin) whose function is only to introduce the individual
and time relative to which the embedded clause is evaluated.
My investigation of the expression of attitudes in Navajo is guided by the questions
and answers in addressed the research program begun by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and
subsequently developed by Moulton (2009, 2015). Kratzer and Moulton explore a
rich range of evidence from English and German that demonstrate that even there,
more familiar verb-driven analyses of attitude reports may not be correct. On the
basis of the evidence from English and German, Kratzer develops an alternative
picture of attitude reports in which key aspects of the semantics of attitude reports
are contributed by material contained in clauses embedded by attitude verbs. The
attitude verb works in concert with the embedded material to determine the attitude
reported.
In the third part of this chapter, I first compare the extremely light meaning
which I associate with nisin to so-called ‘parenthetical’ uses of attitude verbs in En-
glish discussed by Urmson (1952), Rooryck (2001), Simons (2007), Lewis (2013), and
other authors. In these constructions, embedded clauses are claimed to communicate
the ‘main point’ of the utterance while the attitude verb serves a largely evidential
function. I then turn to Kratzer and Moulton’s proposals. I show that the Navajo
facts fit naturally into the empirical landscape which they have explored. Navajo acts
as limiting case within this landscape, in which the role of the attitude verb is limited
to introducing the attitude holder. In this chapter, I do not provide a compositional
treatment for nisin-sentences; however, the compositional proposals which are worked
out by Kratzer and Moulton provide a model for the development of such a treatment.
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4.2 Hypothesis: nisin determines the attitude
In both Navajo and in English, attitude reports seem to involve a verb (bolded)
which embeds a clause (bracketed) and which takes as subject the attitude holder
(italicized):
(1) a. Sandy wants/wishes [for it to rain].
b. Sandy
Sandy
[nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
(laanaa)]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Sandy wants/wishes for it to rain.’
As we saw in Chapter 3, however, English and Navajo diverge in other ways. In
particular, whereas Navajo uses (what appears to be) the same verb, nisin, in a
variety of attitude reports, English attitude reports contain distinct attitude verbs.
The kind of attitude reported in English is correlated with the choice of attitude verb.
Given this correlation between the choice of verb and the attitude reported, a
reasonable hypothesis for English is to assign to the attitude verb denotations which
determine what kind of attitude is being reported. This move has been pursued for a
wide variety of verbs. A small sample of the semantic literature which assumes entries
of this shape includes Cresswell and von Stechow (1982), Heim (1992), Moltmann
(1997), Schlenker (1999), von Stechow (2002), van Geenhoven and McNally (2005),
Hacquard (2006), Villalta (2008), Condoravdi and Lauer (2010), Stephenson (2010),
Rubinstein (2012), Anand and Hacquard (2013), Charlow and Sharvit (2014), Grano
(2015), and Pearson (to appear).
Despite apparent differences between Navajo and English attitude reports, we
might initially pursue a strongly Comparative Hypothesis of the sort discussed in
Chapter 1. Starting from an assumption of crosslinguistic similarity, we could hy-
pothesize that just as has been claimed for English, it is the embedding verb in Navajo
which determines what attitude is reported. I will consider the two hypotheses of this
shape shown below. For each, I consider what an account consistent with the hypoth-
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esis might look like. I then consider challenges to the plausibility of each account in
light of independent facts from Navajo and other Athabaskan languages.
(2) Homophony Hypothesis: The Navajo lexicon contains multiple attitude
verbs nisin, each with a distinct semantics. The verb determines what attitude
is reported.
(3) Underspecification Hypothesis: The Navajo lexicon contains a single at-
titude verb nisin. Context fixes the interpretation of nisin to determine the
attitude reported.
Before we explore these hypotheses, however, a brief note on terminology is in
order. When I consider these two hypotheses, I will ask whether we can define nisin
such that it establishes that the attitude reported is one of desire vs. one of ‘thinking.’
As in Chapter 3, I use the term ‘attitude of thinking’ to describe the attitude reported
by nisin-sentences like (4b).
(4) a. Context: Kii is inside in a windowless room so he does not know what
the weather is like. He hears a pattering sound on the roof.
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
(sha’shin)]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is (probably) raining.’
In the context of the above hypotheses, I will ask whether we can treat the instance
of nisin in (4b) as functioning like English think under accounts where the verb de-
termines the attitude reported.
However, it is crucial to note that invoking English think in this way focuses
on just one of the range of meanings expressible by sentences which contain think.
English sentences with think do not always seem to deal with the beliefs and doxastic
128
states which I invoke above.1 For example, (5) can be used to report the speaker’s
predilection to have the soup; it does not necessarily report the speaker’s belief that
she will have the soup.2
(5) I think I’ll have the soup.
Crucially, however, I will set aside discussion of think in sentences like (5) until section
4.4.1.3 Until then, whenever I ask whether nisin contributes a meaning similar to
English think, I only have in mind the use of think where it occurs in sentences which
concern beliefs and what is true.
4.2.1 The Homophony Hypothesis
I first consider the following hypothesis for nisin-sentences:
(6) Homophony Hypothesis: The Navajo lexicon contains multiple attitude
verbs nisin, each with a distinct semantics. The verb determines what attitude
is reported.
I will specifically consider the adoption of two verbs, ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-nisin.
Each verb can be defined such that it lexically determines what attitude is reported by
the sentence as a whole: ‘want’-nisin establishes the attitude reported as one relating
to desire, while ‘think’-nisin establishes the attitude reported as one relating to beliefs
and thoughts about what is true. Adopting both of these verbs would allow us to
1In the semantic and philosophical literature, the English attitude verb believe (and its crosslin-
guistic counterparts) is treated as the prototypical example of a doxastic attitude verb. However,
there are also authors who explicitly group think in the set of doxastic attitude verbs together with
believe. A sampling of these authors includes Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007), Anand and Hacquard
(2009, 2013), Rawlins (2014); and Fischer, Engelhardt, and Herbelot (2015).
2I thank Angelika Kratzer and Peggy Speas for drawing my attention to these cases.
3Ultimately, we will see that when this alternative use of think is taken into consideration, nisin
begins to look very much like think.
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explain how particleless nisin-sentences such as those in (7) can report the attested
range of attitudes.
(7) a. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(i) ‘Kii thinks it will rain.’ ‘think’-nisin
(ii) ‘Kii wants it to rain.’ ‘want’-nisin
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin]
ArealS.rain.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is raining.’ ‘think’-nisin
The adoption of multiple verbs ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-nisin brings two potential
positive outcomes. First, an account of this shape would capture the restricted range
of meanings which are attested for nisin-sentences. As we saw in Chapter 3, there are
many attitudes which appear not to be reported by nisin-sentences, e.g. ‘knowing,’
‘ordering,’ etc. An analysis of Navajo that assumes two verbs models this restricted
range of meaning via brute force. The Navajo lexicon contains ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-
nisin; it does not contain, e.g., ‘order’-nisin or ‘know’-nisin.
In addition, positing two verbs would give us a way to account for another of the
patterns observed in Chapter 3: particleless nisin-sentences only report desires when
the embedded verb is marked for Future Mode, whereas a particleless nisin-sentence
can be used in contexts which concern the thoughts of the attitude holder regardless
of the temporal morphology borne by the embedded verb (e.g. Future Mode in (8a)
or Perfective Mode in (8b)).
(8) a. Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(i)‘Kii wants it to rain.’
(ii)‘Kii thinks it will rain.’
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b. Kii
Kii
[nahóółt]
ArealS.rain.perf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it rained.’
In an account consistent with the homophony hypothesis, we could define the lex-
ical entry of ‘think’-nisin such that it is not selective: it is licit with embedded clauses
regardless of the temporal morphology they contain. By contrast, we could define
‘want’-nisin such that it obligatorily embeds clauses that contain future temporal mor-
phology. If we define the entry of ‘want’-nisin in this way, we correctly predict that
desire interpretations will only arise for particleless nisin-sentences with the mor-
phosyntactic shape in (8a). If the embedded clause contained any other temporal
morphology, ‘want’-nisin would not be licensed. There is crosslinguistic precedent
for certain embedding expressions to require their embedded clauses to have a fu-
ture temporal orientation (Enç 1996, Abusch 2004, Stowell 2006, Kratzer 2011, Laca
2012a,b, Matthewson 2014, Wurmbrand 2014).
So far, I have only entertained two homophonous verbs, ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-
nisin. In Chapter 3, we saw that the presence of additional particles (sha’shin, laanaa,
lágo) bears on the meaning of the attitude report. For instance, we saw that the
presence of sha’shin seems to commit the attitude of ‘thinking’ to be held in light of
indirect evidence available in the context. The addition of lágo indicates that the
desire expressed is for a particular proposition not to hold. The addition of laanaa
allows the desired state of affairs to be one which holds at times other than in the
future.
Under the homophony hypothesis, we might hypothesize that the Navajo lexicon
contains two ‘basic’ attitude verbs, ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-nisin, which can be modified
in particular ways by embedded particles. Precedent for modification of embedding
expressions by adverbial material comes from recent work by Anand and Brasoveanu
(2010) and Huitink (2012) on sentences like (9):
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(9) John must obligatorily be home by 12.
(Anand and Brasoveanu 2010: (17a))
Anand and Brasoveanu (2010) and Huitink (2012) each argue that adverbial expres-
sions like English obligatorily work to restrict the range of modal interpretations
available to must. Under these accounts, obligatorily as it occurs in (9) is not a modal
quantifier of the familiar sort: rather, it modifies modal quantifiers.4
In the terminology first discussed in Chapter 1, the homophony hypothesis is
a strongly ‘comparative’ hypothesis. In an account consistent with this hypothesis,
Navajo nisin-sentences receive a compositional account that runs fully parallel to those
posited for English and related languages by Cresswell and von Stechow (1982), Heim
(1992), and many other authors discussed in section 4.2. For a researcher convinced of
the adequacy of modal entries for attitude verbs in other languages, the homophony
hypothesis might initially seem appealing as it implies crosslinguistic uniformity in
the compositional semantics of attitude reports.
However, there is a crucial difference between English attitude reports and Navajo
nisin-sentences: whereas English has multiple attitude verbs with distinct morphophono-
4It remains to be seen whether the account given by Anand and Brasoveanu (2010) and Huitink
(2012) can actually be imported into an account of nisin-sentences. Anand and Brasoveanu (2010)
(following Zeijlstra (2007) and Huitink (2012) in observing that in English, an adverbial expression
must occur in the same clause as the modal that it modifies ((i)). As Anand and Brasoveanu observe,
the required clausemate status is expected given the status of obligatory as a modal modifier in their
account.
(i) a. [ John must obligatorily be home by 12 ].
b. #[ John must be home [by the time the clock obligatorily strikes 12 ]].
(Anand and Brasoveanu 2010: (17))
In comparison with the obligatory clausemate status in English, particles like sha’shin and laanaa
are not clausemates with nisin. As Willie (1996) reports and my own work has confirmed, sha’shin
and laanaa are strictly clause-final particles. As such, nisin-sentences with particles must have the
bracketing in (iia), not (iib):
(ii) a. [ [ ... sha’shin / laanaa ] nisin ]
b. *[ [ ... ] sha’shin / laanaa nisin ]
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logical forms, the homophony hypothesis for nisin involves — of course — homophony.
The following subsections argue that assumption of such homophony is deeply implau-
sible and unnapealing given grammatical observations about Navajo and Athabaskan
languages more generally.
4.2.1.1 The implausibility of verbal homophony in Navajo
I first examine challenges that the homophony hypothesis faces from Navajo gram-
mar. As we first saw in Chapter 2, the morphophonological shape of verbs changes
depending on the mode (temporal or aspectual category). A common locus for cross-
mode morphophonological variation within the verb is the verb stem, the rightmost
syllable in a verb word. In the following verb words based on the verb theme glossed
as ‘swim,’ the verb stem (bolded) surfaces as -kh and -k’ depending on whether
the verb occurs in Imperfective Mode or Perfective Mode (Young and Morgan 1987:
d288).
(10) a. ch’í’níshkh Imperfective Mode
out.horizontally.1S.swim.impf
‘I am swimming out horizontally’
b. ch’í’níłk’ Perfective Mode
out.horizontally.1S.swim.perf
‘I swam out horizontally’
All verbs that occur in multiple modes exhibit some degree of morphophonolog-
ical differences in their verb stem depending on the mode. Very rarely, accidental
homophony arises when we compare two verbs in a particular mode. One case of
accidental homophony that I found in a survey of the Young and Morgan (1987)
dictionary is shown in (11) for two verbs in Imperfective Mode.
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(11) Imperfective Mode
a. yishnééh ‘It is happening to me’
b. yishnééh ‘I am migrating’
Although the two verbs in (11) are homophonous in this one particular mode,
they diverge in form when they occur in Perfective Mode ((12)).5
(12) Perfective Mode
a. yisdzaa ‘It happened to me’
b. yíná ‘I migrated’
While accidental homophony may (very rarely) arise in Navajo, we do not find
homophony persisting across modes. As such, if we posit two verbs ‘think’-nisin and
‘want’-nisin, we would have to say that these verbs — and only these verbs — exhibit
homophony which persists regardless of the mode we look at. I illustrate below with
Imperfective Mode and Perfective Mode. For all entries, the verb could be used in
nisin-sentences which report any of the attitudes discussed previously.
These would be the only verb themes in the language to exhibit perfect cross-mode
homophony. We should only accept such an exceptional claim if we find that we have
no choice but to adopt the homophony hypothesis. However, we will see in section
5Such cases are extremely rare. I surveyed both Young and Morgan (1980) and Young and Morgan
(1987) and found only three pairs of verbs which, like yishnééh and yishnééh exhibit homophony when
we look at one particular form for each verb. (i) gives one of these examples. Two other such pairs
are: yíníshdon ‘I shoot at it (repeated shots)’ and yíníshdon ‘I hold it tight (as a rope)’ and (ii)
yiszéé’ ‘I went like a streak’ and yiszéé’ ‘it is quiet, calm, still.’ Like the others, these pairs of verbs
diverge when we look at them in other modes. It remains the case that even in these rare examples,
homophony does not persist across modes.
(i) Homophony between two verbs in Perfective Mode only:
Imperfective Mode Perfective Mode
háníshááh ‘I am going after it’ (YM 1987: d414) haséyá ‘I went after it’ (YM 1980: 123)
haashááh ‘I am climbing up’ (YM 1987: d431) haséyá ‘I climbed up’ (YM 1980: 123)
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Table 4.1. Imperfective Mode
Person Subject + Theme Verb Translations
1S sh + ?zin nisin ‘I think, want, wish, hope’
2S ni + ?zin nínízin ‘you think, want, wish, hope’
3S ? + ?zin nízin ‘he/she thinks, wants, wishes, hopes’
1pl iid + ?zin niidzin ‘we think, want, wish, hope’
4S ji + ?zin jinízin ‘it is thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
Table 4.2. Perfective Mode
Person Subject + Theme Verb Translations
1S sh + ?zin niiz’ ‘I thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
2S ni + ?zin niniz’ ‘you thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
3S ? + ?zin niiz’ ‘he/she thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
1pl iid + ?zin niidz’ ‘we thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
4S ji + ?zin jiniiz’ ‘it was thought, wanted, wished, hoped’
4.2.3 that not only is this not the only choice available to us, but there is evidence
that this hypothesis is not a viable option.
4.2.1.2 The implausibility of verbal homophony across Athabaskan lan-
guages
A second problem for the homophony hypothesis is posed by the existence of coun-
terparts to Navajo nisin-sentences in many Athabaskan languages, including Slavey
(Rice 1989), Tłįchǫ (Saxon 2014), Witsuwit’en (Hargus 2007), Ahtna (Kari 1990), and
Koyukon (Jetté and Jones 2000). In each language, the same basic pattern obtains:
a morphologically consistent verb is found in a range of attitude reports identical to
what we found in Navajo.
(13) a. [Hįdowedzįnę
tomorrow
k’e
on
deshįta
bush
duhshá]
1S.go.opt
yerehwę.
1S.att
‘I’m thinking of going to the bush tomorrow.’
(Rice 1989: 1295)
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b. [Deshįta
bush
duhshá]
1S.go.opt
yerehwę.
1S.att
‘I want to go to the bush.’
(Rice 1989: 1280)
Rice reports that verbs with the theme ?wę are variably translated into English with
want, think, wish, and hope. Choice of the translation is determined in large part by
morphology in the embedded clause, especially the choice of verbal morphology (Rice
1989: 1293).
An advocate for the homophony hypothesis might claim that Athabaskan lan-
guages have in common a set of homophonous verbs. For example, where Navajo
has ‘think’-nisin and ‘want’-nisin, Slavey might have ‘think’-yerehwę and ‘want’-yerehwę.
However, consideration of parsimony might rule against such an account: intuitively,
it seems more plausible that two languages would preserve a single strategy for the
construction of attitudes, in which a single verb with a constant interpretation hap-
pens to occur in different attitude reports. Slavey is spoken in the Northwest Ter-
ritories in Canada, far from where Navajo is spoken in the southwest of the United
States. While Slavey and Navajo have in common the complex verbal morphology
that characterizes the Athabaskan language family as a whole (Rice 2000), it would
be surprising if both Slavey and Navajo — and other Athabaskan languages — had re-
tained homophony in an abstract sense while having not retained the same — or even
similar — phonological forms for the homophonous expressions (nisin vs. yerehwę).
4.2.1.3 Summary
This subsection first considered the shape of an account for nisin-sentences con-
sistent with the homophony hypothesis, under which the Navajo lexico contains mul-
tiple attitude verbs pronounced nisin which determine the attitude reported by the
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sentence as a whole. I then considered arguments from Navajo and Athabaskan
grammars which suggest that this hypothesis is implausible.
4.2.2 The Underspecification Hypothesis
In this section, I explore the following alternative hypothesis for nisin-sentences:
(14) Underspecification Hypothesis: The Navajo lexicon contains a single at-
titude verb nisin which determines the attitude reported by the sentence as a
whole. The interpretation of nisin is fixed in the course of the derivation.
The underspecification hypothesis has in common with the homophony hypoth-
esis the following characteristic: the verb nisin still determines the attitude. This
hypothesis differs, however, from the homophony hypothesis in that the Navajo lexi-
con would only contain a single verb nisin. During the course of the derivation — in
ways to be clarified below — it is determined what kind of attitude is expressed by
nisin. As such, an account consistent with the underspecification hypothesis would
not bring with it the problematic assumption of homophony.
In the discussion below, I first consider in more detail how a single lexical entry
for nisin could give rise to the variety of attitudes reported by nisin-sentences. I then
consider potential considerations from Navajo grammar which could caution against
the adoption of an account consistent with the underspecification hypothesis.
4.2.2.1 An account consistent with the Underspecification Hypothesis
The notion of ‘underspecification’ which I have in mind for nisin under the hypoth-
esis in (14) would be inspired by the theory of modal auxiliaries developed by Kratzer
(1981, 1991, 2012). Kratzer considers sentences like (15) which have long been ob-
served to permit multiple readings, including the epistemic (evidence-oriented) and
deontic (rule-oriented) ones given below.
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(15) Alice must be in her room.
a. Epistemic reading: In all possible worlds consistent with my (the speaker’s)
evidence about how things really are, Alice is in her room.
b. Deontic reading: In all possible worlds consistent with the rules, Alice is
in her room.
Instead of appealing to homophonous entries for each modal auxiliary, Kratzer
proposes that the English lexicon contains a single entry for must that is underde-
termined with respect to what kinds of worlds are quantified over. In the simplified
entry in (16), the modal accessibility relation Acc is fixed by the context of utterance
(c) in the world of evaluation (w).6;7
(16) JmustKc= p.w.8w’ : w’ 2 Accw;c. p(w’)
The context parameter can be filled in the discourse context as in (15), or it can be
overtly specified by adverbial clauses like in (17):
(17) a. Epistemic reading: Given what I know, Alice must be in her room.
b. Deontic reading: Given the rules, Alice must be in her room.
As under the homophony hypothesis, the underspecification hypothesis takes the
verb nisin to be an element which can determine on its own the kind of attitude
reported by the sentence as a whole. The key difference between the homophony hy-
pothesis and the underspecification hypothesis lies in how the attitude is determined.
Under the homophony hypothesis, the lexicon contained multiple entries pronounced
6I omit from this entry Kratzer’s ordering source, a function that applies to the set of modally-
accessible possible worlds, ranks them, and makes available only the best worlds (‘most rule-obeying,’
‘most desirable,’ ‘most stereotypical’) available to the modal domain of quantification.
7Alternatively, Hacquard (2006, 2010) proposes that the syntactic position of modal auxiliaries
determines their modal meaning. I do not take up here a hypothesis in which the interpretation of
nisin is similarly restricted by its syntactic position: I have no evidence that nisin occurs at different
heights when it occurs in sentences which report thoughts vs. desires.
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nisin, each of which invoked a different attitude. Under the underspecification hy-
pothesis, the lexicon only contains one entry for nisin. On analogy with the familiar
account of English modal auxiliaries discussed above, we might imagine that nisin is
defined such that the attitude it expresses is filled in by the context. If beliefs are
particularly salient in the context, a nisin-sentence would report an attitude of ‘think-
ing.’ If desires are particularly salient in the context, a nisin-sentence would instead
report an attitude of desire. What is crucial is that upon being used in an utterance,
the meaning of nisin is fixed.
When nisin occurs without additional particles, the nisin-sentence reports atti-
tudes which we previously described as attitudes of ‘thinking’ or ‘wanting.’ Much as
for the homophony hypothesis, we could imagine particles sha’shin and laanaa work-
ing to further restrict the meaning of nisin once its basic meaning is fixed by context.
We could also imagine these particles working more directly to determine the attitude
reported by nisin: for example, the presence of sha’shin might modify nisin in such a
way so as to guarantee that nisin encodes an attitude related to ‘thinking,’ whereas
modification by laanaa guarantees that nisin instead encodes a particular attitude of
desire.
A question to be addressed with respect to the underspecification hypothesis con-
cerns the link between future morphology and the expression of desire by particleless
nisin-sentences: now that we no longer have two distinct lexical items to work with,
an account in terms of selection becomes less straightforward. However, the litera-
ture already contains precedent for discussion of this general question. We might say
that ‘selection’ of future-marked verbs by nisin under its desire interpretation arises
from a mismatch (either semantic or pragmatic) which arises between certain kinds of
accessibility relations and embedded clauses with a non-future temporal orientation.
An account along these lines is developed by Kratzer (2011) for English modal auxil-
iaries. With respect to question (17b), we might say now that the particles sha’shin,
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laanaa, and lágo work in concert with the effects of context to fix the domain of quan-
tification. Once again, theoretical precedent for modification by particles of modal
quantifiers comes from Anand and Brasoveanu (2010) and Huitink (2012).
The underspecification hypothesis faces another question which did not arise for
the homophony hypothesis at all: given a single underspecified lexical item nisin,
how do we explain why only certain attitudes are attested? That is, if context is
the determining factor in the interpretation of nisin, why could a nisin-sentence not
report an attitude of, e.g., ‘doubting’ in a context where this kind of meaning was
particularly salient?
While I do not offer an answer to this question here, I observe that such restriction
would certainly not be without precedent. For instance, Kratzer (1981) discusses
apparent restrictions on the kinds of modal meanings which are permitted by German
modals darf and kann. For instance, while darf ((18b)) is felicitous in a context like
(18a) which expresses what is possible in light of desires — a bouleticmodal meaning
— kann is infelicitous in such a context ((18c)).
(18) a. Context: Tomorrow is the coronation of the King.
b. Morgen
tomorrow
darf
may
es
it
nicht
not
regnen.
rain
c. #Morgen
tomorrow
kann
can
es
it
nicht
not
regen.
rain
(Kratzer 1981: 61)
If we must accept certain semantic idiosyncracies for modals in other languages that
are otherwise amenable to an underspecified lexical entry, perhaps we could accept
similar idiosyncracies for nisin.
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4.2.2.2 Language-internal arguments against the hypothesis
If we wish to model nisin as a modal expression with an underspecified domain of
quantification, we should ask whether an underspecified modal is a plausible addition
to the Navajo lexicon. I will argue that it is not.
This claim takes as its starting point Rullmann et al.’s (2008) proposal about
crosslinguistic variation in the shape of modal systems. Building on their work on
the modal system of St’át’imcets (Northern Interior Salish), Rullmann et al. (2008)
propose that crosslinguistic differences in the makeup of modal systems can be mod-
eled in terms of parametric differences. One parametric difference which they discuss
is whether a language’s modals are fixed with respect to the kinds of evidence or
facts and circumstances (e.g. rules) that they take into account. As discussed above,
languages like English and German permit (at least some) of their modals to exhibit
flexibility with respect to their interpretation.8 By contrast, many languages of the
Americas — St’át’imcets included — have modal systems in which modal meaning is
never flexible. In these languages, one lexical item could be used to express only epis-
temic (knowledge-oriented) modality while another lexical item would express only
deontic (rule-oriented) modality. Other languages whose modal systems exhibit this
pattern include Nez Perce (Sahaptian) (Deal 2011), Gitksan (Tsimshianic) (Peterson
2010, Matthewson 2013), and Blackfoot (Algonquian) (Reis Silva 2009).
Navajo seems to belong to the set of languages in which modal expressions have
fixed meanings.9 The following examples demonstrate for two modal expressions
8I say “at least some” since modal adverbs in English (e.g. possibly, probably) seem to only permit
epistemic interpretations.
9In a typological survey of modal meaning, van der Auwera and Ammann (2008) cite Navajo
among the set of languages of the Americas with modal expressions (either possibility or necessity
modals, but not both) that are ambiguous between epistemic and non-epistemic interpretations. Van
der Auwera and Ammann seem to be referring to Young and Morgan’s (1987: g161) discussion of
future-marked verbs. As I discuss at length later in this chapter, sentences with future-marked verbs
appear to express either priority modality (i.e. what needs to happen in light of goals in the context)
or predictions about the future. However, it is unclear whether we want to attribute such flexibility
of meaning to future morphology itself. Furthermore, even if we give future morphology a flexible
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— the particle sha’shin and the verb bee haz’ — that each modal expression is only
felicitous in a restricted set of contexts. Sha’shin is only felicitous in epistemic-oriented
contexts while bee haz’ is only felicitious in deontic contexts.
I begin with sha’shin. The epistemic context in (19) concerns evidence and what
is known in the context, not what is permitted or required.
(19) a. Epistemic context: You are playing a game with three cups and a pebble
under one of them. Mary asks you to figure out which cup is hiding the
pebble. You have already turned over Cup 1 and Cup 2: the pebble
wasn’t under either one of them. You say to Mary,
b. Díí
this.one
tsé
rock
biyaa
3O.under
si’
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin.
probably
‘The rock must be under this one.’
Unlike the flexible English must, Navajo sha’shin is infelicitous in contexts targeting
a deontic interpretation:
(20) a. Deontic context: We are talking about what is expected of Mary. Given
the rules of the house, she must go to school.
b. #Mary
Mary
’ólta’góó
school.to
doogááł
3S.go.fut
sha’shin.
probably
(Intended: ‘Mary is required to go to school.’)
Can only mean: ‘Mary is probably at / must be at school.’
Likewise, Navajo has special modal expressions like bee haz’. Willie (1996) iden-
tifies the verb bee haz’ as a modal expression that expresses what is possible in light
modal meaning, nisin would still be unique among modal expressions. No other free morphemes —
particles or verbal expressions — exhibit flexibility of modal meaning.
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of laws or rules. The examples below demonstrate that bee haz’ permits a deontic
interpretation ((21)) but not an epistemic one ((22)).
(21) a. Deontic context: I just turned 16. I am telling you I am allowed to drive
now.
b. K’ad
now
’adeesbąs=ígíí
1S.drive.fut=comp
bee haz’.
3O.with.ArealS.exist.impf
‘I am allowed to drive.’
(22) a. Epistemic context: Alice works at the local school. Sometimes she goes
in on Saturdays. Someone asks you if Alice is going to school tomorrow.
You think it’s possible she will.
b. #Mary
Mary
’ólta’góó
school.to
doogááł=hígíí
3S.go.fut=comp
bee
3O.with
haz’.
ArealS.exist.impf
(Intended: ‘Mary might go to school.’)
Can only mean: ‘Mary is allowed to go to school.’
These restrictions can be explained if the lexical entries of sha’shin and bee haz’
are specified for particular modal accessibility relations. That is, the lexical entry of
sha’shin would specify that the domain of modal quantification is the set of worlds
compatible with evidence and knowledge available in the context. By contrast, the
lexical entry of bee haz’ would specify that the modal’s domain of quantification is
the set of worlds compatible with rules in the context.
Comparable inflexibility can be observed for other modal expressions in Navajo:
none of these expressions seems to exhibit the kind of flexibility in modal meaning
found in English. Navajo patterns like a language which Rullmann et al. (2008)
would claim is parametrically specified for fixed modal meaning. If we take Navajo’s
membership in this set of languages seriously, then it is unexpected that there should
be one verb in the language — nisin — which exceptionally exhibits flexibility with
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respect to its modal meaning. While exceptionality cannot rule out the underspecifi-
cation hypothesis, it should at least give us pause.
4.2.2.3 Summary
This subsection has considered the underspecification hypothesis for nisin, in which
the Navajo lexicon contains a single verb nisin whose meaning is determined in the
course of the derivation. I argued that like the homophony hypothesis, the under-
specification hypothesis faces challenges from Navajo grammar more generally.
Arguments such as those presented so far can, however, only render the hypotheses
implausible: they cannot rule them out entirely. It could be the case that we simply
must accept that nisin-sentences motivate an exceptional analysis. However, the
next section considers additional data which cannot be accounted for under either
hypothesis considered above.
4.2.3 Evidence that nisin does not determine the attitude
Under both the homophony hypothesis and the underspecification hypothesis,
nisin is the primary determinant of the attitude reported by the sentence as a whole.
Furthermore, any given instance of nisin expresses one kind of attitude, regardless of
whether this attitude is lexically- or contextually-determined.
So far, this has not been a problem because we have focused our attention on nisin-
sentences in which a single instance of nisin embeds a single clause: it is no surprise
that these sentences should report only one kind of attitude. However, we also find
sentences like (23) in which a single overt instance of nisin embeds two conjoined
clauses, each of which is shown bracketed below.
(23) Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3S.move.perf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3O.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
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The sentence in (23) can be used felicitously in two kinds of contexts. In the first
context, Alice thinks two things: (i) that Bill moved Flagstaff and (ii) that she is
going to go visit him. The translation offered by consultants in (24b) reflects this
intended interpretation.
(24) a. Context: Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff. She also thinks that her
work is going to make her go see him in the near future, even though she
has no desire to do so.
b. Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3S.move.perf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3O.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice thinks that Bill moved to Flagstaff and that she’ll go visit him.’
It is not surprising that this interpretation should be available in principle for (24b):
the structure would either contain ‘think’-nisin or context would resolve the interpre-
tation of nisin such that the attitude concerns Alice’s thoughts.
What is surprising is the ability of the string in (23) to be uttered felicity in the
context in (25a). Here, Alice thinks that Bill moved to Flagstaff, but she has a desire
to go visit him. Once again, the translation offered by consultants in (25b) reflects
this intended interpretation:
(25) a. Context: Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff. She wants to go visit him
some time, but she does not have any definite plans to do so and knows
it is very likely it will not happen. I’m telling you about Alice.
b. Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3S.move.perf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3O.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and she wants to go see him.’
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The felicity of (25b) in the context in (25a) is surprising under any hypothesis in which
nisin determines the attitude. If (25b) only contains one instance of nisin ((26)), we
expect nisin to either concern what Alice thinks or what Alice wants.10
(26) Single, shared instance of nisin:
Alice ConjP
CP Conj CP
nisin
A proponent of the hypotheses considered so far could have several potential
responses. One such response would be to claim that we have been wrong to think
that nisin can express ‘thinking’ to the exclusion of ‘wanting,’ or vice versa. That
is, perhaps nisin can be defined in such a way that it is sufficiently vague to cover
simultaneously both kinds of attitudes. The translation of (25b) with two English
attitude verbs would, then, not reflect the expression of two distinct attitudes in
Navajo but instead would be the result of a mismatch between the English and Navajo
lexicons: English does not have good counterpart to nisin so-defined.
However, we already saw evidence in Chapter 3 that points away from such a
meaning for nisin. In the following context, one man (Ron) thinks Obama will win
but does not want him to. The other man (Kii) wants Obama to win but does not
think he will:
10While simplified for ease of exposition, the syntactic structures considered in this section cor-
respond to two syntactic analyses offered for superficially similar structures in English that involve
both unpronounced material and conjoined clauses, namely Gapping (Sybil ate chicken and But-
tercup, <ate> fish) and Right Node Raising (Sybil likes, <canned food> and Buttercup dislikes,
canned food) in which certain material (a verb or a nominal expression) appears to go unpronounced
when it corresponds to material pronounced in a conjoined clause. For analyses for constructions
that inform the syntactic structures considered below, see Ross (1967, 1970), Kayne (1994), Johnson
(1996), and Sabbagh (2003), and many others.
146
(27) a. Context: It is 2012 before the presidential election. Given the evidence
he’s seen, Ron thinks that Obama will win. However, Ron doesn’t want
Obama to win. Ron’s friend Kii really wants Obama to win, but he firmly
believes that Obama will not win.
b. #Ron
Ron
dóó
and
Kii
Kii
[Obama
Obama
hodínóołnééł]
3S.win.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘Ron and Kii have some feeling about Obama winning’)
Comment: “They want for him to win. One doesn’t think and the other
one want. I don’t think you can have ‘think’ and ‘want’ in the same
sentence. One’s going to win out over the other.”
In this context, the mental attitude attributed to Ron dóó Kii cannot be described
with a single nisin-sentence. This result is unexpected if nisin expresses some attitude
which subsumes both ‘thinking’ and ‘wanting.’
There is a key difference between (25b) and (27b), however: the number of em-
bedded clauses. In (27b), a single instance of nisin seems to embed a single embedded
clause which has a more complex subject. It is no surprise that such a sentence can
only report one attitude at a time. We might, however, revisit our syntactic assump-
tions about (25b). Perhaps, the true structure is one in which there are two conjoined
nisin-sentences. One instance of nisin is elided to produce the surface string in (25b)
from the structure in (28):
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(28) Two instances of nisin, one elided:
Alice ConjP
CP
CP <nisin>
Conj
and
CP
CP nisin
In the structure in (28), there are two instances of nisin, one in each clause. If each
instance of nisin could contribute a distinct attitude, we could account for the attested
interpretation of (25b). However, I will claim that if (28) contains two semantically
distinct instances of nisin, it will not be possible for ellipsis to apply as it must to
obtain the surface string in (25b).
I begin with the failure of ellipsis given the homophony hypothesis. Under this
account, we would say that each of the clauses conjoined in (28) contains a distinct
embedding verb, ‘think’-nisin in the first clause and ‘want’-nisin in the second. To
produce (25b), ‘think’-nisin would have to elide under identity with ‘want’-nisin. This
is clearly a non-starter. Ellipsis is standardly taken to abide by a general principle
of recoverability of deletion (Chomsky 1965). This principle is frequently modeled in
terms of a requirement that semantic identity hold between the antecedent and the
target of deletion (Keenan 1971, Sag and Hankamer 1984, Dalrymple et al. 1991,
Fiengo and May 1994, Ginzburg and Sag 2000, Merchant 2001, and van Craenen-
broeck 2010, among others).11 There is no sense in which ‘think’-nisin is semantically
identical to ‘want’-nisin: they are completely distinct lexical entries that happen to
11Authors diverge in whether syntactic identity — identity of phrase markers or identity of deriva-
tion — is also relevant. See Merchant (2013) for a general overview of the literature and issues at
hand. This is not important to the discussion of nisin since the two instances of nisin are both verbs
and thus will always be syntactically identical.
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be homophonous. To predict that ‘want’-nisin should license ellipsis of ‘think’-nisin (or
vice versa) is akin to predicting the grammaticality of (29).12
(29) *Alice randirected the meeting and Mary <ranraced> the Boston Marathon.
We might initially be more hopeful about the chances of the underspecification
hypothesis, but such hopes would be misplaced. As discussed earlier, the underspec-
ification hypothesis claims that the Navajo lexicon contains a single verb, nisin. The
interpretation of nisin is fixed when it occurs in a sentence used in a particular con-
text: nisin expresses whatever attitude is salient in the context. Thus, while both
instances of nisin in the tree in (28) might correspond to the same basic entry in the
Navajo lexicon, each instance of the verb would have its meaning fixed differently:
the first instance would be fixed such that it expresses desire and the second such
that it expresses thinking.
In our sketch of the underspecification hypothesis, we thought of nisin as an un-
derspecified modal expression similar to a modal auxiliary (Kratzer 1981, 1991). If
this analogy is correct, we might expect nisin and modal auxiliaries to behave simi-
larly with respect to their elliptical possibilities. This expectation is not borne out.
I illustrate below with the English Gapping sentence in (30). I follow Ross (1967),
Sag (1976), Hartmann (1998), Coppock (2001), Lin (2001), Toosarvandani (2015) in
analyzing English Gapping as involving ellipsis (cf. Johnson 1996, 2009).13
12I thank Peggy Speas (p.c.) for this example.
13Although I illustrate in the main text with Gapping, the same point can also be made by the
following Right Node Raising structure:
(i) Jim believes <that Sandy can take the train> and Alice supposes that Sandy can take the
train.
This sentence is grammatical but is infelicitous in a context like (ii), where the overt and unpro-
nounced instances of can must each support a distinct (ability vs. permission) modal meaning:
(ii) a. Mixed context: Jim believes that little Sandy has been sick and weak for a long time,
but that she is finally physically able to take the train. Alice is unaware Sandy ever
had a physical affliction: she is only concerned with what Sandy is allowed to do.
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(30) Mary can carry these boxes and Bill, <can> climb this ladder.
The sentence in (30) is grammatical but is only licit in contexts in which each
instance of can describes the same kind of possibilities. For example, the context in
(31a) concerns possibilities relating to abilities while the context in (32a) concerns
possibilities relating to goals (i.e. the goal of earning money).
(31) a. Ability context: We are moving boxes up to the attic. Our friends Bill and
Mary are helping us. Bill is very strong and is physically able to carry the
boxes (Mary is too weak to do so). Mary can fit into the narrow space
with the ladder and steady it as Bill climbs. I describe the situation to
you, saying:
b. Bill can carry the boxes and Mary <can> steady the ladder.
(32) a. Goal-oriented context: We are moving boxes up to the attic. Our kids,
Bill and Mary, are helping us. Both Bill and Mary are helping out in
order to earn their allowance for the week. One of the ways that Bill can
earn his allowance is by carrying these boxes. One of the ways that Mary
can earn her allowance is by steadying the ladder. I describe the situation
to you, saying:
b. Our kids can earn their allowance in different ways: Bill can carry the
boxes and Mary <can> steady the ladder.
b. #Jim believes and Alice supposes that Sandy can take the train.
As with the Gapping examples, an obvious answer for what goes ‘wrong’ in (i)/(iib) is that the
overtly pronounced clause that Sandy can take the train has a distinct semantics from the elided
instance due to differences in the interpretation of the modal auxiliary. Given the semantic disparity
that would exist between the overt and elided clauses, ellipsis is not licensed for (i)/(iib) under the
desired interpretation.
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However, (30) becomes infelicitous in the following ‘mixed’ context. Here, the
context is such that each instance of can concerns a different kind of possibility.
In the first clause, can concerns Bill’s physical abilities. In the second clause, can
concerns possible ways of Mary meeting her goal of earning money. In this context,
the gapping construction (repeated in (33b)) is unacceptable.14
(33) a. Mixed context: We are moving boxes up to the attic. Our friend Bill is
physically able to carry these boxes. Our kid Mary is helping out, too:
one of the ways she can earn her allowance is by steadying the ladder. I
describe the situation to you, saying:
b. #Bill can carry these boxes and Mary <can> climb this ladder.
If we assume an ellipsis structure for English sentences like (33b) on par with the
ellipsis structure we are entertaining for Navajo, we must explain why ellipsis of mis-
matched modal expressions is blocked in English ((34a)) but permitted in Navajo.15
14While mismatches in modals’ quantificational domains may prevent ellipsis in English, domain
mismatches may not block ellipsis for all types of quantificational expressions. Examples of sloppy
identity like (i) demonstrate that other kinds of English quantifiers allow ellipsis despite mismatching
quantificational domains (the sets of students under consideration).
(i) a. Context: Alice and Bill teach in schools in different countries.
b. Alice failed every student, Bill did <fail every student> too.
I thank Alejandro Pérez-Carballo (p.c.) for drawing my attention to such examples. I leave to future
consideration how to capture this apparent difference between modal quantifiers and quantificational
determiners.
15I have chosen ability and goal-related (teleological) modal meanings very intentionally to rule
out an alternative explanation for the failure of ellipsis in (33b). An alternative to Kratzer’s (1981,
1991) context-sensitive account of modal meanings is Hacquard’s (2006, 2010) structural account.
In Hacquard’s account, modal auxiliaries permit different interpretations as a function of the struc-
tural position they occupy: composition at different heights in the syntax makes available different
interpretations.
One might ask, then, whether the infelicity of the English sentence in (33b) is due to the modals
occuring at different heights in the syntax: perhaps the mismatching syntax of the ellipsis sites is
to blame rather than a mismatch in the modals’ semantics. In Navajo sentences like (25b), ellipsis
might be permitted because the two instances of nisin occur at the same point in the syntax.
However, we cannot explain the differences between English and Navajo in these terms. Hacquard
argues that both of the modal meanings used in (33b) — ability and goal-oriented — are associated
with the same position in the syntax. Thus, ellipsis in (33b) cannot be said to fail because the two
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4.2.4 Summary
In the previous sections, I considered two hypotheses concerning the source of
belief- and desire-related meanings in Navajo nisin-sentences. In both of these hy-
potheses, the verb nisin was taken to be the primary determinant of the attitude
reported by the nisin-sentence as a whole. These hypotheses have the basic shape of
widely-adopted accounts of attitude reports in other languages. The attitude verb is
instrumental in determining the attitude. However, I argued that neither hypothesis
is satisfactory for Navajo. Not only do both hypotheses face challenges from Navajo
grammar, but neither hypothesis allows us to account for examples of sentences which
contain one nisin but which seem to express two attitudes. In the discussion going
forward, I will set aside any hypothesis in which nisin is primarily responsible for
determining the attitude.
4.3 The embedded clause as the determinant of the attitude
Given that we have already seen that sentences like (34) throw up a challenge for
any account in which nisin determines the attitude, what alternative do we have?
(34) Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3S.move.perf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3O.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and she wants to go see him.’
I argue that it is not nisin which determines the attitude, but instead the clause
— or clauses — which it embeds. Under a shared structure analysis of (34), a single
instance of nisin embeds two clauses conjoined by dóó: each of these clauses has the
ability to determine a different attitude (i.e. attitudes of ‘thinking’ vs. ‘wanting’).
instances of can occur at different positions in the syntax. In order to say that Navajo allows ellipsis
where English does not, we would once again have to propose that the two languages have different
notions of semantic identity.
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Under an account which involves ellipsis of one instance of nisin in (34), two nisin-
sentences are conjoined: each contains an embedded clause which has the ability to
determine a different attitude.
Because the embedded clauses in (34) determine the attitude, we can imagine for
nisin a constant semantics. Under the shared structure analysis, this constant nisin
could be shared by the attitude-determining embedded clauses. Under an elliptical
account, the two instances of nisin would be semantically identical so we would expect
ellipsis to proceed without incident.
This proposal for (34) leads to the following question: if it is the bracketed clauses,
and not nisin, which determine what attitude is reported by a nisin-sentence, do we
ever find the bracketed clauses on their own — as main clauses, without nisin —
expressing comparable meanings? If so, what are the semantics of these clauses?
Does their interpretation differ from that of nisin-sentences? (I.e., what does nisin
contribute if it does not determine the attitude?)
I explore this question by comparing the meanings of nisin-sentences with main
clauses with which they are morphosyntactically identical except for the latter sen-
tences’ lack of nisin. I will demonstrate that these sentences are associated with
meanings which are, to varying degrees, related to the attitudes that I have argued
are reported by nisin-sentences. The clearest comparison will come from comparing
nisin-sentences with particles with their main clause counterparts. We already began
this comparison in Chapter 3. After considering these simpler cases, we will turn to
particleless nisin-sentences and their main clause counterparts.
4.3.1 Laanaa in main clauses and in nisin-sentences
The pair of sentences in (35) demonstrates the semantic parallels which can hold
between certain main clauses and nisin-sentences.
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(35) a. Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa.
wishful
‘I wish it were raining.’
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it were raining.’
Both of the sentences in (35) report attitudes of desire for the state of affairs
described in the embedded clause to hold. Since main clauses with laanaa report
desires, it seems reasonble to claim that in nisin-sentences with laanaa, it is laanaa —
not nisin —- which determines that the attitude is one of desire. The particle laanaa
would perform the same semantic function regardless of the construction in which it
occurs.
There are, however, difference in the interpretations permitted for (35a) vs. (35b)
which turn on the presence vs. absence of nisin. Nisin is obligatorily present if the
attitude holder is not the speaker or if the time of the desire is not the utterance
time.16
16Throughout this discussion, I tacitly assume that the sentences I refer to as ‘main clauses’ are
truly main clauses: they do not contain an unpronounced instance of nisin. The discussion that I
present here concerning differences in the interpretation of purported ‘main clauses’ and their nisin-
sentence counterparts can also be thought of as evidence against the presence of an unpronounced
nisin. If nisin were covertly present in the ‘main clause’ examples, we would have to explain why
this unpronounced nisin is so much more restrictive in the meanings that it allows: why does it not
permit the same range of subjects and temporal perspectives as overt nisin does?
This kind of evidence is a simpler form of the evidence by Grosz (2011b) in his exploration of
German optative constructions. Following Scholz (1991) and Rifkin (2000) (and contra Evans 2007),
Grosz argues that German optative constructions like (i) do not involve main clause deletion of a
desire verb.
(i) <Ich
I
wünschte>
wish
Dass
that
ich
I
deine
your
Statur
build
hätte!
had
‘[I wish] I had your build.’
(Grosz 2011b: (215b))
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I begin with restrictions on the identity of the individual whose desires we are
concerned with. Whereas nisin-sentences with laanaa report the desires of the subject
of nisin (whoever it may be), main clauses with laanaa can only report the desires
of the speaker. This is illustrated by (36). In the context in (36a), Kii’s desires are
extremely salient. Even in such a context, however, the main clause with laanaa in
(36b) is judged to be infelicitous: according to consultants, this sentence only reports
the speaker’s desires, which the context establishes are not consistent with (36b).
In this context, the nisin-sentence in (36c) must be used instead: only then can the
sentence report desires belonging to Kii.
(36) a. Context: I don’t want it to be raining, but Kii does (he is a farmer and
his crops are going dry). We are discussing what Kii wants to be going
on. Kii wants the temperature to cool, he wants the wind to blow less,
and:
b. #Nahodoołtł
3S.rain.fut
laanaa.
wishful
(Intended: ‘Kii wishes it would rain.’)
Can only mean: ‘I wish it would rain.’
c. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wishes it were raining.’
I also explored the converse side of this point: when nisin embeds laanaa, the
sentence can only express the desires of the subject of nisin. To determine this,
I constructed the context in (37a) to make salient the beliefs of my mother but the
desires (or, at least, the perceived desires) of the speaker. As shown by the infelicity of
(37b), however, the resulting sentence cannot have this meaning: the desires reported
are those of the mother.
155
(37) a. Context: I’m a farmer in California. My crops are drying up. My mother
thinks I want it to rain. (She’s actually wrong: if my crops die, I will get
insurance money). I say to you, My mother thinks I want it to rain.
b. #Shimá
1poss.mother
[nahodoołtį̨́ˊł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa]
wishful
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(Intended: ‘My mother thinks I want it to rain.’)
Comment: “You’re saying that the mother wants it to rain.”
Consultants reported that a meaning consistent with the context in (37a) could
only be expressed by a sentence like (38). Here, an additional nisin has been inserted
to the immediate right of laanaa. This new nisin bears a first-person subject: as a
result, the embedded nisin-sentence reports the desires of the speaker.17
(38) Shimá
1poss.mother
[shí
1pro
’ei
top
nahodoołtį̨́ˊł
ArealS.rain.fut
laanaa
wishful
nisin]
1S.att.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘My mother thinks I want it to rain.’
The presence of nisin is also required in order for a sentence to report desires held
at times other than the time of utterance. The context in (39a) concerns the speaker’s
desires in the past. The context establishes that the speaker no longer holds these
desires. In this context, the main clause in (39b) was judged infelicitous: consultants
reported that it could only report desires held by the speaker at the time of utterance
(i.e. now). By contrast, the nisins-sentence in (39c) was judged felicitous in the
context. Here, the verb nisin is marked for perfective aspect which, as discussed by
Smith et al. (2007), by default gives rise to a past tense interpretation.
17Consultants seemed to add the overt first-person pronoun here to rule out the ‘shifted’ inter-
pretation of the first-person subject of nisin, wherein it would be coreferent with the subject in the
main clause, as discussed in section 3.2.2.
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(39) a. Context: It is Thursday. On Monday, I wanted it to rain next Saturday.
Now, however, I have plans to go hiking next Saturday and no longer
want it to rain. I am telling you how I used to feel:
b. #Nahodoołtł
3S.rain.fut
laanaa.
wishful
Can only mean: ‘I wish that it would rain.’
c. [Nahodoołł
3S.rain.fut
laanaa]
wishful
niiz’.
1S.att.perf
‘I wished that it would rain.’
4.3.2 Sha’shin in main clauses and in nisin-sentences
We can also construct pairs of main clauses and nisin-sentences which contain the
particle sha’shin:
(40) a. Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin.
probably
‘It’s probably raining,’ ‘It must be raining.’
b. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Kii thinks it is probably raining,’ ‘Kii thinks it must be raining.’
As we first saw in Chapter 3, both (40a) and (40b) are used felicitously in contexts
in which there is indirect evidence (sounds, smells, visual evidence) that it is currently
raining. In other words, both sentences in (40) express that some proposition (that it
is raining) must be true given indirect evidence available in the context. We saw in
Chapter 3 that sha’shin is infelicitous if there is direct evidence for the truth of the
proposition available, e.g. the speaker ((40a)) or Kii ((40b)) has seen it raining. It
seems reasonable to propose that in nisin-sentences with sha’shin, it is sha’shin — not
nisin — which determines that the meaning expressed involves beliefs and knowledge
about what is the case (here, necessarily formed on the basis of indirect evidence).
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The presence vs. absence of nisin plays a key role in sentences with sha’shin, just
as it did with laanaa. When present, nisin supplies us with the individual whose
evidence supports the truth of the proposition in question. In (40a), it is the speaker
whose evidence leads to the conclusion that that it is raining is true. In (39b), by
contrast, it is Kii whose evidence is relevant: in light of what Kii knows, it must be
raining. In nisin-sentences, what the speaker does, or does not, know is irrelevant.
The following example illustrates. In the context in (41a), it is established that
while the speaker has direct evidence for the truth of that Mary is at home, Kii does
not. The nisin-sentence in (41b) is licit in this context: sha’shin is felicitous because
Kii, the subject of nisin, only has indirect evidence for the truth of that Mary is at
home. By contrast, even if Kii’s perspective is made very salient, the main clause with
sha’shin in (41c) is judged infelicitous in the context as given. Consultant comments
indicated that this sentence could only express what must be true in light of the
speaker’s indirect evidence: since the speaker is established as having access to direct
evidence, the resulting sentence is infelicitous.
(41) a. Context: I know that Mary is at home. Kii, however, only has certain
evidence that she’s at home: he saw her car in front of the house and a
light on inside. I report Kii’s thinking to you, saying:
b. Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att
‘Kii thinks Mary must be at home,’ ‘Kii thinks Mary is probably at home.’
c. Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin.
probably
‘Mary must be at home,’ ‘Mary is probably at home.’
Just as we saw for sentences with laanaa, the presence of nisin also permits a wider
range of temporal perspectives for sentences with sha’shin. In the context in (42a),
we learn that the speaker had access to certain indirect evidence yesterday which led
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him to conclude the truth of that it was raining. Since then, this evidence and this
conclusion has been debunked, but we can still describe the speaker’s prior state of
knowledge with the nisin-sentence in (42b), where the verb is marked for perfective
aspect. By contrast, the main clause sentence with sha’shin in (42c) is infelicitous in
the same context: this sentence is only felicitous if the speaker’s state of knowledge
is currently one in which she only has indirect evidence for the truth of that it is
raining.
(42) a. Context: I was inside in a windowless room yesterday. I heard a pattering
sound on the roof and concluded then it must be raining. Since then, I
have learned that it wasn’t raining: the sound I heard was hammering by
construction workers. I tell you this, saying:
b. [Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably
niiz’.
3S.att.perf
‘I thought it must be raining.
c. #Nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin.
probably
Can only mean: ‘It must be raining,’ ‘it’s probably raining.’
There is one notable difference between the sentences we saw with laanaa vs. sen-
tences with sha’shin. This differences concerns consultants’ manner of translation:
while translations are not direct clues about meaning (Matthewson 2004), they can
provide us with useful clues. Both main clauses and nisin-sentences with laanaa were
translated into English using wish. By contrast, only nisin-sentences with sha’shin
were translated into English with think: main clauses with sha’shin were simply trans-
lated as [must/probably ].
What accounts for the absence of think in main clauses? I propose that in the
English translations of nisin-sentences, think is present to indicate whose perspective
we are interested in: that is, it does exactly what I have argued nisin to do. This
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evidential use of think has been the subject of long interest in both the philosophical
and linguistic literature, with recent work by Simons (2007) and Lewis (2013). I will
return to this use of think in section 4.4.1 where I will compare it to nisin. In main
clauses with sha’shin, by contrast, think need not appear in the English translation
because must or probably in a main clause permits the interpretation I have attributed
to sha’shin in main clauses: they indicate the necessity or likelihood of the truth of
the proposition given indirect evidence available to the speaker. Including I think in
the English translation would be superfluous.18
4.3.3 Particleless nisin-sentences and particleless main clauses
So far, I have argued that the semantics of the clause embedded by nisin determines
the attitude reported by the nisin-sentence as a whole. Sentences with laanaa report
desires because they contain laanaa; sentences with sha’shin report claims about what
must be true given the (indirect) evidence because they contain sha’shin. The verb
nisin only functions to specify further the individual’s whose desires or evidence is
relevant, or to indicate at what time these desires were held or the evidence available.
If nisin is not present, sentences with sha’shin and laanaa are evaluated from the
perspective of the speaker and at the time of the utterance.
Can we make the same claim for nisin-sentences which do not contain particles?
That is, do the embedded clauses in (43b) and (44b) determine what attitude is
reported by the sentence as a whole?
18The speaker-oriented interpretation is not the only interpretation available to unembedded epis-
temic modals in English. As von Fintel and Gillies (2011) discuss, while the “speaker-centric” inter-
pretation is generally available for epistemic modals, other authors have observed that other readings
are possible and must be accounted for (Hacking 1967, DeRose 1991). I will leave for future investi-
gation closer sutdy of whether unembedded instances of sha’shin in Navajo permit a similar broader
range of interpretations relative to different groups’ or individuals’ knowledge, beyond that of the
speaker alone. For now, I observe that the default interpretation of unembedded sha’shin picks up
the speaker’s perspective.
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(43) a. Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’ay.
3O.with.3S.eat.impf
‘Kii is eating stew.’
b. Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’ay]
3O.with.3S.eat.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary thinks that Kii is eating stew.’
(44) a. Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył.
3O.with.3S.eat.fut
(i) ‘Kii will eat stew.’
(ii) ‘Kii should eat stew.’
b. Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył]
3O.3S.stew.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(i) ‘Mary thinks Kii will eat stew.’
(ii) ‘Mary wants Kii to eat stew.’
Just as I already did for sentences with particles, I will argue that we can sys-
tematically relate the meanings of the main clauses in (43a) and (44a) with their
nisin-sentence counterparts. To develop this argument, I first explore in more depth
the semantics of the main clauses in (43a) and (44a). I then consider how the mean-
ings of these sentences can be systematically related to what I have characterized
previously as attitudes of ‘thinking’ and ‘wanting’ reported by nisin-sentences.
4.3.3.1 Main clause assertions and their nisin-sentence counterparts
I first consider the truth conditions of the particleless sentences in (45).
(45) a. Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’ay.
3O.with.3S.eat.impf
‘Kii is eating stew.’
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b. Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’ay]
3O.with.3S.eat.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary thinks that Kii is eating stew.’
We first explored particleless sentences like those in (45) in section 3.3.1, where
we compared them to sentences with sha’shin. I repeat the key findings from this
comparison below:
(46) Comparison of sentences with, and without, sha’shin:
a. Contexts in which the attitude holder uses indirect or inferential evidence
to conclude that  is true: sentences with and without sha’shin are felic-
itous.
b. Contexts in which the attitude holder has direct evidence for the truth of
: only sentences without sha’shin are felicitous.
Examples like (47) and (48) were key to establishing (46b). In the context in (47a),
it is established that the speaker has direct evidence that that it is raining is true:
the particleless assertion in (47b) is felicitous while the addition of sha’shin in (47c)
results in infelicity. The same is true of (48a), where it is established that the subject
of nisin, Kii, has direct evidence that that Mary is home is true: the particleless nisin-
sentence in (48b) is felicitous while the sentence with sha’shin is not.19 (I return to
the ?-diacritic of the English translation of (47b) at the end of this subsection. Note
that the Navajo sentence in (46b) does not have this diacritic.)
19One conclusion that we can draw is the following: since the (b)- and (c)-sentences above are
felicitous in different contexts, we can conclude that the particleless (b)-sentences do not, in fact,
contain a covert version of sha’shin.
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(47) a. Context: You see Mary walk past her window. You say,
b. Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá.
3S.sit.impf
‘Mary is at home.’
c. #Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin.
probably
#‘Mary must be at home,’ ‘Mary is probably at home.’
Comment: “You saw her? That doesn’t sound right.”
(48) a. Context: We are all talking about where Mary is. I do not know. Kii says
he saw Mary at her home just a moment ago. I report Kii’s thinking to
you, saying:
b. Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá]
3S.sit.impf
nízin.
3S.att.impf
? ‘Kii thinks Mary is at home.’
Comment: “You’re reporting that’s what he’s thinking, it’s okay.”
c. #Kii
Kii
[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá
3S.sit.impf
sha’shin]
probably
nízin.
3S.att.impf
Comment: “If he actually saw her, then I’d say [(48b)].”
The only difference between the particleless main clause assertion in (47b) and the
nisin-sentence in (48b) is the presence of nisin. In our study of nisin-sentences with
particles, we saw that nisin determined a time and individual relative to which the
desire is expressed or the epistemic claim is made. If nisin was absent, the individual
and time defaulted to the speaker (or, perhaps, a group including the speaker) and
the time of utterance. The same holds for (47b) and (48b). (47b) expresses an
assertion on the part of the speaker: if made sincerely, the speaker is indicating her
commitment to the truth of that Mary is at home, such that this proposition is true
given what the speaker believes the world to be like. In (48b), by contrast, it is Kii
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who is committed to the truth of that Mary is at home: the sentence concerns what
Kii thinks the world to be like, not the thoughts of the speaker.
Relating assertions with attitudes of ‘thinking’ I propose that what I pre-
viously characterized as attitudes of ‘thinking’ in Navajo are, in fact, the result of
embedding a main clause assertion under nisin. That is, Navajo attitudes of ‘thinking’
are assertions attributed to particular individuals. There is significant precedent in
the semantic and philosophical literature for a link between assertions and attitudes
of belief, which I will treat as related to attitudes of ‘thinking.’ Both assertions and
these types of attitudes involve a proposition which is necessarily true in light of
certain beliefs or knowledge. Authors differ in whose beliefs or knowledge they hold
to be key in assertions. Kissine (2009) discusses this point in relation to Stalnaker’s
(1978, 2002) model of assertions, observing that assertions are made relative to the
collective state of knowledge modeled as the Stalnakerian conversational background.
More recently, Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito’s (2010) proposed that assertions
are made relative to the speaker’s state of belief. Although I characterized the Navajo
assertion in (47b) as made relative to the speaker’s beliefs, we could certainly also
entertain the view that it is made relative to certain shared knowledge and beliefs.
The source of the beliefs or knowledge is much more clear-cut for English sen-
tences with think and Navajo nisin-sentences. As discussed above for nisin-sentences
like (48b), the belief and knowledge involved clearly belong to the subject of nisin.
Similarly, in an English sentence like John thinks it is raining, the beliefs and knowl-
edge involved are tied to John, the subject of think.20
20As Speas (2004), Hacquard (2006), and Stephenson (2007) discuss in detail, epistemic modals
which are embedded beneath attitude verbs are also obligatorily interpreted relative to the perspec-
tive of the subject of the attitude verb. (i) could be uttered even if, for instance, the speaker is
completely certain that Sandy is stupid.
(i) Dave thinks Sandy might be stupid.
(adapt. Hacquard 2006: (206b))
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We should be careful, however, to note a difference between nisin-sentences and
their translations into English sentences with think.21 In particular, the use of English
think seems to add an evidential signal of weakness or uncertainty which is not carried
by nisin. Examples like (48) showed us that Navajo speakers can use nisin-sentences
in contexts where the subject of nisin has direct evidence for, and total confidence in,
the truth of the embedded proposition. By contrast, the ‘?’ diacritic on the English
translation in (48b) indicates that English think seems to indicate some degree of
uncertainty on the part of the attitude holder.22
A number of authors discuss the apparent ‘weakness’ of English sentences with
think and other epistemic and doxastic verbs (guess, know, believe), noting that swap-
ping out one verb for another seems to create a cline of certainty or commitment
(Urmson 1952, Hooper 1975, Givón 1982, Thompson and Mulac 1991, Rooryck 2001,
Simons 2007, Lewis 2013, Denis 2015). Lewis (2013) argue that the weakness asso-
21I thank Angelika Kratzer and Barbara Partee for raising this point.
22In the Navajo sentence (48b), nisin is marked for a third-person subject. If we change the subject
to first-person ((i)), preliminary consultant comments suggests that the sentence exhibits the same
weakness as we identified for English sentences with think. In the context shown, consultant preferred
(ib) without nisin, i.e. as the main clause assertion in (ic).
(i) a. Context: You just drove past Mary’s house and saw her by the window. We are talking
about where Mary is. You say to me:
b. ??[Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá]
3S.sit.impf
nisin.
1S.att.impf
?¿I think Mary is at home.’
c. Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sidá.
3S.sit.impf
‘Mary is at home.’
Under the account we have developed so far, this result is unexpected: (ib) and (ic) are both
assertions made from the perspective of the speaker so they should be equivalent.
In order to obtain a weaker meaning for (ib) we might first reconsider whose perspective is relevant
for (ic). Main clause assertions plausibly make claims which bear on the mental states of more
individuals than the speaker alone: in uttering (ic), the speaker indicates that she (believes that
she) is not alone in thinking that Mary is at home. If nisin is present as in (ib), by contrast, the
speaker has chosen to explicitly indicate that the assertion that Mary is at home is made from her
perspective. Weakness of (ib) might arise via a pragmatic story similar to the ones discussed by
Simons (2007) and Lewis (2013) for parenthetical attitude verbs in English.
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ciated with English sentences like (48b) is the result of pragmatic reasoning: if the
speaker had been certain that it was raining, she would have simply asserted that
this was the case. This apparent weakness associated with think seems to be absent
from Navajo nisin-sentences in the general case, however. The function of nisin seems
to be purely to identify the source of a particular commitment or assertion.23
4.3.3.2 Ambiguity between priorities and assertions about the future
In this section, I explore the interpretations available to main clauses like (49),
which contains a future-marked verb but no additional particles:
(49) Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył.
3O.with.3S.eat.fut
(i) ‘Kii will eat stew.’
(ii) ‘Kii should eat stew.’
I argue that the two meanings attributed to the main clause in (49) are the source of
the ‘thinking’ and ‘wanting’ attitudes identified for nisin-sentences like (50):
(50) Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył]
3O.3S.stew.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
(i) ‘Mary thinks Kii will eat stew.’
(ii) ‘Mary wants Kii to eat stew.’
Before returning to explore the semantic relation between (49) and (50), I will explore
in more depth the truth conditions of the main clause in (50).
23I note that a similarly pure meaning is available for English think when it is used to report an
individual’s internal dialogue.
(i) John looked outside and saw the rain pouring down. He thought: “It’s raining. I’ll never
get to the park now.”
I do not know why using think with a direct discourse (quotative) environment like (i) should make
a difference in the degree of certainty linked to think.
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Sentences of the shape in (49) can be used felicitously in two kinds of contexts.
First, contexts which involve predictions about the future. This context is exemplified
in (51). The reading in (51b) is familiar from our earlier discussion of assertions. In
the context in (51a), the speaker has certain knowledge and beliefs about how events
will proceed: in light of this knowledge, the speaker of (50b) can assert that Bill will
take I40.
(51) a. Context: My friend Bill has told me that he’s going to go to Phoenix via
I40. I tell you about this, saying:
b. (Bill
Bill
Hoozdogóó
Phoenix.to
déyáa=go,)
3S.go.impf=go
I40
I40
’átiingóó
road.to
bił ’adoolwoł.
3O.with.3S.drive.fut
‘(To get to Phoenix,) Bill will take I40.’
The second kind of context in which (49) is licensed is shown in (52). The context
in (52a) expresses that in light of certain goals and desires which Bill may have, it
should be the case that Bill will take I40. I follow Portner’s (2007, 2009) terminology
in using the term ‘priority’ modality to refer to expressions of necessity or possibility
in light of various goals, desires, and rules which hold in the context.
(52) a. Context: My friend Bill is trying to decide where to go this summer on a
trip. She lives in Albuquerque. One place he was considering is Phoenix.
I think the best route from Albuquerque to Phoenix is I40: it’s the fastest,
the safest, and the most attractive. There are alternative routes that he
could take, though, and I know that Bill has an irrational dislike of I40
so he will not take it. I tell you about the situation, saying:
b. (Bill
Bill
Hoozdogóó
Phoenix.to
déyáa=go,)
3S.go.impf=go
I40
I40
’átiingóó
road.to
bił ’adoolwoł.
3O.with.3S.drive.fut
‘(To get to Phoenix,) Bill should take I40.’
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Particleless main clauses permit a priority interpretation only if the verb is future-
marked. As we have already seen, clauses with any temporal form of the verb can be
used to convey assertions. In section 4.3.3.1, for instance, we saw assertions expressed
by main clauses with verbs marked for imperfective aspect. If the the verb in (52b) is
changed from future-marked bił ’adoolwoł to imperfective-marked bił ’oolwoł ((53b)),
the sentence is not licit in contexts which deal with priorities:
(53) a. Context: Bill is on his way to Albuquerque. I’m not sure what route he
is taking, but I say that the best route is I40: it’s the fastest, the safest,
and the most attractive. Bill should be taking I40.
b. #(Bill
Bill
Hoozdogóó
Phoenix.to
déyáa=go,)
3S.go.impf=go
I40
I40
’átiingóó
road.to
bił ’oolwoł.
3O.with.3S.drive.impf
(Intended: ‘(To get to Phoenix,) Bill should be taking I40.’)
Can only mean: ‘(To get to Phoenix,) Bill is taking I40.’
Particleless main clauses with future-marked verbs ([-fut]) seem to be the gen-
eral linguistic strategy for expressing a general notion of priority-oriented modality in
Navajo (Young and Morgan 1987: g161).24;25 Although more specific modal expres-
24Although I have not explored their semantics in detail yet, constructions involving particles seem
to permit a similar range of priority-oriented meanings. Willie (1996) discusses the construction in
(i), the verb is marked for Optative Mode and the fourth person subject. The verb is followed by
the particle le’ — a particle which otherwise seems similar to laaanaa — the locative particle, the
copula ’át’é, and the subordinator =go.
(i) Nijólnish
4S.work.opt
le’
wishful
gi=’át’é=go
loc=3S.be.impf=go
t’óó
just
naashbé.
1S.swim.impf
‘I should be working but I am just swimming.’
(Willie 1996: (31))
This is clearly a complex construction and it is not at all clear how the individual morphemes
contribute to its apparent meaning. Since consultants that I worked with never volunteered this
construction, I will not discuss it further here.
25I vary in my manner of English translation for priority-related interpretations of these sentences:
in some cases I have translated them into English with should and in other cases, I translate them
with need. This is intended to reflect the observation that future-marked verbs in Navajo seem to
express both strong (i.e. what has to happen) and weak (i.e. what should happen) forms of necessity
priority modality. For detailed discussion of weak vs. strong necessity, see von Fintel and Iatridou
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sions exist, e.g. the deontic/rule-oriented expression bee haz’, these expressions are
not licit in the full range of contexts which license sentences of the shape [-fut]. I
found that consultants did not accept sentences with bee haz’ in contexts which did
not invoke actual rules or laws.
(54) a. Context: Same as in (52)
b. #(Bill
Bill
Hoozdogóó
Phoenix.to
déyáa=go,)
3S.go.impf=go
I40
I40
’átiingóó
road.to
bił ’adoolwoł=ígíí
3O.with.3S.drive.fut=igii
bee haz’.
3O.with.ArealS.exist.impf
(Intended: ‘(To get to Phoenix,) Bill should take I40.’)
Comment: “You’re saying there is a law that he has to go that way.”
While I have asserted that sentences of the shape [-fut] allow two ‘readings,’
we should establish that such strings are actually truth-conditionally ambiguous and
not, for instance, sufficiently vague such that its (single set of) truth conditions are
consistent with both the contexts given above. To demonstrate the ambiguity of (49),
we can apply Zwicky and Sadock’s (1975) ‘Test of Contradiction,’ just as we did in
section 3.5.1 to argue for the ambiguity of the nisin-sentence counterparts to (49). I
repeat the key example below:
(2008), Rubinstein (2012), and Silk (2014). When I asked consultants about context-sentence pairs
like (i) (from von Fintel and Iatridou 2008), consultants volunteered the Navajo sentence shown
where differences in the strength of the two modal statements is indicated by the presence of an
intensifying adverb t’áá ’iiyisí ‘really.’
(i) a. Context: You operate a restaurant. You’re telling me about hygiene there. You say,
Everybody should wash their hands, but cooks have to wash their hands.
b. T’áá ’ánółtso
everybody
nihila’
2plposs.hand
tánidaohgis,
3O.2plS.wash.fut
ndi
but
ch’iyáán ’ííł’íní
cook
t’áá ’iiyisí
really
bila’
3poss.hand
táádadoogis.
3O.3S.wash.fut
Lit: ‘Everybody will wash their hands, but cooks really will wash their hands.’
Future work should consider how this apparent variability in strength should be encoded.
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(55) a. Context: Kii is supposed to help his father put up a fence this afternoon.
If it rains, Kii will not have to work. So, Kii wants it to rain. However,
Kii looks outside and sees that the sky is clear so he believes it is not
going to rain.
b. [Kii
Kii
[nahodoołtł]
ArealS.rain.fut
nízin]
3S.att.impf
’ákondi
but
[[doo
neg
nahodoołtł
ArealS.rain.fut
da]
neg
nízin].
3S.att.impf
‘Kii wants it to rain but he thinks it won’t.’
The non-contradictory nature of the conjoined sentence in (55b) demonstrated to us
that Navajo nisin-sentences of the shape [-fut nisin] are systematically ambiguous
between the two meanings which I characterized ealier as attitudes of ‘thinking’ and
‘wanting.’
A similar ambiguity can be demonstrated for main clauses of the shape in (49).
The context-sentence pairs in (56) and (57) apply the Test of Contradiction to such
sentences. The contexts below both express that some state of affairs should take
place but also make clear that according to the speaker, the state of affairs is unlikely
to actually happen. That is, the speaker is asserting ‘should -fut but not -fut.’
Consultants volunteered the sentences shown in (56b) and (57b). Both the first and
second conjuncts in (56b) and (57b) contain future-marked verbs and no additional
morphology. Whereas the ‘literal’ English translations are contradictory, the Navajo
sentences are not. This supports a view in which Navajo sentences [-fut] permit two
distinct readings.
(56) a. Context: You and I are town inspectors. We visit towns and tell them
what they need to fix according to the safety standards and regulations,
and what will be possible given their budgets. You say the roads in this
town need to be fixed in order to meet safety standards, but you have
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seen that the town is very low on money and will not be able to afford
it. You’re telling me about the situation. You say, ‘There need to be new
roads, but I don’t think it’s going to happen.’
b. ’Atiin
road
t’áá yá’adát’ééh=ígíí
3plS.good=igii
’ádadoolnííł,
3S.be.fut
’ákondi
but
doo
neg
’ádadoolnííł
3S.do.fut
da.
neg
Consultant translation: ‘There need to be new roads, but it’s not going
to happen.’
Lit. translation: #‘There will be new roads, but there won’t be.’
(57) a. Context: My grandfather is in poor health but still lives alone in his own
house. A health care worker has come in to assess the situation. The
health care worker thinks my grandfather needs to sell the house so he
can move and live in a safer environment. However, he has told her he
absolutely won’t do it. She tells me, ‘Your grandfather needs to sell his
house, but he’s not going to do it.’
b. Nicheii
2poss.grandfather
bighan
3poss.house
baa nahidoonih,
3O.3S.sell.fut
ndi
but
doo
neg
’adoolnííł
3S.do.fut
da.
neg
Consultant translation: ‘Your grandfather should sell his house, but he’s
not going to do it.’
Lit. translation: #‘Your grandfather will sell his house, but he won’t.’
The alternation between expressions of assertions and expressions of priorities is
closely linked to the choice of temporal morphology. We have already seen that future
marking is not sufficient to guarantee a priority interpretation: the second clauses in
(56) and (57) make assertions (predictions) about the future and accordingly contain
future-marked verbs. However, we have also seen that future marking is necessary for
a priority interpretation to arise: this was demonstrated by the failure of a priority
interpretation to arise for sentences like (53) with imperfective-marked verbs.
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We will have to wait to determine the source of this link between priority modality
and future morphology.26 What is key, however, is that this pattern is already familiar
to us from our discussion of particleless nisin-sentences: while a future-marked verb is
not sufficient to guarantee that a nisin-sentence will report an attitude of ‘wanting,’ it
is a necessary condition. In the absence of a future-marked verb, a nisin-sentence can
only report what I have referred to as an attitude of ‘thinking.’27 I will argue that this
parallel importance for temporal morphology indicates a deeper link between main
clause expressions of priority and nisin-sentences which report attitudes of ‘wanting’:
the latter is only disguished from the former by the presence of nisin.
26I offer two directions to investigate. First, we could claim that clauses (main and embedded)
which express priority-related meanings contain a covert priority modal operator which selects for
future-marked verbs. We first considered the link between future marking and particular embedded
expressions in section 4.2.1. As discussed there, there is crosslinguistic precedent for certain modal
expressions to require their embedded clauses to have a future temporal orientation (Stowell 1982,
2006; Enç 1996; Condoravdi 2002; Abusch 2004; Laca 2008, 2012a,b; Kratzer 2011; Matthewson
2013, 2014; Wurmbrand 2014). Matthewson (2014) demonstrates that modals in Gitksan (Tsimshi-
anic) which express permission ((i)) are only felicitous if the embedded clause is future-oriented. In
Gitksan, future orientation is only licensed by the future marker dim, which is obligatory in (i).
(i) anook-xw(=hl)
deontic.poss-med=cn
#(dim)
fut
ha’w-s
go.home-pn
Savanna.
Savanna
‘It was allowed that Savanna went home.’
(Matthewson 2013: (73))
We could claim that whatever operator is responsible for priority modality in Navajo is, it is like
the Gitksan modal in (i) and selects for future-marked verbs.
Alternatively, we could claim that only clauses with future-marked verbs can express priority
modality because this meaning is carred by future morphology itself. There is a long tradition in the
literature for treating future as a type of modal which quantifies over some set of possible worlds.
A subset of the work which advances or supports this theory is Jespersen (1924), Thomason (1970),
Lyons (1977), Smith (1978), Palmer (1979), Enç (1996), Stowell (2000), Copley (2002), Condoravdi
(2003), Kaufmann (2005), Jaszczolt (2006), Tonhauser (2006), Giannakidou (2012), and Klecha
(2013). The only recent account which explicitly argues against a modal account of the future is
Kissine (2008). The idea would be that future morphology in Navajo is a modal which permits both
predictive (‘normal future’) and priority-oriented meanings.
27The importance of future morphology rules against a view in which particleless main clause and
nisin-sentences contain a covert version of the desire-related particle laanaa. As seen most recently
in section 4.3.1, future-marked verbs are not required with laanaa, either in main clauses or in
nisin-sentences.
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Relating expressions of priority with attitudes of ‘wanting’ In the previous
subsection, I argued that what I previously characterized as attitudes of ‘thinking’
in Navajo arise when main clauses which express assertions are embedded by nisin. I
argue now that we can make a parallel move and say that what I previously called
attitudes of ‘wanting’ arise when main clauses which express priorities are embedded
by nisin and, as such, the priorities expressed are tied to a particular individual.
It is certainly not implausible to associate ‘wanting’ with particular personal pri-
orities. As previously discussed, Portner (2009) uses the term ‘priority’ modality to
subsume categories of modality which relate to what is necessary or possible in light
of desires, goals, and rules. As Portner (2009) illustrates with sentences like (58) that
the line between desires and goals is frequently indistinct. Portner illustrates with
sentences like (58). Is it Mary’s goal or her desire to eat salted caramels? That is,
when we utter (58), are we making a claim about what Mary should do in order to
satisfy her desires, or what she should do in order to satisfy her goals? It is hard to
tell.
(58) (Given her love of salted caramel,) Mary should try this candy.
Given the arbitrariness of the boundaries between goals and desires, Portner writes
that “we should not think of the categories [of priority modality] as mutually exclu-
sive or as exhausting the range of meanings” (2009: 185). Indeed, in their discus-
sion of the annotation of modality in texts, Rubinstein et al. (2013) use the term
bouletic/teleological to refer to “tokens that are arguably both bouletic and teleolog-
ical.” Rubinstein (2012: 134) proposes that desires can be viewed as a “special type
of goal (one that can be associated with a desiring agent).”
If desires (and desire-like goals) can be loosely characterized as priorities linked to
particular agents, it is not surprising that the nisin-sentences of interest are translated
into English as ‘want.’ Nisin serves to introduce a particular individual’s perspective.
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The embedded cause expresses priorities which are tied to that individual’s perspec-
tive: they are the priorities which are held by the attitude holder and not necessarily
held, for instance, by society at large. That is, the influence of nisin (in some way)
restricts the kinds of priorities taken into consideration.
Before accepting this picture, however, we should rule out an alternative to it.
Perhaps desires more specifically — and not a broader notion of priorities — are
what link main clauses to their nisin-sentence counterparts. That is, perhaps priority
meanings are only licensed for main clauses where the priorities concerned could be
construed as desires held by the speaker.
However, while it may be the case that all desires count as priorities, it is not the
case that all priorities count as desires. In order to decide between the two pictures
presented above, we should determine whether conjunctions of the shape in (59) are
permitted with the interpretation shown.
(59) [-fut], but [:-fut nisin]
‘Should , but I don’t want to .’
If the first clause in (59) necessarily invokes desires, consultants should judge (59) to
be contradictory: the first clause would express the  should happen given the desires
held, but the second clause immediately denies that the speaker has this desire.
The contexts that we considered in (56) and (57) do not tell us what we need
to know: while desires were not explicitly invoked in the setup for each context, it
is not strange to imagine that town inspectors might want, on some level, to have
roads be up to code, or that a health care worker might want her clients to be as
safe as possible. I looked at contexts designed to elicit structures with the shape and
meaning shown in (59). I designed the contexts to make salient priorities which were
in explicit conflict with the desires of the speaker. One such context-sentence pair is
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given in (60), which demonstrates that the interpretation attributed to (59) is indeed
attested.
(60) a. Context: What society tells us is that one should eat cabbage to improve
one’s health. However, you hate cabbage and don’t want to eat it.
b. Ch’il łigaaí
cabbage
deeshł
3O.1S.eat.fut
ndi
but
doo
neg
deeshł
3O.1S.eat.fut
da
neg
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I should eat cabbage, but I don’t want to eat it.’
In the noncontradictory reading of (60b), whatever priorities are referenced in the
first clause are separable from the speaker’s desires. The first clause expresses that
in light of priorities held in society, the speaker should eat cabbage. The second
clause, by contrast, indicates that in light of the priorities which are associated with
a particular agent (the speaker), the speaker should not eat cabbage.
We will return to examples like (60) in sec. 4.4.1 when we consider the relationship
between nisin-sentences and parenthetical uses of think in English. We will see that
the (un) availability of constructions of the shape in (59) distinguishes nisin-sentences
from English sentences with parenthetical think.
4.4 Placing nisin-sentences in a broader theoretical context
In the previous sections, I argued that Navajo nisin-sentences do not lend them-
selves to accounts of attitude reports in which the attitude is determined by the
choice of attitude verb.28 The picture of nisin-sentences which emerged had two key
ingredients. First, the attitude verb nisin is a light expression which does not de-
termine the attitude reported. Instead, nisin functions only to determine the point
28Authors who develop, or assume, a verb-driven view of attitude reports include Cresswell and
von Stechow (1982), Heim (1992), Moltmann (1997), Schlenker (1999), von Stechow (2002), van
Geenhoven and McNally (2005), Hacquard (2006, 2010), Villalta (2008), Condoravdi and Lauer
(2010), Stephenson (2010), Rubinstein (2012), Anand and Hacquard (2013), Charlow and Sharvit
(2014), Grano (2015), and Pearson (to appear).
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of view and temporal perspective against which the embedded clause is evaluated.
Second, the meaning of the embedded clause determines the attitude reported by the
nisin-sentence as a whole. For example, attitudes similar to ‘thinking’ or ‘wanting’
are reported when nisin embeds clauses which, when used as main clauses, express
assertions, epistemic claims, and priority modality.
The first ingredient finds precedent in two places: (i) proposals about special
‘parenthetical’ uses of attitude verbs by Urmson (1952), Rooryck (2001), Simons
(2007), and Lewis (2013), and (ii) a novel theoretical account of attitude reports
pioneered by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and subsequently developed by Moulton (2009,
2015). The second ingredient is also rooted in the aforementioned alternative analysis
of attitude reports by Kratzer and Moulton. Kratzer and Moulton present a range
of empirical arguments from English and German to argue that clauses embedded by
attitude verbs contain modal material which is crucial to the interpretation of attitude
reports. Kratzer and Moulton develop a fully compositional account which captures
the new relationship between the attitude verb and embedded modal operators. Even
though I do not develop a compositional analysis of the Navajo facts, Kratzer and
Moulton’s proposals provide models which could form the basis for such an analysis,
in which embedded material — e.g. expressions of priority and epistemic modality
— drives the interpretation of nisin-sentences.
4.4.1 Attitude verbs with an evidential-like function
I first relate the lightness of nisin to discussion of special ‘parenthetical’ uses of
English attitude verbs by authors including Urmson (1952), Rooryck (2001), Simons
(2007), and Lewis (2013).29 As Simons (2007) discusses, different utterances of sen-
29I thank Angelika Kratzer (p.c.) for making clear to me the link between parenthetical uses of
attitude verbs and my claims about Navajo nisin-sentences.
176
tences like (61) can differ in their ‘main point.’ (The sentence in (61) is adapted
slightly from an example given by Simons (2007).)
(61) Henry { thinks, believes, says, hears, ...} that Louise will see Bill tomorrow
night.
Authors have long observed that in certain utterances of (61), the attitude verb in
(61) can be interpreted ‘parenthetically,’ such that the ‘main point’ of the utterance
is carried not by the main clause but instead by the embedded clause (Urmson 1952,
Bresnan 1968, Ross 1973, Hooper 1975, Reinhart 1983, Rooryck 2001, Simons 2007,
Lewis 2013, Denis 2015). Evidence for the ‘main point’ status of the embedded clause
in (61) comes from several sources. First, sentences like (61) are felicitous as answers
to questions which relate to the content of the embedded clause. This is illustrated
in (62).
(62) a. A: Who will Louise see tomorrow night?
b. B: Henry thinks/believes that she will see Bill tomorrow night.
c. B: Henry said that she will see Bill tomorrow night.
d. B: Henry heard that she will see Bill tomorrow night.
(adapt. Simons 2007: (2))
The felicity of (62b)-(62d) as responses to (62a) is unexpected if we believe the
main point of an utterance can only be carried by the main clause. Simons (2007) cites
work by Abbott (2000) as exemplifying this point of view.) It would not be appropri-
ate to respond to a question about Louise’s plans with a claim about Henry’s state
of mind. Rather, the answer to the question in (62a) is provided by the embedded
clauses in (62b)-(62d), that Louise will see Bill. The embedding verbs think, believe,
say, and hear function parenthetically in (62b)-(62d): they provide more information
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about the claim made by the embedded clause — namely that it is associated with
Henry — but this information is not the main point.
Lewis (2013) considers another kind of evidence for the main point status of certain
embedded clauses. Lewis cites data like (63):
(63) a. A: Where is John? It’s time to start the meeting.
b. B: Mary thinks he’s working from home.
c. C, v.1: No, he’s actually in the conference room.
d. C, v.2: #No, she thinks he’s too busy to attend today.
(Lewis 2013: (152) - (153))
Lewis observes that the embedded clause in (63b) must have ‘main point’ status since
a third party C could respond to B with (63c), which provides an alternative location
for John. By contrast, C cannot respond as in (63d) with information about Mary’s
beliefs. If the main clause in (63b) had main point status, we would expect (63d) to
be felicitous and (63c) to be infelicitous.
A different utterance of the sentence in (61) could instead carry its main point in
the main clause. I refer to this interpretation as involving a ‘non-parenthetical’ use
of the attitude verb. Simons illustrates this use with question-answer pairs like (64).
Given the felicity of B’s response, the main clause in (64b) must carry the main point
of the utterance: this is because A’s question concerned Henry’s mental state. B’s
response describes Henry’s mental state.
(64) a. A: What is bothering Henry?
b. B: He thinks that Louise will see Bill tomorrow night.
(Simons 2007: (3))
Simons cites Urmson (1952) as the originator of discussion about parenthetical
uses of certain embedding verbs. Urmson writes that parenthetical verbs “prime the
hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of
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our statements” (Urmson 1952: 484). As Rooryck (2001) notes, Urmson attributes
to parenthetical verbs many of the attributes we currently attributed to expressions
which function as ‘evidentials,’ carrying information about the “source and reliability
of the embedded claim” (Simons 2007: 1034). Among the evidential-like meanings
which Rooryck cites for parenthetical verbs are those in (65).
(65) a. I feel that Jules is back. Nonvisual sensorial
b. I see that Jules is back. Sensory inferential
c. Sarah said that Jules is back. Quotative
d. I believe/think/guess/suppose/gather that Jules is back. Speculative
(adapt. Rooryck 2001: 158)
4.4.1.1 Similarities between parenthetical think and nisin
In section 4.2, I considered — and discarded — hypotheses in nisin made the
same semantic contribution as English attitude verbs want and think, under a view of
these verbs in which they determine the attitude reported by the sentence as a whole.
However, when I argued that nisin makes a contribution distinct from English think,
I was focused on a very particular use of think, one which reported beliefs. Now that
we have expanded our view of think to take into account its use as a semantically
parenthetical expression, we find that nisin-sentences are quite similar to English
sentences with parenthetical think.
The basic parallels between these constructions and nisin-sentences should already
be clear. In both, the main point of the utterance is carried by the embedded clause.
In English, this is illustrated by demonstrating the felicity of attitude reports as
answers to questions about the content of the embedded clause (e.g. (62)). In Navajo,
I made this point by demonstrating that the attitude reported by a nisin-sentence as a
whole is determined by the meaning of the embedded clause. The function of nisin is
to make clear whose assertions or whose priorities the embedded clause concerns. In
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this way, nisin has a function like the evidential meanings attributed to parenthetical
verbs in (65).
Once we turn our attention to parenthetical uses of attitude verbs in English,
we can identify some more specific interpretative similarities between English and
Navajo nisin-sentences. In the example in (62), B’s responses expressed a prediction
(attributed in part to Henry) about what Louise will do tomorrow night. We can also
find sentences with parenthetical think which permit a desire-like interpretation.30 In
the dialogue in (66), B’s response contains think used parenthetically: A’s question is
answered by the embedded clause. Crucially, B’s response is not making a prediction
about the future. Rather, as shown by the paraphrase, she is expressing a desire or
disposition for getting spinach soup.31;32
(66) a. A: What will you get from the buffet?
b. B: I think that I will get spinach soup.
 I am disposed to get (i.e. have a preference for) spinach soup.
30I thank Peggy Speas and Angelika Kratzer for bringing these examples to my attention.
31It seems that future morphology is needed in the embedded clause in order for asentence like
(66b) to obtain its ‘desire’-like meaning. We might ask why future morphology is necessary. One
hypothesis is that the ‘desire’ paraphrase in (66) seems tied to the ‘dispositional’ use of English
future, as discussed by Copley (2002) and many others. According to Copley, this meaning for will
can take into account desires held in the context.
Copley illustrates this kind of use for will in main clauses with examples like (i):
(i) a. Context: Seen on a billboard:
b. We will change your oil in Madera.
(Copley 2002: (132)
(ib) can express an ‘offer’ in addition to a prediction. In the context of a billboard, the ‘offer’
meaning is far more accessible. Copley proposes that the ‘offer’ interpretation arises when will
quantifies over future worlds compatible with the desires of the addressee. The influence of desires
can be represented in a conditional paraphrase like: If you want us to change your oil in Madera,
we will change your oil in Madera (Copley 2002: 137a).
32In order for English sentences with think to allow a desire-like interpretation, the embedded
clause must be animate and capable of expressing volition, viz. the absence of such a meaning for a
sentence like I think it will rain.
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Sentences with English parenthetical think and Navajo nisin exhibit another par-
allel as well: we can construct English sentences with parenthetical think which allow
meanings like those that we identified for Navajo sentences with one nisin but which
expressed two attitudes. (67) repeats the key example from Navajo. (68) gives a near
equivalent from English.33
(67) a. Context: Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff. She wants to go visit him
some time, but she does not have any definite plans to do so and knows
it is very likely it will not happen. I’m telling you about Alice.
b. Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3S.move.perf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3O.to
deeshááł]
1S.go.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and she wants to go see him.’
(68) I think that Bill moved to Flagstaff and that I’ll go see him.
In my judgment, the English sentence in (68) can be uttered by Alice in a context
like (67a). Crucially, the second embedded clause, that I’ll go see him, can describe
a state of affairs which the speaker desires. The speaker is expressing a desire to go
see Bill: she is not expressing that she believes that she will (or wants to) go see him.
That is, whatever the function of think is in (68), it does not necessarily introduce an
attitude which relates to beliefs.
Given the discussion from Urmson, Rooryck, Simons, Lewis, and others about
the contribution of parenthetical attitude verbs, it is not surprising that a sentence
with a single instance of parenthetical think can occur in a sentence which allows the
‘mixed’ meaning described. I think in (68) indicates that the speaker is the ‘source’
of the embedded claims (to use terminology from Rooryck): the speaker is making
33The English example in (68) and the discussion below are thanks to Angelika Kratzer (p.c.).
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an assertion that Bill moved to Flagstaff and is expressing a preference or desire to
see him.
If nisin in (67b) makes contribution similar to the one claimed for English par-
enthetical think, then it is likewise unsurprising that the Navajo sentence in (67b)
allows the attested meaning: like parenthetical think, nisin indicates that the speaker
is the ‘source’ of the embedded claims, one of which is an assertion and one of which
is an expression of priorities.
4.4.1.2 Differences between parenthetical think and nisin
Despite a number of similarities between nisin and parenthetical uses of English
attitude verbs (especially think), we cannot say that both verbs make completely
identical contributions. I discuss below two apparent differences between nisin and
parenthetical think.
Differences in embedded priority modals English parenthetical think and Navajo
nisin diverge with respect to the meanings permitted when they combine with em-
bedded clauses describing priorities. This difference becomes apparent when we try
to ‘construct’ attitudes similar to ‘wanting’ English using the strategy that I explored
for Navajo in section 4.3.3.2. Under one reading, (69a) was translated into English
with the priority modal should. When nisin was added ((69b)), the sentence was
instead translated with want.
(69) a. Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył.
3O.3S.stew.fut
‘Kii should eat stew.’
b. Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooył]
3O.3S.stew.fut
nízin.
3S.att.impf
‘Mary wants Kii to eat stew.’
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If we claim that Navajo nisin performs the same function as English parenthetical
think, then we might predict (69b) to be true in the same kinds of situations as the
English sentence with parenthetical think in (70b). As before, I present the target
sentence in a short dialogue to ensure we are targeting the parenthetical use of think.
In (70b), parenthetical (i.e. evidential-like) think embeds a clause which contains a
priority modal, should.
(70) a. A: What should Kii have for dinner?
b. B: Mary thinks that Kii should eat stew.
The English sentence in (70b) and the Navajo sentence in (69b) differ in the
entailment relations which hold between each sentence and the language’s respective
expression of priority modality in main clauses. In section 4.3.3.2, we saw that Navajo
sentences like (71b) were judged to be non-contradictory in contexts like (71a).
However, (69) comes apart from (70) when we consider the entailment relations
which hold between each sentence and the language’s respective strategy for express-
ing priority modality in main clauses. We saw in section 4.3.3.2 that sentences like
(71) were judged to be non-contradictory.
(71) a. Context: What society tells us is that one should eat cabbage to improve
one’s health. However, you hate cabbage and don’t want to eat it.
b. Ch’il łigaaí
cabbage
deeshł
3O.1S.eat.fut
ndi
but
doo
neg
deeshł
3O.1S.eat.fut
da
neg
nisin.
1S.att.impf
‘I should eat cabbage, but I don’t want to eat it.’
Given that (71b) does not express a contradiction, it seems that whatever priorities
are relevant to the first clause, they are distinct from the priorities relevant to the
second clause. The first clause expresses that in light of priorities held in society, the
speaker should eat cabbage. The second clause, by contrast, indicates that in light of
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the priorities which are associated with a particular agent (the speaker), the speaker
should not eat cabbage.
By contrast, I find the English sentences in (72) to be contradictory. This is
true regardless of where think is pronounced in the sentence. I show I think in three
positions to confirm we are dealing with parenthtical think: placement of I think
makes no difference to the contradictory nature of (71).
(72) a. #I should eat cabbage but I think I shouldn’t eat cabbage.
b. #I should eat cabbage but I shouldn’t, I think, eat cabbage.
c. #I should eat cabbage but I shouldn’t eat cabbage, I think.
Given that all of the sentences in (72) are contradictory, whatever priorities are rel-
evant to the first clause must also be relevant in the second clause. Either the first
clause cannot set aside the speaker’s personal priorities, or the second clause cannot
set aside society’s priorities. Whatever the case, there is a real difference between
English sentences like I think I should  on one hand and, on the other hand, English
sentences I want to  and Navajo nisin-sentences expressing personal priorities.
I leave for future work the question of whether this difference arises because of a
difference in the semantic contribution of nisin vs. parenthetical think, a difference in
English and Navajo priority modality, or a combination of the two factors.
Nisin only has an ‘evidential-like’ function There is also a more fundamental
difference between nisin and English attitude verbs used parenthetically: there is
no sense in which nisin as discussed above is being used ‘parenthetically.’ Rather,
its evidential-like function seems to be its one and only contribution. Nisin always
determines (only) the individual and time relative to which the embedded clause is
evaluated, while the embedded clause always determines the attitude expressed.
By contrast, Simons (2007) and Lewis (2013) propose that the evidential-like
function of English attitude verbs only arises secondarily in special contexts as the
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result of special pragmatic circumstances.34 Furthermore, for these authors there is
nothing semantically distinct about ‘parenthetical’ and ‘non-parenthetical’ attitude
verbs. While these authors do not make explicit claims about the lexical entries
of attitude verbs, there is nothing in their discussion to suggest that they would
assign attitude verbs denotations other than entries which are solely responsible for
determining the attitude reported.35
4.4.2 Locating key aspects of attitude meanings in embedded clauses
As we discussed above, nisin always has a light meaning: it never functions to
determine the attitude expressed by a nisin-sentence. This was the first ingredient of
our picture of nisin-sentences. The second ingredient was closely related: since nisin
does not determine the attitude expressed, this meaning must be contributed by the
clause embedded by nisin. Both of these ingredients are precedented in proposals first
made by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) for English and German and subsequently developed
by Moulton (2009, 2015) for other constructions in English.36
Kratzer and Moulton’s proposals present an alternative to a compositional account
of attitude reports in which the attitude verb is defined such that it alone determines
34It is not the case that all authors claim the evidential-like meaning is secondary. As Simons (2007:
1041, fn. 9) points out, Urmson (1952) suggests that for some attitude verbs, the parenthetical and
evidential use may be primary; the use of these verbs as “psychological descriptions” is secondary.
Even so, however, Navajo nisin would still behave differently from English attitude verbs: nisin does
not seem to have a non-evidential meaning available even as a secondary interpretation.
35Rooryck, Simons, and Lewis differ in their conception of how evidential meanings arise for
English attitude verbs used parenthetically. Simons (2007) argues that attitude verbs come by their
bleached parenthetical meaning due to a process of pragmatic reasoning (Simons 2007: 1040). Lewis
(2013) continues Simons’ pragmatic account, proposing that the embedded clause achieves its ‘main
point’ function to resolve a mismatch between the Question Under Discussion and the utterance.
Rooryck (2001: 131) discusses the ‘de-intensification’ of parenthetical verbs by which movement of
a verb to a higher syntactic projection (MoodevidentialP) somehow results in the bleaching of the
attitude verb such that it functions as an evidential head.
36While the discussion below focuses on Kratzer and Moulton, other authors have also explored
accounts which build on Kratzer (2006, 2013a). In particular, see Anand and Hacquard (2009) and
White (2014) for discussion of additional data from English, and Deal (2014) for discussion of the
application of such an account to data from Nez Perce (Sahaptian).
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the attitude reported. Authors who develop, or assume, an account of this general
shape include Cresswell and von Stechow (1982), Heim (1992), Moltmann (1997),
Schlenker (1999), von Stechow (2002), van Geenhoven and McNally (2005), Hacquard
(2006, 2010), Villalta (2008), Condoravdi and Lauer (2010), Stephenson (2010), Ru-
binstein (2012), Anand and Hacquard (2013), Charlow and Sharvit (2014), Grano
(2015), and Pearson (to appear). These authors assign attitude reports modal truth
conditions. Attitude verbs are treated as modal quantifiers which compose first with
the proposition (set of possible worlds) determined by the embedded clause. Attitude
verbs determine the attitude reported by determining what kinds of possible worlds
are quantified over. For instance, the verb believe is standardly assumed to quantify
over doxastic alternatives. If Alice believes that Mary is at home is true, then in all
of Mary’s doxastic alternatives, the proposition that Mary is at home is true.
Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and, subsequently, Moulton (2009, 2015) maintain a modal
semantics for attitude reports in their entirety but argue that the modal meaning
is not contributed by attitude verbs. They present a fully compositional account in
which modal meaning associated with a particular attitude report comes instead from
functional material in the periphery of the embedded clause. Example (73) gives a
schematic version of the logical forms they explore.
(73) [ attitude.verb [ modal ...... ] ]
In the following subsection, I summarize a subset of Kratzer and Moulton’s em-
pirical arguments from English and German in favor of this alternative view. At the
end of the subsection, I return to the connections between Kratzer and Moulton’s
proposals and our picture of Navajo nisin-sentences. I argue that the division of se-
mantic labor between nisin and embedded material represents is distinct from what
is found in English and German but is very much a predicted state of affairs given
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Kratzer’s framework. Navajo represents a ‘limiting case’ in which all meaning specific
to a particular attitude is located in the embedded clause.
4.4.2.1 Empirical arguments in favor of embedded modals
In this subsection, I briefly summarize some of the empirical arguments which
Kratzer and Moulton present in support of locating modal operators in clauses em-
bedded by attitude verbs. The arguments to be discussed are given in (74):
(74) a. Expressions for which a modal semantics is motivated only when they
compose with subordinate clauses.
b. Overtly pronounced modals and related expressions in clauses embedded
by attitude verbs.
c. Attitude reports whose interpretation depends on the shape of the em-
bedded clause.
I will present these arguments in broad and informal strokes. See Kratzer (2006,
2013a) and Moulton (2009, 2015) for additional discussion of each of these arguments
and for details of the syntax and compositional semantics of constructions discussed.
Introduction of modal meaning by subordinate clauses I first consider ar-
guments from expressions (nominal and verbal) which do not seem to be inherently
modal expressions but which seem to become modal expressions when they compose
with a subordinate clause. I highlight two arguments of this shape. I first summarize
Kratzer’s (2013a) discussion of ‘manner of speaking’ verbs. I then present discussion
of nominal expressions like story and idea from Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton
(2009, 2015).
First, manner of speaking verbs. Kratzer (2013a) observes that large set of verbs
identified by Levin (1993) can occur both in sentences like (75a) and in sentences like
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(75b). The examples in (75) give only a small set of the many verbs for which this
alternation is attested.
(75) a. I { sighed / growled / chirped / squeaked / brayed / barked / groaned }.
b. I { sighed / growled / chirped / squeaked / brayed / barked / groaned }
that Ortcutt was a traitor.
(Kratzer 2013a)
When we focus only on the sentences in (75a), it seems that verbs like sigh,
growl, and so on function as intransitive expressions whcih describe an instance of
noisemaking by the speaker. By contrast, the sentences in (75b) report communicative
attitudes: the speaker communicates the information carried by the embedded clause,
that Ortcutt was a traitor. The speaker communicates this information via sighing,
growling, etc.
In the strategy pursued by Kratzer (2013a) all of the verbs in (75) have the
semantics in (76). That is, in all of its uses, a verb like sigh describes events of
‘sighing.’37
(76) JsighK = s.sighing(s)
(Kratzer 2013a: 52)
Note that while I only define sigh here, Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton (2009)
consider similarly ‘light’ entries for many other verbs, including believe (denotes sit-
uations of belief), claim (denotes situations of ‘claiming), see (denotes situations of
‘seeing’), and hear (denotes situations of ‘hearing.’ Moulton (2009) discusses see and
hear; I return to them below.
37The subject is added later in the derivation via composition with a head which introduces an
external argument (Kratzer 1996). I suppress for brevity world arguments in denotations given
throughout the following discussion.
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Taken alone, however, the entry for sigh as given in (76) is not suitable for a
sentence like (75b). Kratzer proposes that (75b) can compose with a proposition and
report communicative attitudes of speech because of material which is contained in
the clause subordinate to sigh. (75b) has the schematic logical form in (77).
(77) Ralph sighed [ say [that Ortcutt was a spy] ].
The clause subordinate to sigh contains a covert modal operator, say, which quanti-
fies over worlds consistent with the content of events of speech (i.e. worlds consistent
with what was said in these events).38 In all of these worlds, the proposition deter-
mined by that Ortcutt was a traitor — a set of possible worlds — is true. When the
subordinate clause (bracketed in (77)) composes with the verb sigh, more information
is added about the events of speech in question: they are also ‘sighings.’ For details of
the compositional semantics, see Kratzer (2013a). For our purposes, the key observa-
tion is that verbs like sigh only report communicative attitudes of speech when they
compose with a subordinate that-clause. This is because the modal meaning which
characterizes communicative attitude reports comes from the subordinate clause, not
sigh.
I now turn to a second example of expressions which make a similar point. As
Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton (2009, 2015) discuss, certain nouns can compose
with that-clauses which seem to describe the propositional content which they con-
vey.39 In (78), the that-clause indicates that whatever content is associated with the
story and the rumor, it is consistent with the truth of that Ortcutt was a spy.
(78) Alice heard the story / the rumor [that Ortcutt was a spy].
38That is, the modal domain of quantification is projected from an event, not a possible world.
For discussion of the projection of modal domains from ‘anchors’ — a set which includes individuals,
events, and situations — see Hacquard (2006) and Kratzer (2006, 2013a, 2013b).
39For arguments that that-clauses are modifiers, rather than arguments of, nouns, see Stowell
(1981), Kratzer (2006), and Moulton (2009, 2015).
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The sentence in (78) can be paraphrased informally as follows: if (78) is true,
then that Ortcutt was a spy is true in all worlds consistent with what Alice heard
(the story or rumor). However, it seems unlikely that the modal meaning associated
with communicative attitude reports should be attributed to the entries of nouns like
story and rumor in the general sense. Intuitively, these expressions describe entities.
It is only when they compose with that-clauses that it seems necessary to introduce
modality to their meanings.
Kratzer and Moulton argue that the that-clause in (78) contains a modal which
quantifies over a particular set of accessible worlds, namely the worlds consistent with
the content of the story or rumor. In all of these worlds, the proposition that Ortcutt
is a spy is true. A schematic logical form is given in (79):
(79) Alice heard the story / the rumor [ say that Ortcutt was a spy] ].
To summarize, then, modal meaning is needed to model the meanings of manner of
speaking verbs and nouns which are modified by that-clauses. In both cases, however,
it is not plausible to locate this modal meaning in the entries of the verbs and nouns
themselves. The alternative which Kratzer and Moulton explore is that this key
aspect of meaning comes from the embedded clause.
Overt modal material in the embedded clause Thus far, we have only seen
examples with Kratzer and Moulton consider from English. In both of the examples
explored, the embedded modal was unpronounced. However, it is not always the case
that the posited modals are covert. Kratzer (2013a) discusses a number of languages
which contain certain overt material in embedded clauses. Kratzer proposes that
this material may be overt realizations of the operators that she proposes contribute
attitude-related modal meaning.
In some cases, this material has not been previously analyzed as modal but can
be linked to, e.g., reportative expressions. Kratzer (2013a) points to a number of lan-
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guages in which subordinate clauses in reportative constructions contain complemen-
tizers which are derived from verbs of speech. Kratzer cites examples from Dravidian
and Indo-Aryan languages discussed by Bayer (1999) and suggests that these com-
plementizers may carry the modal meaning characteristic of communicative attitude
reports. Kratzer (2013a) also cites German reportative subjunctive morphology as
potentially serving in this capacity. In a sentence like (80), modal meaning relating
to speech would be carried by the embedded material which triggers the realization
of the reportative subjunctive form of the copula, sei.
(80) Das
the
Gerücht
rumor
sagt,
says
dass
comp
er
he
ein
a
Spion
spy
sei.
is
‘The legend says that he is a spy.
(Kratzer 2013a: 45)
In the examples given above, the embedded material of interest is not material for
which a modal semantics is independently motivated. However, as Kratzer (2013a)
observes, we can also find examples in German and English in which attitude verbs
embed clauses which contain clearly modal expressions. The following examples from
English and German contain priority ((81)) and reportative ((82)) modal expressions,
respectively.
(81) He advised that we should set up an emergency fund.
(Kratzer 2013a: 21)
(82) Ralph
Ralph
behauptet
3S.claims
[Ortcutt
Ortcutt
soll
report
ein
a
Spion
spy
sein].
3S.be
‘Ralph claims that Ortcutt is a spy.’
(Kratzer 2013a: 57)
Both of the sentences above have in common that the embedded modal seems to
(in Kratzer’s words) ‘match’ the embedding verb in some way. In (81), both advise
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and should involve priorities: if you give someone advice, you are telling them what
they should do, or what ought to happen. In (82), both behauptet and soll involve
reported speech. However, as Kratzer discusses, only one priority or reportative
modal meaning seems to be interpreted in each sentence.40 Kratzer proposes that
such sentences present evidence that attitude verbs embed functional material (e.g.
should, soll) which express modal meanings previously associated with attitude verbs
themselves. That is, (81) has the meaning it does because the embedded clause
contains a priority modal; (82) has the meaning it does because the embedded clause
contains a reportative modal. Once again, meaning which is key to different kinds of
attitude reports is parceled out to the embedded clause.
Link between differences in meaning and embedded clause structure Thus
far, we have seen different pieces of empirical evidence in favor of placing modal op-
erators in clauses embedded by attitude verbs. The final kind of data to be discussed
comes from Moulton (2009) and demonstrates that by invoking a range of inter-
changeable embedded modal operators, we can explain differences in the meanings of
minimally different sentences.
Moulton considers data including the paradigm in (83). While the sentences in
(83a)-(83b) contain the same verbs (see, hear, feel), they have different truth condi-
tions (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, Barwise 1981, among others).41
(83) Perception verb paradigm (partial)
a. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [it to be raining].
b. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [that it was raining]. (Moulton 2009)
40For other discussion of apparently ‘harmonic’ or uninterpreted modal expressions, see authors
including Halliday (1970), Lyons (1977), Coates (1983), Palmer (1986), Portner (1997, 2009), Geurts
and Huitink (2006), and Zeijlstra (2007)).
41Moulton also considers factive uses of perception verbs (e.g. Mary saw that ). For discussion
of factivity within such an approach, see Moulton (2009) and Kratzer (2013a).
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The sentence in (83a) reports an epistemic commitment on the part ofMary. That
is, Mary believes that what she saw (heard, felt, etc.) was a situation of it raining.
This is demonstrated by the following infelicitous example:
(84) Mary saw / heard / felt it to be raining, # but she believed it wasn’t.
While (83a) expresses epistemic commitment, it differs from (83b) in that only
the latter is factive. This contrast is demonstrated by (85). It is not felicitous to
deny the truth of the embedded clause in (83b)/(85b). No infelicity arises with such
a denial for (83a)/(85a).
(85) a. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [it to be raining], but it actually wasn’t.
b. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [that it was raining], # but it actually wasn’t.
Under a view of attitude reports in which the meaning of the report as a whole
is driven by the attitude verb’s semantics, we must posit multiple entries for each
perception verb. One version of see, hear, and feel would encode epistemic commit-
ment but not factivity. A second homophonous version of each verb would encode
factivity. As Moulton (2009) points out, this move is inelegant.
Moulton’s (2009) alternative account locates modal operators associated with epis-
temic commitment and with factivity in the clauses embedded by perception verbs.42
(86) a. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [epi [it to be raining ] ].
b. Mary { saw / heard / felt } [fact that it was raining ] ].
By invoking different functional material, Moulton is better-positioned to explain
why the morphosyntactic shape of the embedded clause is correlated with differences
in the meaning of the sentence as a whole. The embedded modal determines whether
42See Kratzer (2013a) for independent discussion of sentences whose differences in meaning are
best attributed to alternation in embedded functional material.
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or not the attitude report as a whole is factive or only expresses epistemic commit-
ment. The embedded modal also determines the shape of the embedded clause (e.g.
its finiteness). Both the meaning of the sentence and its morphosyntactic form de-
pend on the choice of modal operator. In Moulton’s analysis, replacing one operator
with another leads to the observed semantic and morphosyntactic differences.
4.4.2.2 Nisin-sentences in the context of Kratzer and Moulton
The empirical evidence which I summarized above supports Kratzer and Moulton’s
alternative conceptualization of attitude reports. In their accounts, key aspects of
an attitude report’s meaning — their modality — come not from the attitude verb
but from the embedded clause. Similarly, I have claimed that the meaning of the
embedded clause determines the attitude reported by a nisin-sentence.
We can also see more specific similarities between Navajo and the accounts given
by Kratzer and Moulton. In each of their accounts, the modal meaning of an em-
bedded clause is determined by what modal operator the embedded clausal periphery
contains. (87) repeats the simple schematic of this logical form. Proposed occupants
of the ‘modal’ position include overt elements (including English and German priority
and reportative expressions) and covert elements (including say, epi, and fact).
(87) [ attitude.verb [ modal ...... ] ]
In our earlier discussion of Navajo, I claimed only that the meaning of the em-
bedded clause determined the meaning of the nisin-sentence as a whole. I did not
attribute the key meaning to some particular piece of embedded material. Taking
proposals by Kratzer and Moulton as our starting point, we can begin to see what
shape a compositional picture might take: it is not that the meaning of the embed-
ded clause in its entirety determines what attitude is reported, but rather that the
attitude is determined by particular functional material within the embedded clause.
194
We have already seen two obvious candidates for such material in Navajo. As
we first discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2), Navajo particles sha’shin and laanaa
can only be prounced at the edge of the embedded clause. This suggests that these
particles occur in the periphery of the embedded clause, just like the modal operators
which Kratzer and Moulton propose and explore for German and English.
The following questions must be addressed when we develop a compositional ac-
count of nisin-sentences:
(88) a. How does nisin “connect up” semantically with the embedded clause?
b. What is the set of element(s) found in the embedded clause which are
responsible for determining the attitude? What are their denotations?
With respect to the first question, I again look to the answers given for English
and German by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton (2009, 2015). While each author’s
account differs in certain details of its implementation, each author defines attitude
verbs and embedded modals in such a way that the attitude report as a whole receives
a modal semantics which reflects both the semantic characteristics of the attitude verb
and the embedded modal.43
The second question will be interesting to investigate for Navajo. I already sug-
gested that sha’shin and laanaa are good candidates for the peripheral modal expres-
sions which Kratzer and Moulton posit for German and English. What should be
done with particleless nisin-sentences? An obvious hypothesis is to claim that parti-
cleless clauses embedded by nisin contain covert modal operators. Under an account
of this shape, we will minimally need a priority modal and another modal operator
associated with assertions. Conveniently, covert modal expressions of both kinds have
43One difference is the kind of semantic relationship which holds between the embedding verb and
embedded clause. Moulton (2015) proposes that embedding verbs semantically select for embedded
clauses. By contrast, Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton (2009) develop analyses in which the
embedding verb does not select for an embedded clause. Instead, it is modified (optionally) by the
embedded clause.
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been independently entertained by previous authors. Bhatt (1999) proposes a covert
priority modal occurs in certain English infinitival relative clauses.44 Alonso-Ovalle
and Menéndez-Benito (2010) build on previous proposals and posit a covert modal
which occurs in main clause assertions in a variety of languages (see also Hacquard
(2010)).
Navajo nisin-sentences present a ‘limiting case’ in the theoretical landscape which
is predicted by Kratzer and Moulton’s proposals. I have argued that all attitudes
of ‘thinking’ and ‘wanting’ which we have discussed contain the same verb, nisin.
Because there is only one verb, any differences in the attitude reported by a nisin-
sentence must be due to the choice of embedded material. Subtle distinctions in
different attitudes of ‘wanting,’ for instance, would follow from how we define laanaa
as opposed to the priority modal. In short, then, any responsibility for determining
what attitude is reported has been completely removed from the attitude verb.
The division of labor is different in Navajo than it is in German. In contrast with
Navajo, English and German have a variety of attitude verbs which occur in attitude
reports which are, in some cases, quite subtly different: compare, for instance, the
set of think vs. suppose vs. conclude vs. surmise, or claim vs. say vs. propose.45
For Kratzer and Moulton, each attitude verb in this set denotes different kinds of
situations or events, e.g. an event of ‘claiming’ vs. an event of ‘proposing.’ The set
is united by the choice of embedded modal, e.g. a reportative modal such as say
44Bhatt considers sentences including (ib) and argues that the infinitival relative clause here admits
the reading targeted by the context and informally paraphrased with should because it contains an
unpronounced priority modal.
(i) a. Context: The goal is to solve the problem but without violating any social norms.
b. Magnus knows how [ modalpri to solve the problem].
 Magnus knows how he should solve the problem.
45Authors including Urmson (1952), Hooper (1975), Givón (1982), Thompson and Mulac (1991),
and Denis (2015)) discuss subtle differences in various attitude verbs which relate to ‘thinking.’
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(Kratzer 2013a). In this picture, differences between different attitude reports within
the family would fall out from differences in the kinds of situations denoted.
Since Kratzer and Moulton’s accounts invoke two basic pieces — the attitude verb
and an embedded modal — we expect the existence of a system like Navajo nisin-
sentences. English, German, and Navajo all use these same two basic pieces when
building attitude reports. However, the languages differ in the semantic importance
assigned to each piece. Navajo has one verb, nisin, which is maximally light. English
and German, by contrast, have many attitude verbs which are semantically ‘heavier’
than nisin: they help to determine the attitude reported. The relative weight in
Navajo vs. English and German reverses when we turn to the embedded modal:
Navajo has a richer set of embedded modals than is needed in English and German.
The typological differences between the three languages fall out, then, by adjusting
the relative semantic importance of the attitude verb and the embedded modal.
4.4.3 Summary
I have discussed two lines of theoretical work which can inform further exploration
and formalization of nisin-sentences. The picture which I presented of nisin-sentences
had two key ingredients. The first ingredient was the lightness of the attitude verb,
nisin. I related this ingredient to an alternative view of attitude reports developed
by Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton (2009, 2015) and by a separate set of propos-
als about ‘parenthetical’ attitude verbs by Urmson (1952), Rooryck (2001), Simons
(2007), and Lewis (2013). The second ingredient was the use of the embedded clause
to determine what attitude was reported. Precedent for greater semantic importance
for the embeddd clause comes from Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and Moulton’s (2009, 2015)
alternative conceptualization of attitude reports in English and German. Kratzer and
Moulton’s proposals provide a basis for future formalization of Navajo nisin-sentences.
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4.5 Chapter summary
In this chapter, I considered in greater detail a subset of the rich range of data
introduced in Chapter 3. The focus was on the following puzzle: if, as I argue, there
is a single nisin with a constant semantics, what determines the attitude which is ex-
pressed by a nisin-sentence? My investigation of the expression of attitudes in Navajo
was guided by the questions and answers addressed the research program begun by
Kratzer (2006, 2013a) and subsequently developed by Moulton (2009, 2015). I pro-
posed that the clauses embedded by nisin can be systematically related to their main
clause counterparts. These clauses express meanings including desire, conclusions
drawn from indirect evidence, assertions, and priorities. Navajo uses the semantically
bleached verb nisin to introduce the individual and time relative to which the embed-
ded clause is evaluated. When viewed from the perspective of Kratzer and Moulton’s
compositional account of attitude reports, Navajo nisin-sentences represent a ‘limiting
case,’ demonstrating how much meaning can be removed from the attitude verb and
attributed instead to embedded material.
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PART III: ADJECTIVAL AND
COMPARATIVE MEANING IN
NAVAJO
CHAPTER 5
ADJECTIVAL AND COMPARATIVE MEANING IN
NAVAJO
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on another topic where investigation of Navajo data can
enrich both our empirical and theoretical perspectives: what are the syntactic and
semantic characteristics of adjectival expressions and degree constructions which con-
tain them? The data and discussion in this chapter build directly on work previously
published as Bogal-Allbritten (2013) and Bogal-Allbritten (2014).
In the first part of the chapter, I present an empirically rich picture of the mor-
phological, syntactic, and semantic characteristics of the structures of interest. I then
develop an account of the syntax and semantics of adjectival verbs in Navajo. I argue
that while all adjectival verbs in Navajo denote expressions of the same semantic type
— relations between degrees and individuals — they differ in the syntactic structure
they project. The size of the syntactic structure is correlated with the choice of
adjectival morphology. Adjectival verbs which bear so-called ‘Comparative Aspect’
morphology project an extended functional structure (degree phrase, DegP) which
surrounds the lexical adjectival phrase (AP) projection. This structure includes syn-
tactic positions for a DP (the subject) and a degree expression (e.g. comparative
phrases, measure phrases, intensifiers, etc.). By contrast, adjectival verbs marked
for so-called ‘Absolute Aspect’ and ‘Perfect Aspect’ only project an AP structure.
This syntactic structure only has space for one argument, the subject DP. I propose
that by positing morphologically-determined syntactic heterogeneity among the set
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of Navajo adjectival verbs, we can explain various differences in degree constructions
which contain adjectival verbs of different morphological shapes.1
5.2 The morphology of adjectival verbs in Navajo
This section introduces the basic morphological characteristics of adjectival ex-
pressions in Navajo. The discussion in this section builds on the descriptive picture
of Navajo verbs presented in Chapter 2 (section 2.2). Whereas the earlier discussion
focused on the morphology associated with eventive verbs, this section focuses on the
morphology found on verbs which denote adjectival properties.
Predicative adjectival meanings in Navajo are uniformally expressed by means of
verbs.2 As was first discussed in Chapter 2, Navajo verbs that describe events can
1One topic which will not be taken up in this chapter is the possibility of analyzing some, or
all, Navajo adjectival verbs without recourse to degrees. A degree-free view of adjectival meaning
was first addressed by Klein (1980) for English adjectives. Much more recently, authors including
van Rooij (2011) and Burnett (2014) have developed new degree-free analyses which avoid certain
problems which Klein’s original analysis was said to face (von Stechow 1984, Klein 1991). Authors
including Kennedy (2007), Beck et al. (2009), and Bochnak (2013, 2015) have also investigated
degree-free accounts of adjectival meaning. Unlike Klein, van Rooij, and Burnett, however, these
authors propose that only certain languages lack degrees; they propose to model certain crosslin-
guistic differences by appealing to parametric variation with respect to degree arguments. I leave
further for future work consideration of the Navajo data discussed here in light of the evidence and
analyses presented by authors cited above.
2Attributive adjectival meaning is expressed in one of two ways. First, via adjectival verbs in
a relative clause or nominalization structure ((i)). Second, via a very limited number of adjectival
stems that can be suffixed to nouns ((ii)). As shown in (ii), suffixation can produce lexicalized
compounds (e.g. chidítsoh ‘truck’) in some cases. For a full list of expressions of this kind, see Young
and Morgan 1987: d436).
(i) a. Hastiin
man
nineez=ígíí
3S.tall.aa=igii
‘The tall man, the man who is tall.’
b. Łóó’
fish
’adaałts’íísí
3plS.small.aa
léi’
indef.det
‘some little fish’ (YM 1987: d275)
(ii) a. Chidítsoh
chidí =tsoh
car big
‘truck’
b. Bįįhtsoh
bįįh=tsoh
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occur in a range of morphological forms. Following Young and Morgan (1987), these
forms are referred to as ‘Modes.’ Changing a verb’s mode can lead to changes in the
morphophonological shape of its stem and can trigger the presence of certain prefixes.
Verbs in different Modes can describe events with different aspectual and temporal
properties, as is informally suggested by the paraphrases given in (1).
(1) Examples of Modes found with eventive verbs:
a. ch’í’níshkh
out.1S.swim.impf
‘I am swimming out horizontally’ Imperfective Mode
b. ch’í’níłk’
out.1S.swim.perf
‘I swam out horizontally’ Perfective Mode
c. ch’í’deeshkł
out.1S.swim.fut
‘I will swim out horizontally’ Future Mode
In Chapter 2, I followed Young and Morgan in observing that the same range
of Modes are not available to verbs describing stative properties, including adjecti-
val verbs. However, Navajo adjectival verbs can nevertheless be divided into three
classes based on shared morphological characteristics. In the following subsections, I
summarize Young and Morgan’s (1987) discussion of three morphological classes of
adjectival verbs, referred to as Comparative Aspect ca), Absolute Aspect (aa), and
Perfective Aspect (pa).3
deer big
‘big deer’ (YM 1987: d62)
3I refer the interested reader to Bogal-Allbritten (2010) for more discussion of the distribution
of ca, aa, and pa, and their distribution across the Athabaskan language family. Apparently
exhaustive lists can be found in Young and Morgan (1987).
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5.2.1 Perfective Aspect
First, adjectival verbs marked for Perfective Aspect. Perfective Aspect-marked
(or, pa-marked) adjectival verbs denote a range of properties, including temperatures,
textures, and other qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) properties. A selection
of pa-marked adjectival verbs is given in (2). For a more complete list, see Young
and Morgan (1987: d437).
Table 5.1. Selection of Perfective Aspect-marked adjectival verbs
Verb Gloss Translation
honeezk’az ArealS.cold.pa ‘it (area, space) is cold’
deesdoi 3S.hot.pa ‘it (area) is hot’
sigan 3S.dried.pa ‘it is dry’
neesk’á 3S.fat.pa ‘she/he/it is fat’
náshzhoh 3S.moist.pa ‘it is moist, wet’
yistin 3S.frozen.pa ‘it is frozen’
sizílí 3S.warm.pa ‘it is warm, tepid’
yistł’in 3S.speckled.pa ‘it is speckled’
The set of pa-marked adjectival verbs cannot be defined in terms of any shared
prefixes. The label of ‘Perfective Aspect’ is due to Young and Morgan (1980, 1987),
who use this label given the morphophonological similarity of the stems of pa-marked
adjectival verbs to the shape of semantically-related eventive verb stems in Perfective
Mode. However, there is no sense in which pa-marked adjectives are synchronically
marked for perfective aspect.
5.2.2 Absolute Aspect
Second, adjectival verbs marked for Absolute Aspect. Absolute Aspect-marked
(or, aa-marked) adjectival verbs denote a range of properties, including dimensions,
colors, and qualitative attributes. A selection of aa-marked adjectival verbs is given
in (2). For a more complete list, see Young and Morgan (1987: d436-437).
Unlike the morphologically heterogeneous set of pa-marked adjectival verbs, aa-
marked verbs have in common certain prefixes. First, the null classifier, ?. Second,
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Table 5.2. Selection of Absolute Aspect-marked adjectival verbs
Verb Gloss Translation
nineez 3S.tall.aa ‘she/he/it is long/tall’
’áłts’óózí 3S.slender.aa ‘she/he/it is slender, narrow’
nizhóní 3S.pretty.aa ‘she/he/it is pretty’
niłhin 3S.greasy.aa ‘she/he/it is greasy, oily’
niłchxon 3S.stinking.aa ‘she/he/it is stinking’
łigai 3S.white.aa ‘she/he/it is white-colored’
the thematic prefix ni. As can be seen from the entries in Table 5.2, the prefix ni is
not overtly realized on all aa-marked verbs when marked for third-person subject.
However, if the adjectival verbs are instead given first-person subjects ((2)), the ni is
once again overtly realized:
(2) a. ’ánísts’óózí ‘I am slender’
b. łinishgai ‘I am white-colored’
As the entries in Table 5.2 demonstrate, aa-marked verbs may bear a range of
other thematic prefixes at their left edge, e.g. the prefix łi that Young and Morgan
(1987) report appears in verbs with means relating to coloration (łigai ‘she/he/it is
white-colored,’ łikizh ‘she/he/it is spotted’).
5.2.3 Comparative Aspect
Finally, I turn to adjectival verbs that Young and Morgan (1987) describe as being
marked for Comparative Aspect, abbreviated ca. Adjectival verbs that reliably
allow ca morphology denote positive, measurable dimensions:
In addition, I found cited in Young and Morgan (1987) a small number of other
adjectival verbs that permit ca morphology but which do not denote positive and
measurable dimensions. I say that these verbs did not ‘reliably’ permit camorphology
either because they were not generally volunteered by consultants in elicited sentences,
in sharp contrast with the verbs in Table 5.3. Instead, consultants instead used aa-
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Table 5.3. Comparative Aspect-marked adjectival verbs (reliably used)
Verb Gloss
’áníłnééz 3S.tall.ca
’áníłdáás 3S.heavy.ca
’áníłtso 3S.large.ca
’áníłtéél 3S.wide.ca
’áníłtsááz 3S.wide,thick.ca
’áníldííl 3S.big.ca
’ánílmáál 3S.big.around.ca
marked counterparts to the expressions in (2); I return to the overlapping distribution
of ca and aa morphology below.
Table 5.4. Comparative Aspect-marked adjectival verbs (not reliably used)
Verb Gloss
’ánóoshóní 3S.pretty.ca
’ábóodziil 3S.strong.ca
’ádóolwo’ 3S.fast.ca
The label ‘Comparative Aspect’ is potentially misleading. A reader familiar with
comparative constructions in other languages might imagine that the verbs in (2)
occur in comparisons of superiority like, for instance, an adjective found in English
comparisons of superiority, e.g. taller or heavier. This is not the case. As we will see
in section 5.3, comparison of superiority in Navajo can only be expressed if adjectival
verbs — including the ca-marked ones in (2)— occur with a special comparative
postpositional phrase.
Indeed, on their own, ca-marked adjectival verbs cannot be used to express any
meaning: note that I gloss the examples in (2) but do not translate them. As we
will see in section 5.3, ca-marked adjectival verbs cannot occur on their own without
further modification. As such, there is no translation that can be given to ca-marked
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verbs in isolation. This sets ca-marked adjectival verbs apart from aa- and pa-
marked verbs that can occur without further modification.4
In our discussion of pa- and aa-marked adjectival verbs, we found no overlap:
some kinds of properties (e.g. the property of being white colored) were expressed
by aa-marked adjectival verbs while other kinds of properties (e.g. the property of
being hot) were expressed by pa-marked adjectival verbs. By contrast, any property
(e.g. tallness, heaviness, bigness) that can be expressed via a ca-marked adjectival
verb also has a aa-marked counterpart.
Table 5.5. Selection of ca￿- and aa-marked adjectival verbs
Property ca-marked aa-marked
tallness ’áníłnééz nineez
heaviness ’áníłdáás nidaaz
bigness ’áníłtso nitsaa
wideness ’áníłtéél niteel
thickness ’áníłtsááz nitsaaz
girth ’ánílmáál nimaal
prettiness ’ánóoshóní nizhóní
strength ’ábóodziil bidziil
speed ’ádóolwo’ dilwo’
Only a subset of properties that can be expressed via aa-marked adjectival verbs
have ca-marked counterparts, however. There is no ca-marked verb, for instance,
which expresses the property of being greasy, for instance:
4In fact, Young and Morgan (1987) do provide ‘translations’ in their dictionary entries for ca-
marked verbs, e.g.:
(i) ’ánísdáás
‘to be comparatively heavy’ (YM 1987: d144)
While this might be a useful informal paraphrase for ca-marked verbs, ‘to be comparatively heavy’
is not a valid translation for the verb in (i) since this verb cannot be used as a discrete grammatical
and interpretable unit.
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(3) a. Attested:
niłhin
3S.greasy.aa
b. Unattested:
*’áníłhin
3S.greasy.ca
Like aa-marked adjectival verbs, ca-marked verbs are associated with certain
morphological characteristics. First, the classifier prefix ł.5 Second, the thematic
prefixes ’á and ní. These prefixes have not obvious meaning in isolation. They are
not linearly adjacent, as shown by the possibility of intervening prefixes, e.g. the
‘distributive plural’ prefix da:
(4) ’ádaníłtso
’á = da = ní = ? = ł = tso
thematic = distr.pl = thematic = 3S = classifier = stem
In addition, if we compare pairs of verbs in Table 5.5, we see that there is a clear
relationship between the stems found in ca-marked and aa-marked verbs, but there
are differences (tone, consonant voicing, vowel choice).
Note that I do not provide translations for the ca-marked adjectival verbs in
(3). As we will see in the next subsection, ca-marked adjectival verbs never occur
outside of comparative constructions: thus, no translation can be offered for these
morphemes in isolation. This sets ca-marked adjectival verbs apart from both pa-
5As with classifiers in other verbs, the ł prefix often goes unpronounced in particular mor-
phophonological environments, e.g. when the first-person subject marker is present:
(i) a. ’ánísnééz
1S.tall.ca
b. *’ánísłnééz
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and aa-marked adjectival verbs, which can occur in comparative constructions but
need not.
5.3 Navajo degree constructions of interest
This section presents in descriptive detail the Navajo degree constructions which
will be used in later sections to support the proposals that I make about adjectival
syntax in Navajo. This section discusses the morphology, syntax, and semantics of
each degree construction of interest. Table 5.6 summarizes the degree constructions
to be discussed below.
Table 5.6. Degree constructions to be discussed
Construction Translation Characteristic morphology
Positive x is adj none
Comparison of superiority x is more adj than y Postposition y-lááh ‘beyond y’
Equative x is as adj as y Enclitic y=gi ‘at y’
Comparison of inferiority x is less adj than y Postposition y-’oh ‘short of y’
Measure phrase x is MP adj MP
Degree question how adj is x? wh-word haa
Intensifier x is very adj particle ’ayóo
Whenever possible, I illustrate each construction in Table 5.6 with at least three
examples, each containing an adjectival verb in a different morphological form (ca-
marked, aa-marked, pa-marked). In the course of the discussion, we will make the
two following observations:
(5) a. The morphosyntactic shape of a degree construction generally varies de-
pending on the morphological form of the adjectival verb.
(i) Degree constructions which contain ca-marked verbs have one mor-
phosyntactic form.
(ii) Degree constructions which instead contain aa- or pa-marked verbs
generally have another, more complex morphosyntactic form.
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b. Most degree constructions can contain adjectival verbs in any morpho-
logical form. However:
(i) Some degree constructions can only contain ca-marked verbs.
(ii) One degree construction (the positive construction) only allows aa-
and pa-marked verbs.
This section only has descriptive goals, however. We will return in later sections to
consider the theoretical import of the observations in (5).
5.3.1 Positive construction
I first consider the positive construction. The positive construction is illus-
trated for English in (6). As shown, the English positive construction contains an
adjective used predicatively which does not bear any overt degree morphology. The
sentences in (6) are true just in case the subject — Sandy, Phoenix — exceeds a
salient contextual standard of comparison for the adjective in question.
(6) a. Sandy is tall.
b. Phoenix is hot.
The Navajo positive construction can contain either aa- or pa-marked adjectival
verbs depending on what adjectival property is invoked. Like in English, the Navajo
positive construction contains adjectival verbs which do not bear any overt degree
morphology. The Navajo sentences in (7b) and (8b) have truth conditions identical
to their English translations: each sentence is true just in case the subject exceeds a
salient contextual standard of comparison for the adjectival property in question.
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(7) a. Context: Sandy is a teenaged girl. She is 5’10”, which is tall for a girl.
You describe Sandy to me, saying:
b. Sandy
Sandy
nineez.
3S.tall.aa
‘Sandy is tall.’
(8) a. Context: Phoenix gets up to over 100 degrees in the summer. It is a very
hot city. You describe Phoenix to me, saying:
b. Hoozdo
Phoenix
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is hot.’
As (7) and (8) show, the Navajo positive construction can contain both aa- and
pa-marked adjectival verbs. By contrast, the positive construction cannot contain
ca-marked verbs. In the context in (9a), the sentence in (9b) is judged unacceptable:
(9) a. Context: Sandy is a teenaged girl. She is 5’10”, which is tall for a girl.
You describe Sandy to me, saying:
b. *Sandy
Sandy
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘Sandy is tall.’)
5.3.2 Comparison of superiority construction
I turn next to the comparison of superiority construction. Both of the
English sentences in (10) exemplify this construction. Both sentences contain two
special pieces of degree morphology, the comparative marker (either -er or more) and
the standard marker (than).
(10) a. Sandy is taller than Alice.
b. This film is more interesting than that one.
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I label this construction as ‘comparison of superiority’ instead of ‘comparative’ to
distinguish it from the less than comparative construction, which I refer to as the
‘comparison of inferiority’ construction (section 5.3.4).
In the examples in (10), the standard of comparison seems to be an individual
(Alice, that one). English also permits comparisons of superiority to be made with
a degree as the standard of comparison ((11a)) or with an embedded clause as the
standard of comparison ((11b)) (the ‘comparative subdeletion,’ or ‘subcomparative,’
construction).
(11) a. Sandy is taller than 6 feet.
b. This table is longer than that one is wide.
Navajo has constructions like (10) and like (11). I consider both in turn below. I dis-
cuss first Navajo’s versions of sentences like (10) to introduce general morphosyntactic
properties of comparison of superiority constructions.
5.3.2.1 Comparison with an individual
The following examples illustrate the comparison of superiority construction in
Navajo. This construction in Navajo only contains one special morpheme, the post-
position -lááh. The postposition marks the standard of comparison. Where the stan-
dard of comparison is realized as a full nominal expression (e.g. shideezhí in (12b)),
-lááh bears object marking to match this expression (third person object marker yi-).
The standard of comparison can also be realized as object marking on -lááh, as in
(13b). The three examples below illustrate the comparison of superiority construction
for ca-, aa-, and pa-marked verbs, respectively.
(12) a. Context: My mother is 5’10”. My little sister is only 5’4”.
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’ ca-marked
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(13) a. Context: I am describing my mother to you and tell you that she is very
pretty — she is prettier than I am. I say:
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
shilááh
1O.beyond
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is prettier than I am.’ aa-marked
(14) a. Context: The temperature in Phoenix is 100 degrees Fahrenheit. It is
only 70 degrees Fahrenheit in Flagstaff.
b. Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
Kinłánídi
Flagstaff.loc
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is hotter than Flagstaff.’ pa-marked
The postpositional marker -lááh found in the comparison of superiority construc-
tion is also found in locative expressions in Navajo, usually in conjunction with an
additional locative enclitic, e.g. =di ‘at’ as in (15).6
(15) K’os
cloud
biláah=di
3O.beyond=loc
chidí naat’a’í
airplane
bik’idziigaii.
3S.come.into.view.perf
‘An airplane came into view beyond the cloud.’
(YM 1987: d205)
It is crosslinguistically extremely common to see locative morphology used in var-
ious degree constructions. In Stassen’s (1985) typological survey of comparison of
superiority constructions crosslinguistically, almost 50% of the languages discussed
— a number which includes Navajo — express comparison using spatial or locative
adpositions of various kinds.
Comparing (12), (13), and (14), we find that the morphosyntactic shape of the
comparison of superiority construction changes depending on the morphological form
6The presence of =di on -lááh causes a change in the tone of the postposition’s vowels. Unmarked,
-lááh features a long high tone (áá) while when marked with =di, the vowels instead show falling
tone (áa).
212
of the adjectival verb. While -lááh is invariably present, ca-marked adjectival verbs
are directly preceded by the comparative postposition ((12b) whereas additional ma-
terial (’át’éego) intervenes between the postposition and aa- and pa-marked verbs
((13b), (14b)). As indicated in the glosses, ’at’éego breaks down into two pieces: the
copula marked for a third-person subject (’át’é) and the subordinator =go first dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3).7 As previously discussed, =go is used elsewhere
in Navajo as a clausal subordinator ((16)).
As (15a) demonstrates, ca-marked adjectival verbs are directly preceded by com-
parative postpositions. By contrast, when adjectival verbs are aa-marked ((15b)) or
pa-marked ((15c)), the postposition is followed by a copula, ’át’é, which is in turn
followed by the subordinating marker =go. This additional morphology is never licit
with ca-marked verbs:
(16) *Shimá
1poss.mother
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’)
This syntactic difference which tracks the morphological shape of adjectival verbs will
be the focus of later discussion in section 5.5. I will argue that this difference helps to
diagnose syntactic differences between aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs on one hand
and ca-marked adjectival verbs on the other.
5.3.2.2 Other standards of comparison
All of the examples seen thus far featured individuals as the standard of compari-
son. Navajo also permits comparison of superiority constructions of the shape in (17).
7The basic form of the copula is ’át’é. When ’át’é is marked by =go, the vowel lengthens and
acquires falling tone. This same pattern can be observed for other verbs marked by =go as well, e.g.
(i).
(i) hol ‘it exists’ + =go! hólǫgo
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In (17), the standard of comparison is the clause ’eii naaltsoos ’áníłtéél ‘that book is
wide.’
(17) a. Context: You have two books. One is 9” long. The other book is 6” wide.
You are describing these books to me.
b. Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’
Following standard terminology, I refer to constructions like (17) as subcompar-
ative comparisons of superiority. The subject of the embedded clause can either be
distinct from the main clause subject as in (17), or the two subjects can match:
(18) a. Context: You have a book whose cover is 9” long and 6” wide. You are
describing the shape of the book to me.
b. Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than it is wide.’
In the Navajo subcomparative construction, the embedded clause which serves as the
standard of comparison always bears the subordinator =ígíí. We first saw =ígíí in
Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3), where we saw it occur on embedded clauses and relative
clauses.
When we examined comparisons of superiority with individuals as the standard of
comparison, the construction was exemplified with ca-, aa-, and pa-marked adjecti-
val verbs. By contrast, the examples in (107b) contained only ca-marked adjectival
verbs. This limited range of examples is not accidental: neither aa- nor pa-marked
adjectival verbs can occur in the subcomparative construction.
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(19) a. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=ígíí
3S.wide.aa=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
b. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
c. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=ígíí
3S.wide.aa=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
I return to consider an explanation for these facts in section 5.7.5.
5.3.3 Equative construction
I now turn to the equative construction. This construction is illustrated for
English in (20). As with the English comparison of superiority construction, English
equatives involve two morphemes: one instance of as which precedes the adjective
and a second instance which precedes the standard of comparison.
(20) a. Sandy is as tall as Alice.
b. Sandy is as pretty as Alice.
In the following subsections, I first consider Navajo counterparts to sentences like
(20), in which the standard of comparison is an individual. There, I introduce the
key morphosyntactic features of the equative construction. I then consider Navajo
equative constructions in which the standard of comparison is a degree (measure
phrase) or an embedded clause.
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5.3.3.1 Equatives with an individual standard of comparison
The Navajo equative construction is illustrated in the three examples below for
ca-, aa-, and pa-marked adjectival verbs, respectively. The Navajo equative con-
struction involves one special morpheme, the enclitic =gi, which marks the standard
of comparison.
(21) a. Context: My mother and I are both 5’6” tall.
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
shí=gi
1pro=loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is as tall as me.’
(22) a. Context: My mother and I are equally pretty.
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
shí=at
1pro=loc
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóni.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is as pretty as I am.’
(23) a. Context: Today, Gallup and Phoenix have both reached 100 degrees
Fahrenheit.
b. Diij
today
Na’nízhoozhí
Gallup
Hoozdo=gi
Phoenix=loc
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Today, Gallup is as hot as Phoenix.’
The enclitic =gi functions a locative marker elsewhere in the language. In (24),
=gi marks the place (bich’oozhlaa’) where a hole exists.
(24) Shi’éétsoh
1poss.coat
bich’oozhlaa’=gi
3poss.elbow=loc
bighánídláád.
3S.be.torn.through.perf
‘There’s a hole in my coat sleeve at the elbow.’
(YM 1987: d187)
Like the comparison of superiority construction, the morphosyntactic shape of
equative constructions differs depending on the morphological form of the adjectival
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verb. If the verb is ca-marked, the =gi-marked standard of comparison directly
precedes the verb ((21)). If the verb is instead aa- or pa-marked, ’át’éego intervenes
between the verb and the =gi-marked standard of comparison ((22), (23)). As before,
we can break ’át’éego into the copula, ’át’é, and the subordinator =go.
5.3.3.2 Other standards of comparison
All of the examples seen so far used individuals as the standard of comparison.
Equative constructions can also feature an embedded clause ((25)) as the standard
of comparison.8
(25) Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=í=gi
3S.wide.ca=i(gii)=loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is as long as that book is wide.’
As in the subcomparative construction, both adjectival verbs in a subequative con-
struction must be ca-marked. None of the constructions in (26) is grammatical:
(26) a. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=í=gi
3S.wide.aa=i(gii)=loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
(Intended: ‘This book is as long as that book is wide.’)
b. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=í=gi
3S.wide.ca=i(gii)=loc
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is as long as that book is wide.’)
8As (25) demonstrates, the shape of the subordinator in the embedded clause is different in the
equative construction: instead of =ígíí, it is realized as =í. Young and Morgan (1987) identify =í as
a variant of =ígíí. I do not seek to explain this here; one possibility to note is that using =í avoids
=ígíí being directly followed by the phonologically similar =gi.
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c. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=í=gi
3S.wide.aa=i(gii)=loc
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is as long as that book is wide.’)
I will not address these data specifically, but I return to the parallel facts seen for
comparisons of superiority in section 5.7.5.
5.3.4 Comparison of inferiority construction
I turn now to the comparison of inferiority construction. This realization of
this construction in English is exemplified in (27). Like comparison of superiority
constructions, English comparisons of inferiority contain two morphemes, the com-
parative marker less and the standard marker than.
(27) a. Sandy is less tall than Alice.
b. This film is less interesting than that one.
Navajo comparison of inferiority constructions only involve one morpheme, the
postposition -’oh. As in the comparison of superiority construction, the standard
of comparison determines the object marking found on the postposition. The three
examples below illustrate comparison of inferiority constructions with ca-, aa-, and
pa-marked adjectival verbs, respectively.
(28) a. Context: I am 5’4” tall. My father is 6’ tall.
b. Shizhé’é
1poss.father
bi’oh
3O.short.of
’ánístso.
1S.large.ca
‘I am less tall than my father,’
‘I’m shorter than my father.’
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(29) a. Context: I am comparing rugs. I am telling you this rug is not as pretty
as that rug.
b. Díí
this
diyogí
rug
’eii
that
diyogí
rug
yi’oh
3O.short.of
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘This rug is less pretty than that one.’
(30) a. Context: The temperature in Flagstaff is 70 degrees Fahrenheit. In
Phoenix, it is 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
b. Kinłánídi
Flagstaff.loc
Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
yi’oh
3O.short.of
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Flagstaff is less hot than Phoenix.’
As in both the comparison of superiority and equative constructions, the mor-
phosyntax of comparison of inferiority constructions varies depending on the morpho-
logical shape of the adjectival verb. If the adjectival verb is ca-marked, the standard
of comparison directly precedes the verb ((28)). If the adjectival verb is instead aa-
or pa-marked, ’át’éego (the copula ’át’é plus the subordinator =go) intervenes between
the adjectival verb and the standard of comparison.
5.3.5 Measure phrase construction
I turn now to the measure phrase construction. As shown in (31), measure
phrases can directly precede adjectival verbs:
(31) Hastądi
six
’adées’eez
feet
’ánísnééz.
1S.tall.ca
‘I am six feet tall.’
I found that measure phrases were only accepted with ca-marked adjectival verbs.
Consultants did not accept the sentences in (32), regardless of whether or not ’át’éego
interceded between the measure phrase and the verb:
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(32) a. *Hastądi
six
’adées’eez
feet
nisneez.
1S.tall.aa
(Intended: ‘I am six feet tall.’)
b. *Hastądi
six
’adées’eez
feet
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nisneez.
1S.tall.aa
(Intended: ‘I am six feet tall.’)
The ungrammaticality of the sentences in (32) is surprising. The adjectival verb
nisneez describes a measure dimension (height): why can the precise degree of height
not be named as it was in (31)? I return to consider a possible answer to this question
much later when I consider the syntactic and semantic analysis of aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs (section 5.7.5).
5.3.6 Degree questions
The next structure I consider is the degree question, expressed in English via
how-questions:
(33) a. How tall is Sandy?
b. How hot is it outside?
Navajo expressions degree questions using the structures shown below for ca-, aa-,
and pa-marked adjectival verbs. The wh-word haa is used in all degree questions.9
9The wh-word used in degree questions, haa, has a wide distribution in Navajo as a wh-word, as
shown in (i):
(i) Ch’í’iilkeedígííshą’
movie
haa
wh
yoolye?
3S.be.called
‘What’s the name of the movie?’
(YM 1987: d287)
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(34) a. Haaníłnééz?
wh.3S.tall.ca
‘How tall is she/he/it?’
b. Hait’ée=go
wh.3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní?
3S.pretty.aa
‘How pretty is she/he/it?’
c. Hait’ée=go
wh.3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi?
3S.hot.pa
‘How hot is it?’
As with all other degree constructions which are licit with ca-, aa-, and pa-
marked adjectival verbs, the morphosyntactic shape of degree questions differs de-
pending on the morphological form of the adjectival verb. When the adjectival verb
is ca-marked, the wh-word haa is prefixed to the left edge of the verb ((34a)). When
the adjectival verb is instead aa- or pa-marked, the copula and the subordinator =go
intervene between haa and the verb ((34b), (34c)).
In the examples in (34), haa was shown prefixed to the left edge of the adjectival
verb ((34a)) or to the left edge of the copula ((34b), (34c)). Examples from Young
and Morgan and judgments provided by consultants demonstrated that the wh-word
can also be orthographically represented as separate from the adjectival verb ((35a))
or as separate from the copula ((35b), (35c)). Consultants volunteered the sentences
in (34) and (35) interchangeably.
(35) a. Haa
wh
níneez?
3S.tall.ca
‘How tall is she/he/it?’
b. Haa
wh
yit’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní?
3S.pretty.aa
‘How pretty is she/he/it?’
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c. Haa
wh
yit’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi?
3S.hot.pa
‘How hot is it?’
The examples above demonstrate that in degree questions, the shape of the ca-
marked verbs (in (a)-sentences) and the copula (in (b)- and (c)-sentences) differs
slightly in shape from what we have seen previously. In (34a)/(35a), the ca-marked
verb lacks the initial ’á prefix that we have otherwise observed on ca-marked verbs. In
(34b)/(35b) and (34c)/(35c), the copula lacks the ’á prefix and is instead pronounced
(y)it’é. This seems like a pattern of note and raises a number of questions, including:
(i) is the prefix ’á on ca-marked verbs the same as the ’á on the copula? (ii) does the
presence vs. absence of ’á indicate anything about the site of syntactic merger of the
wh-word? I leave consideration of these questions for future work.
5.3.7 Intensifer construction
The final construction of interest is the use of intensifiers. Examples of inten-
sifiers in English include very and really. Informally, intensifying adverbs seem to
indicate that the subject exhibits the property in question to an extent that greatly
exceeds the standard of comparison.
(36) a. Sandy is very tall.
b. This film is really interesting.
The Navajo intensifier which I will consider here is ’ayóo. This particle can modify
ca-, aa-, andpa-marked adjectival verbs. As with the English translations of the
sentences in (37), the Navajo sentences shown were judged felicitous in contexts in
which the subject of the adjectival verb exceeded the contextual standard for the
property in question (height, beauty, heat) to a significant degree.
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(37) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is very tall.’
b. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’ayóo
very
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My little sister is very pretty.’
c. Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
’ayóo
very
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is very hot.’
A difference of note between the intensifer construction and all other degree con-
structions discussed above is that the intensifier construction does not change is syn-
tactic shape depending on the morphological form of the adjectival verb. That is, the
subordinated copula ’át’éego does not intervene between ’ayóo and ￿aa- or pa-marked
adjectival verbs. In fact, consultants did not find such intervention to be acceptable,
as shown in (38):
(38) a. *Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’ayóo
very
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
(Intended: ‘My little sister is very pretty.’)
b. *Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
’ayóo
very
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
(Intended:‘Phoenix is very hot.’)
5.3.8 Summary
This section gave an overview of the morphological, syntactic, and semantic char-
acteristics of the set of Navajo degree constructions which we will use in our investi-
gation below.
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5.4 The importance of the morphological shape of adjectival
verbs
In the descriptive discussion in the previous section, we begin to notice instances
where the morphological shape of adjectival verbs had an effect on their participation
in degree constructions. In this section, I focus on further illustrating the following
observations. Aspects of the (a)- and (c)-observations were already made in the course
of the previous discussion; the (b)-observations are new.
(39) Adjectival verbs marked for Comparative Aspect (ca):
a. In main clauses, ca-marked adjectival verbs must be accompanied by an
overt degree expression.
b. Degree expressions have a fixed position: they are always adjacent to
ca-marked verbs.
c. Degree expressions occur in their ‘bare’ form when they modify ca-
marked adjectival verbs.
(40) Adjectival verbs marked for Absolute Aspect (aa) or Perfective Aspect (pa):
a. aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs can occur without overt degree expres-
sions.
b. Degree expressions do not have a fixed position: they can be adjacent to
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs but do not have to be.
c. Degree expressions (with one exception, intensifier ’ayóo) never occur in
the ‘bare’ form when they modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
5.4.1 Required presence of a degree expression
In the course of discussing the positive construction, we already saw that whereas
aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs can be used without one of the degree expressions
given in Table 5.7. I introduce the descriptive term ‘degree expressions’ as way to
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collectively refer to the visible material which was key to the degree constructions
seen in the previous sectin.
Table 5.7. Navajo degree expressions seen in section 5.3
Degree construction Degree expression
Comparison of superiority y-lááh ‘beyond y’
Equative y=gi ‘at y’
Comparison of inferiority y-’oh ‘short of y’
Measure phrase e.g. hastądi ’adées’eez ‘6 feet’
Degree question haa wh-word
Intensifier ’ayóo ‘very’
The familiar sentences in (41) show aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs without any
member of Table 5.7.
(41) a. Sandy
Sandy
nineez.
3S.tall.aa
‘Sandy is tall.’
b. Hoozdo
Phoenix
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is hot.’
By contrast, we saw that ca-marked adjectival verbs could not be used in this way.
Regardless of the context used, sentences of the shape in (42) were always rejected
by consultants:
(42) *Sandy
Sandy
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘Sandy is tall.’)
I characterize the difference between ca- and aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs as
follows:
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(43) a. In main clauses, ca-marked adjectival verbs must be accompanied by an
overt degree expression.
b. aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs can occur without overt degree expres-
sions.
Crucially, my observation about ca-marked adjectival verbs has two restrictions.
First, I explicitly note that it seems that overt degree expressions are required, i.e.
an expression from Table 5.7. I say ‘overt’ to set aside the question of whether the
positive construction contains a covert degree expression. In literature on the positive
construction crosslinguistically, it is quite standard to invoke a covert operator which
makes a comparison between the subject and an appropriate contextual standard of
comparison (Cresswell 1976, von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 1997, among many others).
If we say that such a covert expression is used in the positive construction in (42), we
must specify that this same expression cannot satisfy the requirements of ca-marked
verbs — however we characterize these requirements. Otherwise, we would expect
(43) to allow an interpretation like (42a).
The second restriction in my observation about ca-marked adjectival verbs is that
an overt degree expression is required when these verbs are used in main clauses.
This part of the description is present to capture the contrast between ungrammatical
main clauses like (43) and the use of ca-marked adjectival verbs in subcomparative
and subequative constructions (sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3). In the subcomparative construc-
tion in (44), the subordinate clause contains a ca-marked adjectival verb which is not
preceded by an overt degree expression. This sentence is nevertheless grammatical.
(44) Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’
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In section 5.6.1, I will argue that the embedded clause is not actually devoid of a
degree expression: rather the degree expression in question is covert. At that point,
we will ask why the same covert degree expression cannot occur in (42): if it could,
we would incorrectly expect (42) to be grammatical.
5.4.2 The fixed position of degree expressions
I now turn to the following contrast:
(45) a. Degree expressions have a fixed position: they are always adjacent to
ca-marked verbs.
b. Degree expressions do not have a fixed position: they can be adjacent to
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs but do not have to be.
When an adjectival verb is ca-marked, degree expressions are subject to stringent
locality restrictions: they can only occur directly to the left of the adjectival verb.
The following examples illustrate with the comparison of superiority construction
((46)) and the equative construction ((47)). The (a)-sentences show the grammatical
configuration in which the degree expression (bracketed) precedes the verb; the (b)-
sentences demonstrate the ungrammaticality that results when the degree expression
occurs to the left of the subject.
(46) a. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
[bá’ííníilta’í
our.teacher
yilááh]
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My little sister is taller than our teacher.’
b. *[Bá’ííníilta’í
3O.for.1plS.read.i(gii)
yilááh]
3O.beyond
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’áníłnééz.
33S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My little sister is taller than our teacher.’)
(47) a. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
[shimá=gi]
1poss.mother.loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My little sister is as tall as my mother.’
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b. *[Shimá=gi]
1poss.mother.loc
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My little sister is as tall as my mother.’
If we replace ca-marked adjectival verbs with ones which are aa- or pa-marked,
linear separation of the degree expression from the adjectival verb is allowed. The
following examples illustrate with the comparison of superiority construction.10
(48) a. K’ad
now
[hosiyoolts’łígíí
speed.of.sound
bilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
chidí naata’a’í
airplane
dadilwo’.
3plS.fast.aa
‘There are now airplanes that are faster than the speed of sound.’
(adapt. YM 1987: d458)
10Recall from section 5.3 that in all but one case, degree constructions containing aa- and pa-
marked adjectival verbs are syntactically more complex than the same construction with a ca-marked
verb: degree expressions are separated from aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs by the copula ’át’é
and the subordinator =go. I return to this point below. For now, I give a note on the bracketing
to be used in this section. In a sentence like (48a), I place brackets around hosiyilts’łígíí bilááh
’át’ée=go to indicate that this structure in its entirety — crucially, including ’át’é and =go — counts
as the degree expression. Examples in which degree expressions are left-dislocated provide support
for this choice of bracketing. For instance, we might consider an alternative hypothesis in which
’át’é and =go form a constituent with the adjectival verb, e.g. (i). Under this bracketing, the degree
expression would only consist of hosiyilts’łígíí bilááh.
(i) Hypothetical alternative bracketing:
K’ad [hosiyilts’łígíí bilááh] ’át’ée=go chidí naat’a’í dadilwo’.
However, I found that it is not possible for hosiyilts’łígíí bilááh to be dislocated to the exclusion of
’át’é and =go:
(ii) *K’ad
now
hosiyilts’łígíí
speed.of.sound
bilááh
3O.beyond
chidí naat’a’í
airplane
’át’ée=go
3S.be.impf=go
dadilwo’.
3plS.fast.aa
(Intended: ‘Airplanes are now faster than the speed of sound.’)
I take the ungrammaticality of examples like (iii) (and other similar sentences) to support the idea
that ’át’é and =go are part of the degree expression constituent.
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b. [Phoenix
Phoenix
bilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
kééhasht’įgí
1S.live.igii
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Where I live is hotter than Phoenix.’
In (48a), the subject of the verb, chidí naata’a’í ‘airplane,’ intercedes between the
aa-marked adjectival verb dadilwo’ ‘they are fast’ and the degree expression (brack-
eted). In (48b), the degree expression is separated from the pa-marked adjectival
verb deesdoi by the subject kééhasht’įgí ‘where I live.’
Parallel data can be constructed using the equative construction. In (49), the
equative degree expression is separated from the aa-marked adjectival verb by the
subject, shideezhí ‘my little sister.’ Consultants also accepted the sentence where the
degree expression directly preceded the verb, nizhóní ‘s/he/it is pretty.’
(49) [Shí=gi
1pro=loc
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My little sister is as pretty as I am.’
Negation markers can also intervene between a degree expression and an aa-
/pa-marked adjectival verb, but not between a degree expression and a ca--marked
adjectival verb. Recall from Chapter 2 (section 3.2.2) that negation is expressed
in Navajo by means of a frame construction, doo...da. When the adjectival verb is
marked for aa as in (50), the first half of the negation frame, doo can occur to the
left of the degree expression ’ayóo ((50a)) or it can intercede between the degree
expression and the adjectival verb ((50b)).11
11A topic left for future investigation is whether any interesting scope-related interpretative dif-
ferences arise in (50a) vs. (50b). That is, is it the case that (50a) is only felicitous if my mother
is extremely short (i.e. ‘very not-tall’)? And can (50b) be used if my mother is of unremarkable
tallness (i.e. ‘not very-tall’)?
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(50) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
doo
neg
’ayóo
very
nineez
3S.tall.aa
da.
neg
‘My mother is not very tall.’
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
doo
neg
nineez
3S.tall.aa
da.
neg
‘My mother is not very tall.’ (Lit: ‘...very not tall’)
By contrast, while doo could occur to the left of ’ayóo ((51a)), it could not intercede
between a ca-marked adjectival verb and ’ayóo ((51b)).
(51) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
doo
neg
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz
3S.tall.ca
da.
neg
‘My mother is not very tall.’
b. *Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
doo
neg
’áníłnééz
3S.tall.ca
da.
neg
(Intended: ‘My mother is not very tall.’)
5.4.3 Syntactic differences in degree expressions
The final observation which I will discuss is given in (52):
(52) a. Degree expressions occur in their ‘bare’ form when they modify ca-
marked adjectival verbs.
b. Degree expressions (with one exception) never occur in the ‘bare’ form
when they modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
We have already seen this point partially illustrated by the data considered so
far. In examples of degree constructions with ca-marked adjectival verbs, the verb is
preceded by the degree expression on its own. In the case of the comparison of supe-
riority construction ((53a)), this means that the verb is preceded by the comparative
postpositional phrase, shilááh ‘beyond me.’ In the case of the equative construction
((53b)), this means that the verb is preceded by the equative phrase, shí=gi ‘at me.’
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(53) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh]
1O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is taller than me.
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shí=gi]
1pro=loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is as tall as I am.’
I will refer to degree expressions like those in (53) as degree expressions in their
‘bare’ form.’ The bare form is to be contrasted with the morphosyntactically complex
form of degree expressions found in degree constructions which contain aa- or pa-
marked adjectival verbs. In (54a), the degree expression (bracketed) contains the
copula ’át’é and the subordinator =go in addition to shilááh. In (54b), the copula and
subordinator accompany shí=gi.12
(54) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh
1O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is prettier than I am.’
b. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shí=gi
1pro=loc
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is as pretty as I am.’
Precisely the same kind of structure is attested for pa-marked adjectival verbs. I
illustrate in (55) with the comparison of superiority construction.
(55) Hoozdodi
Phoenix
[Kinłánídi
Flagstaff
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is hotter than Flagstaff.’
12For evidence that the copula and subordinator form a constituent with shilááh as opposed to
the verb, see footnote 10 in the previous subsection.
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What we have not yet seen is the impossibility of the inverse state of affairs. I give
these data below; while I illustrate with the comparison of superiority construction,
the same observations can be replicated for all other degree constructions except ’ayóo
‘very.’ (56a) shows that inclusion of a copula and subordinator in the degree expression
in front of a ca-marked adjectival verb is ungrammatical. (56b) and (56c) show that
the use of the bare comparison of superiority degree expression is ungrammatical with
an aa- or pa-marked adjectival verb:
(56) a. *Shimá
1poss.mother
[shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’)
b. *Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh]
1O.beyond
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
(Intended: ‘My mother is prettier than I am.’ )
c. *Hoozdodi
Phoenix
[Kinłánídi
Flagstaff
yilááh]
3O.beyond
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
(Intended: ‘Phoenix is hotter than Flagstaff.’)
The only exceptional degree expression is ’ayóo, which always occurs in its bare
form regardless of the morphological shape of the adjectival verb which it modifies.
(57) a. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My little sister is very tall.’
b. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’ayóo
very
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My little sister is very pretty.’
c. Hoozdodi
Phoenix
’ayóo
very
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is very hot.’
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5.4.4 Summary
In this section, we observed a number of differences in degree constructions which
were keyed to the morphological shape of the adjectival verb. I repeat these differences
in (58).
(58) a. Adjectival verbs marked for Comparative Aspect (ca):
(i) In main clauses, ca-marked adjectival verbs must be accompanied
by an overt degree expression.
(ii) Degree expressions must be adjacent to ca-marked verbs.
(iii) Degree expressions occur in their ‘bare’ form when they modify ca-
marked adjectival verbs.
b. Adjectival verbs marked for Absolute Aspect (aa) or Perfective Aspect
(pa):
(i) aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs can occur without overt degree ex-
pressions.
(ii) Degree expressions do not have to be adjacent to aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs.
(iii) Degree expressions (with one exception) never occur in the ‘bare’
form when they modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
Thus far, these observations are only stipulated on the basis of the empirical
evidence available to us. In the next section, I consider how we can better understand
these differences if we posit distinct syntactic structures for ca-marked and aa-/pa-
marked adjectival verbs. I argue that whereas ca-marked adjectival verbs select for
a degree expression as an argument, aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs do not.
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5.5 The syntactic heterogeneity of Navajo adjectival verbs
In this section, I argue that adjectival verbs of different morphological shapes
project distinct syntactic structures. I further argue that certain — if not all — all
of the differences observed in the previous section are better understood in light of
the posited differences in adjectival syntax.
I propose that ca-marked adjectival verbs are associated with the syntactic struc-
ture in (59), originally proposed for English adjectival expressions in English by
Kennedy (1997, 1999) who built on earlier proposals by Abney (1987). An extended
functional projection (degree phrase, DegP) surrounds the lexical adjectival phrase
(AP). Both the DegP and the AP select for an argument. A determiner phrase (DP)
— realized as the sentential subject — must be merged into AP. A degree expression
must be merged into the specifier of DegP. The set of degree expressions includes
the structures discussed in the last section, e.g. comparative postpositional phrases,
measure phrases, or intensifiers. A ca-marked adjectival verb is ill-formed unless it
is contained within a structure like (59) in which both argument positions are filled.
(59) DegP
degree expression Deg’
Deg AP
DP A.ca
By contrast, aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs only project an AP. Once a DP
has merged into the structure given in (60), an aa- or pa-marked verb is associated
with a complete syntactic structure.
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(60) AP
DP A.aa/pa
In this section, I elaborate on the structures shown above and consider theoretical
precedent for the syntactic structures I have attributed to ca-marked adjectival verbs
and aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs. As part of the discussion, I relate the syntactic
structures which I have proposed to the syntax of Navajo intransitive eventive verbs
and their transitivized counterparts. The syntactic picture which I present for even-
tive verbs is largely due to proposals by Hale and Platero (1996) and Hale (2000,
2001). Transitivized eventive verbs and ca-marked adjectival verbs exhibit certain
morphology in common which could suggest that they project comparable syntactic
structures. I also relate the proposed syntactic structures to the larger literature
on the syntax of adjectival expressions crosslinguistically. The key contribution of
Navajo is that only certain adjectival verbs — those which are ca-marked — are syn-
tactically transitive expressions with an extended functional projection. In previous
work, adjectival expressions in other languages are argued to have the same syntax.
5.5.1 The extended verbal projection in Navajo
In order to see how the syntactic structures for ca-marked and aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs relate to eventive verbal syntax, we must first become familiar with
proposals on the latter topic. Hale and Platero (1996) and Hale (2000, 2001) discuss
alternation in transitivity in Navajo verbs which appears to be correlated with the
choice of classifier prefix. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rightmost prefix in a Navajo
verb is referred to as the ‘classifier.’ Navajo has four classifier prefixes, each of which is
in complementary distribution with the others: ?, ł, d, or l. The choice of classifier for
many Navajo verbs is frequently idiosyncratic. However, Hale (2000:86) observes that
for many Navajo verbs, alternation between the ? and ł classifiers seems to indicate
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an alternation in transitivity (see also Jelinek and Willie 1996). Hale (2000) gives
the following examples from Young and Morgan (1980) to illustrate the alternation;
I have supplemented Hale’s glosses with full morphological breakdowns of verbs to
illustrate the position of the classifier in each verb.13
(61) a. Tóshjeeh sits’il.
tóshjeeh si = ? = ? = ts’il
barrel Mode.perf = 3S = ?.classifier = stem.perf
‘The barrel shattered.’
b. Łeets’aa’ séłts’il.
łeets’aa’ ? = si = sh = ł = ts’il
dish 3O = Mode.perf = 1S = ł.classifier = stem.perf
‘I shattered the dish.’
(Hale 2000: (46))
(62) a. Tin yíy’.
tin yi = ? = ? = y’
ice Mode.perf = 3S = ?.classifier = stem.perf
‘The ice melted.’
b. Yas yíłh.
yas ? = yi = sh = ł = y’
snow 3O = Mode.perf = 1S = ł.classifier = stem.perf
‘I melted the snow.’
(Hale 2000: (47))
13In addition to these examples, Hale gives 18 other paired examples of verbs which show an
alternation in transitivity based on the choice of classifier (Hale 2000: 87). Hale also cites examples
of pairs verbs which do not exhibit this manner of deriving transitivity.
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According to Hale and Platero (1996), all verbs for which transitivity can be
indicated by ł share the property of having a DP argument (DP1) which functions as
the theme or patient. When only this DP argument is present, it is realized as the
sentential syntactic subject. Hale (2000) gives the following simplified structure for
such an intransitive verb like sits’il in (61a).14
(63) VP
DP1 V
The presence of the ł clasifier reflects the addition of a functional syntactic shell
around the VP. Building on the structures in Hale and Platero (1996) and Hale
(2000), I give the verb séłts’il in (61b) the structure in (64).15;16
(64) vP
DP2 v’
v VP
DP1 ł-V
14Following Hale and Platero (1996), Hale’s structures (2000) contain a root element R which
composes with a category-defining head, V. I simplify Hale’s structures by removing R and using
only V. Nothing hinges on this. In addition, Hale uses V (rather than V’ or VP) at all projection
levels. I depart from Hale here, as well.
15I will only use the label v to refer to morphemes which introduce an argument position in the
syntax. This use of ‘v’ is a simplification: many authors use v to refer to a morpheme which is always
present and heads the extended verbal projection even where no additional argument is present (e.g.
in unaccusative or passive constructions). The benefit of doing so is that all verbs are associated
with the same general sets of heads (i.e. lexical V, functional v); differences in their syntax or
semantics follow from differences in the properties of the particular V or v used.If we wanted to say
that all Navajo verbs include a vP projection, we could say that ł corresponds to a particular v —
one which introduces an argument — such as the agentive or causative v heads. To simplify the
proposal, however, I will only invoke v when an argument position has been added.
16Once the verb has been transitivized, the lower DP is interpreted as the sentential syntactic
object while the higher DP is interpreted as the sentential syntactic subject.
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The tree in (64) is very much in the spirit of Hale and Platero (1996), Hale (2000), and
Hale (2001). A verb with the ł classifier has an extended functional projection around
the lexical VP projection. I follow Chomsky (1995) in referring to the functional head
in question as v (‘little-v’), although we could also have joined Hale (2001) — who in
turn follows proposals by Kratzer (1996) — in referring to it as a Voice head. The v
head introduces an argument position of its own in its specifier position. This position
is filled by DP2 in the tree above. When the vP shell surrounds VP, the verb word
bears the ł classifier.17
5.5.2 The extended adjectival projection crosslinguistically
Since Abney (1987), authors have considered syntactic parallels between adjectival
expressions and verbs (see also Corver 1990, 1997; Grimshaw 1991; and Kennedy 1997,
1999). These authors propose that all adjectives are associated with an extended
functional projection headed by Deg, a degree head. They explicitly link the role of
the Deg head to functional heads within the verbal and nominal domains, namely v
and the determiner head D.18
17This structure departs from Hale and Platero (1996) and Hale (2000) in three ways. First, they
treat ł as a second lexical V head. Second, because they treat ł as a lexical head, they do not have
the subject merge into the phrasal projection headed by ł: as Hale and Platero (1996: 10) write,“the
subject...is an external argument, not present in the lexical structure” so it must merge into a higher
projection. By contrast, I treat ł as a functional head; as such, having the subject merge into the
phrasal structure projected by ł is not problematic: the position occupied by DP2 is standardly
associated with external arguments.
The third difference is that Hale and Platero treat the classifier ł as the morphological realization
of the Voice (or v) head. By contrast, I will take ł to reflect the presence of a vP shell, but not to
be the v head itself. Again, nothing hinges on this move.
18The alternative to the DegP hypothesis is Bresnan’s (1973) proposal that the AP projection con-
tains all material relating to degrees. See also Selkirk 1970, Jackendoff 1977, Hellan 1981, McCawley
1988, and Hazout 1995.. If we wished to rephrase my proposal in terms of an AP-only hypothesis,
we might say that all A heads in Navajo (regardless of the choice of aa, pa, or ca morphology) have
a complement position (occupied by the subject) but only ca-marked A heads project a specifier
position (occupied by the degree expression). For simplicity, I set aside further consideration of how
an AP-only account could apply to Navajo.
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Under an account with invokes DegP, all adjectival projections include a degree
head, Deg. Kennedy (1997, 1999) names the English degree morphemes more/-er,
less, and as among the set of overt Deg heads. Among the covert Deg heads is the
head which occurs in measure phrase constructions (e.g. Alice is 6’ tall), which I
refer to as meas following Svenonius and Kennedy (2006). Each of these Deg heads
projects a syntactic structure like in (65) (adapt. Kennedy 1997: 148).19
(65) DegP
Deg’
Deg
more/less/as/meas
AP
..DP...A...
XP
The specifier of DegP contains a phrasal projection, XP, which Kennedy identifies
as the particular type of phrase which each Deg head selects for. For example, XP
will be a than-phrase when Deg is more/-er or less but an as-phrase when Deg is as.
When Deg is filled by meas, XP is a measure phrase.20
5.5.3 Syntactically heterogeneous adjectival verbs in Navajo
I now return to the syntax of adjectival verbs in Navajo. Taking the syntactic
picture of eventive verbs as my starting point, I propose that we can analogize the
syntactic structure projected by aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs to the simple VP
structure assigned to the intransitive verbs discussed above. These verbs project only
19See Lechner (1999) for an alternative DegP structure.
20For Kennedy (1997, 1999), only one kind of English Deg head fails to project a specifier position:
the covert pos head found in the positive construction.
(i) [DegP [Deg’ Deg.pos [AP ..DP...A... ] ] ]
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the lexical adjectival phrase (AP) shown in (66a). As was the case for eventive VP
((66b)), only one argument position is contained within AP.
(66) a. AP
DP A.aa/pa
b. VP
DP1 V
I further propose that only ca-marked adjectival verbs ((67a)) have an extended
functional projection (DegP) of the kind adopted by Abney, Kennedy, and other
authors cited above. This functional projection has the same shape as the vP shell
which we argued above surrounds transitivized eventive verbs in Navajo ((67b)). Both
the Deg and v heads project a specifier position. In the case of vP, the specifier
position is filled by a second nominal expression. In the case of DegP, the specifier
position is filled by a degree expression, which includes at least the overt expressions
discussed above.
(67) a. DegP
degree expression Deg’
Deg AP
DP A.ca
b. vP
DP2 v’
v VP
DP1 ł-V
Note that the Deg head invoked in (67a) is not like many of the Deg heads con-
sidered by Kennedy (1997, 1999) and other proponents of the DegP hypothesis for
English. As noted above, English has many specialized Deg heads, including compar-
ative morphemes like more/-er and less. By contrast, Navajo only has one Deg head:
all meaning associated with various degree constructions comes from material within
the degree expression, e.g. the postposition -lááh ‘beyond’ found in comparisons of
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superiority. The English Deg head which is most closely related to the Navajo Deg
head is the Deg head posited for the measure phrase construction, termed abs by
Kennedy (1997, 1999) and meas by Svenonius and Kennedy (2006). In their pro-
posals, this English Deg head projects a specifier position but does not introduce
meaning specific to, e.g., the comparison of superiority or equative constructions.
Navajo verbal morphology supports the parallelism between vP and DegP struc-
tures shown in (67a) and (67b). In our discussion of Navajo eventive verbs and the vP
projection, we saw that the ł classifier prefix appeared when an argument-introducing
v head was present. That is, for verbs which participated in the transitivity alter-
nation discussion, ł was the morphological ‘footprint’ of a transitivized argument
structure. The ł classifier is also a morphological hallmark of ca morphology. Recall
the following morphological breakdown of ca-marked adjectival verbs, first seen in
section 5.2.3.21
(68) ’áníłnééz
’á = ní = ? = ł = nééz
thematic.ca = thematic.ca = 3S = ł.classsifier = stem.ca
We also saw earlier that all ca-marked verbs have an aa-marked counterpart. That
is, we can find pairs which are related both in meaning and in the shape of their stem.
The table in 5.8 gives a selection of such pairs. If the ca-marked verbs on the left are
compared with their aa-marked counterparts on the right, we see that the aa-marked
forms lack the ł classifier. Instead, Young and Morgan (1987) observe that these
21As Hale and Platero (1996) and Hale (2000) discuss for eventive verbs, the correlation between
classifier choice and number of arguments is not perfect in the domain of adjectival verbs. There
are aa-marked adjectival verbs which seem to bear a classifier other than ? and there are certainly
pa-marked verbs which bear a different classifier. Since many adjectival verbs which are aa-marked
— and all which are pa-marked — lack a ca-marked counterpart, it is, of course, not possible to
say for many adjectival verbs whether marking the verb for ca would result in the presence of ł.
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aa-marked adjectival verbs instead bear the ? classifier prefix. The morphological
breakdown of one aa-marked verb is given in (69).
Table 5.8. Selection of ca￿- and aa-marked adjectival verbs
Property ca-marked aa-marked
tallness ’áníłnééz nineez
heaviness ’áníłdáás nidaaz
bigness ’áníłtso nitsaa
wideness ’áníłtéél niteel
thickness ’áníłtsááz nitsaaz
(69) nineez
ni = ? = ? = neez
thematic.aa = 3S = ?.classifier = stem.aa
I propose that the alternation between the ? and ł classifiers on aa- vs. ca-
marked verbs is not accidental. Instead, this morphological alternation performs
precisely the same function as it for eventive verbs which participated in transitivity
alternation. When ł is present, it indicates that an argument-introducing functional
head (v or Deg) is present. For both adjectival verbs and eventive verbs, the ł classi-
fier is the morphological ‘footprint’ of the transitivized argument structure shown in
(67).22
5.5.4 On arguments realized verb-externally
In the trees seen so far, I have placed a DP projection in each position which
contains a nominal argument. I will represent a sentence like (70) with a syntactic
structure like (71).
22If one wished to posit a DegP shell for all adjectival verbs in Navajo, one could say that ca- and
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs are both associated with DegP shells but that the projections differ
in whether or not DegP contains a specifier position to be filled by a degree expression. Although
I will not give such representations here, I do not see that making this move would have any effect
on the proposals made here.
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(70) Ł’
horse
dzaanééz
mule
yiztał́.
3O.3S.kick.perf
‘The horse kicked the mule.’
(71) vP
ł’ v’
v VP
dzaanééz ł-V
Under this view, the nominal expressions merge as part of the verb word but
move upwards — out of the verb word — and adjoin higher in the syntactic structure
(not shown). Various discourse factors may conspire to determine the final order of
verb-external nominal expressiosn (section 2.2.2). When first merged, however, the
verb-external nominal expressions ł’ and dzaanééz are actually the arguments of the
verb. This view agrees with work by Speas (1990), Hale and Platero (1996), and
Hale (2000), who argue that verb-external nominal expressions — either covert or
overt — have argument status. Object and subject marking on the verb word itself is
inflection which reflects the features (number, person) of any verb-external nominal
expressions.
This view is far from uncontroversial. Other authors argue that the argument
positions of Navajo verbs are filled instead by pronominal morphology realized as
prefixes on the verb (Willie 1989; Willie and Jelinek 2000; Hale 2003; Hale, Jelinek,
and Willie 2003). This view of Navajo is part of the broader project of the ‘Pronom-
inal Argument Hypothesis,’ pioneered by Jelinek (1984) and subsequently modified
by authors including Baker (1991, 1995, 1996). Under this account, verb-external
nominal expressions are always adjoined modifiers which can add information but are
not needed to satisfy the verb’s structural requirements.
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The argument vs. adjunct status of verb-external nominal expressions in Navajo
is somewhat peripheral. While I will continue to use trees like (71), it would not
be difficult to redo the discussion using structures which are consistent with the
Pronominal Argument Hypothesis. As long as something fills the nominal argument
positions projected by verbs, the nature of this ‘something’ — full DPs vs. pronominal
marking — is not especially crucial.
However, I would like to note that the present proposal for degree expressions does,
in fact, speak indirectly to the status of verb-external material. While verb-external
nominal expressions may or may not have argument status, degree expressions which
merge into the specifier of DegP projected by ca-marked adjectival verbs are an
example of verb-external expression which, under the present proposal, function as
arguments to the verb. The presence of a degree expression does not correspond
to anything which is recognized as pronominal marking on the verb, so we cannot
say that this argument position is filled by morphology borne by the verb. Thus,
regardless of what the eventual verdict is for nominal expressions, I argue that at
least one kind of verb-external expression — degree expressions — is a syntactic
argument of the (extended projection of) adjectival verbs.
5.6 Outcomes of the proposed syntactic heterogeneity
In this section, I discuss how the attribution of distinct syntactic structures to
aa-/pa-marked and ca-marked adjectival verbs, we can begin to explain why cer-
tain differences in degree constructions are keyed to the morphological shape of an
adjectival verb. The differences to be discussed are repeated below:
(72) Adjectival verbs marked for Comparative Aspect (ca):
a. In main clauses, ca-marked adjectival verbs must be accompanied by an
overt degree expression.
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b. Degree expressions have a fixed position: they are always adjacent to
ca-marked verbs.
c. Degree expressions occur in their ‘bare’ form when they modify ca-
marked adjectival verbs.
(73) Adjectival verbs marked for Absolute Aspect (aa) or Perfective Aspect (pa):
a. aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs can occur without overt degree expres-
sions.
b. Degree expressions do not have a fixed position: they can be adjacent to
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs but do not have to be.
c. Degree expressions (with one exception, intensifier ’ayóo) never occur in
the ‘bare’ form when they modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
5.6.1 Explaining the required presence of a degree expression
I start with the following contrast:
(74) a. In main clauses, ca-marked adjectival verbs must be accompanied by an
overt degree expression.
b. aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs can occur without overt degree expres-
sions.
It is relatively straightforward to see how the account accounts for a simpler —
although incomplete — version of this contrast, namely that ca-marked adjectival
verbs must be accompanied by degree expressions while aa-/pa-marked adjectival
verbs do not. Under the proposal above, adjectival verbs differ in the size of their
syntactic projections and, by extension, the number of arguments they take. Whereas
aa-/pa-marked verbs project an AP which only contains one argument position, ca-
marked adjectival verbs project a DegP structure whose specifier position must be
filled by a degree expression. In the absence of a degree expression, the syntactic
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structure of a ca-marked adjectival is crucially incomplete and, as a result, ungram-
matical.
This is not precisely the picture described in (74), however. As discussed earlier,
we must explain why the ca-marked verb in the main clause in (75a) must be preceded
by a degree expression but the embedded ca-marked verb in the subcomparative
construction in (75b) (’áníłtéél) does not have to be.
(75) a. *Sandy
Sandy
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘Sandy is tall.’)
b. Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí]
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’
One response to this observation is that we simply mistaken that the embedded clause
in (75b) lacks a degree expression. We could say that the specifier position of the
embedded DegP contains a covert degree expression. That is, the bracketed material
in (75b) (the embedded clause plus the subordinator =ígíí) would have the following
structure. As shown in the tree in (76), I do not commit to a particular syntactic
category (DP vs. CP) for the clause marked by =ígíí. (For discussion of the range of
uses of =ígíí, see section 2.2.3.)
￿
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(76) CP/DP
C/D
=ígíí
DegP
?Op Deg’
Deg AP
’eii naaltsoos ’áníłtéél.ca
The appeal to a covert degree expression is not as stipulative as it might first
seem. Potential evidence from Navajo that this position is, in fact, covertly filled is
that (76b) becomes ungrammatical when an overt degree expression is added to the
embedded clause, viz. the addition of ’ayóo in (77):
(77) *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áyóo
very
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
There is also significant precedent in the theoretical literature for taking the sub-
comparative (or, all clausal comparative constructions) constructions to contain a
covert degree operator in the embedded clause, as shown for English in (78). Struc-
tures like (77) are explored by authors including Bresnan (1973), Chomsky (1977),
von Stechow (1984), and Lechner (2004).
(78) This book is longer than [OP1 that book is d1-wide].
In some languages, this operator is overtly realized as in, e.g. Dutch:
(79) De
the
tafel
table
is
is
[langer
longer
dan
than
hoe
wh
breed
wide
het
the
kantoor
office
is].
is
‘The table is longer than the office is wide.’
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If we are correct to posit a covert degree expression in embedded clauses in Navajo
subcomparatives, we must explain why this operator cannot be used in a main clause
like (75a). I will return to these question later when I consider the syntax and
semantics of subcomparative structures like (75b).
5.6.2 Explaining the fixed position of degree expressions
I now turn to the contrast repeated in (80):
(80) a. Degree expressions have a fixed position: they are always adjacent to
ca-marked verbs.
b. Degree expressions do not have a fixed position: they can be adjacent to
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs but do not have to be.
I will propose that this contrast can also be explained using the proposed syntactic
heterogeneity. In contrast with ca-marked adjectival verbs, the syntactic structure
projected by aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs has no position for a degree expression
to merge into. As a result, degree expressions which modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival
verbs are adjoined at the AP level:
(81) AP
degree expression AP
DP A.aa/pa
Given their status as adjoined modifiers, we expect degree expressions which mod-
ify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs to have characteristics in common with other
plausibly adjoined modifiers in Navajo. This expectation is borne out: other kinds
of adjoined modifiers allow for the same kinds of positional flexibility as we have
observed for degree expressions which modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
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Recall first that degree expressions which modify aa-/pa-marked verbs can be
separated from the verb by the subject, as in (82).
(82) a. K’ad
now
[hosiyoolts’łígíí
speed.of.sound
bilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
chidí naata’a’í
airplane
dadilwo’.
3plS.fast.aa
‘There are now airplanes that are faster than the speed of sound.’
Likewise, locative phrases which optionally modify eventive verbs can either di-
rectly precede the verb ((83a)) or they can be separated from the verb by the subject
((83b)). The examples in (83) are from discussion of this issue by Faltz (2000). As
indicated by the use of parentheses, the locative phrase Kinłánídi ‘in Flagstaff’ does
not have to be present at all.
(83) a. Biyáázh
3poss.son
(Kinłánídi)
Flagstaff.loc
naalnish.
3S.work.impf
‘His/her son works in Flagstaff.’
b. (Kinłánídi)
Flagstaff.loc
biyáázh
3poss.son
naalnish.
3S.work.impf
‘His/her son works in Flagstaff.’
(Faltz 2000: 38-39)
We also saw that degree expressions could be separated from aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs by the negation marker doo, e.g. (84):
(84) Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
doo
neg
nineez
3S.tall.aa
da.
neg
‘My mother is not very tall.’ (Lit: ‘...very not tall’)
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Likewise, a search of Young and Morgan (1987) turns up a number of examples like
(85) in which doo intervenes between an optional locative phrase and an eventive
verb.
(85) (’Ałná
back.and.forth
’áhát’į=gi)
ArealS.move.impf=loc
doo
neg
njigháa
4S.go.impf
da.
neg
‘One should stay out of the heavy traffic.’
Lit: ‘One should not stand where things (vehicles) go back and forth.’
(YM 1987: d223)
The pattern for eventive verbs seems to be that adjoined modifiers are flexible in their
linear position. Under my account of the syntax of aa- and pa-marked adjectival
verbs, we expect the same flexibility to be exhibited by the degree expressions which
modify them since these expressions will also be adjoined.
By contrast, degree expressions are merged in an argument position in the syn-
tactic structure associated with ca-marked adjectival verbs, namely the specifier of
DegP. We may find, then, that in comparison with adjoined modifiers to aa- and pa-
marked adjectival verbs, degree expressions with ca-marked adjectival verbs exhibit
less positional flexibility. This is borne out. We find that degree expressions (e.g. the
equative phrase in (86)) can only be adjacent to the ca-marked verb.
(86) a. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
[shimá=gi]
1poss.mother.loc
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My little sister is as tall as my mother.’
b. *[Shimá=gi]
1poss.mother.loc
shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My little sister is as tall as my mother.’
The data in (86) lead to another question, however. If the degree expression
and subject were pronounced in the order in which they were merged into the struc-
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ture of a ca-marked adjectival verb, we would expect the subject to occur closer to
the verb word than the degree expression. As shown by (86b), this is not possible.
One possibility is that subjects (and other nominal expressions) move leftward after
merging with the verb. More must be said, however, about the motivation for this
movement.23
5.6.3 Towards an explanation of syntactic differences in degree expres-
sions
I turn now to the third contrast correlated with the morphological shape of the
adjectival verb, repeated below:
(87) a. Degree expressions occur in their ‘bare’ form when they modify ca-
marked adjectival verbs.
b. Degree expressions (with one exception) never occur in the ‘bare’ form
when they modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
Specifically, I will discuss how the proposal for adjectival syntax helps us to address
the following questions. First, why can ‘bare’ degree expressions be used with ca-
marked adjectival verbs ((88a)) but not — except ’ayóo — with aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs ((88b))?
(88) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh]
1O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is taller than me.
23One possibility is that, as Willie (1989), Willie and Jelinek 2000, and Hale (2003) argue, verb-
external nominal expressions but instead are adjoined. The verb’s nominal argument positions are
filled by pronominal prefixes on the verb which are coindexed with the adjoined expressions. Thus,
degree expressions would be the only verb-external expressions which are actually arguments: recall
from section 5.5.4 that degree expressions do not correspond to any pronominal prefixes on the verb
so it is not possible to analyze verb-external degree expressions as adjuncts like nominal expressions.
If nominal expressions are claimed to adjoin high in the syntax, we might expect to find — as we
do — that degree expressions occur closer to the verb.
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b. *Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh]
1O.beyond
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
(Intended: ‘My mother is prettier than I am.’ )
Second, why can degree expressions which include a copula (’át’é) and subordinator
(=go) be used with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs ((89a)) but not with ca-marked
adjectival verbs ((89b))?
(89) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shilááh
1O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is prettier than I am.’
b. *Shimá
1poss.mother
[shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’)
I begin by asking why the addition of a copula and subordinator allows a degree
expression to modify an aa-/pa-marked adjectival verb. I propose that the presence
of the copula and subordinator suggest that the degree expression is acting as a
clause-level modifier. In section 2.2.3, we saw examples of go-marked clauses which
are subordinate to other clauses. In the structures in (90), there are two clausal
projections (CP): one is the main clause and one is marked by =go. The subordinate
clause (bracketed) in (90a) adds temporal information while the subordinate clause
(bracketed) in (90b) gives the antecedent to a conditional.
(90) a. [Shizhé’é
1poss.father
níyáa=go]
3S.come.perf=go
da’diidl.
1plS.eat.fut
‘When my father comes, we’ll eat.’
(Schauber 1979: 224)
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b. [Tł’ízí chh
billy.goat
bich’į’
3O.to
kójít’į=go]
4S.do.this=go
hach’į’ báháchįįh.
3S.get.mad.impf
‘If you do this to a billy goat, he gets mad.’
(YM 1987: d499)
I propose that go-marked clauses modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs because
the latter count as clause-level projections. To explain this idea, I return to an idea
that we have already discussed several times: once a verb composes with all of its
nominal arguments, it can function as a standalone clause. In the domain of adjectival
verbs, this means that once an aa-/pa-marked adjectival verb has composed with a
DP, the AP functions in effect as a CP:
(91) AP/CP
DP A.aa/pa
At the point at which the degree expression adjoins to (91), it is adjoining to a
clause-level projection. Examples like (90) seem to suggest that the modification of
clause-level projections is accomplished — at least in the general case — by go-marked
clauses. Thus, modification of the AP/CP in (91) requires structure to be added to
the degree expression until it is the size of a go-marked clause.
We must still explain why the structure in (92) is ruled out:
(92) *Shimá
1poss.mother
[shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’)
We can approach the problem from a few directions. First, we can observe that at
the point at which a degree expression modifies a ca-marked adjectival verb, the
structure projected by the verb does not correspond to a clause: the structure is only
complete — and clausal status reached — once the degree expression has merged into
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the specifier of DegP. If the addition of the copula and subordinator is only needed
for modification of full clausal structures, then there is no reason for the additional
structure to be added to a degree expression which will modify a ca-marked adjectival
verb. A second way that we might rule out (92) is to say that the specifier position
of DegP can only be occupied by syntactic structures of a certain size. That is, while
a postpositional phrase, measure phrase, or particle can be merged into this position
in the verb’s extended projection, a full subordinated clause cannot.
5.6.3.1 The exceptional case of ’ayóo
When I discussed modification of aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs, I noted that
there was one type of ‘bare’ degree expression which could modify such verbs. This
apparently exceptional degree expression is the intensifier particle ’ayóo. As shown
in (93), ’ayóo has the same shape whether it modifies ca-marked adjectival verbs
or ((93a)) and aa-/pa--marked adjectival verbs ((93b,c)). Sentences like (94) were
never accepted by consultants.
(93) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is very tall.’
b. Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
’ayóo
very
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My little sister is very pretty.’
c. Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
’ayóo
very
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is very hot.’
(94) *Shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
[’ayóo
very
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
(Intended: ‘My little sister is very pretty.’)
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Given these data, I propose that the syntax of ’ayóo itself is such it can either
adjoin to the AP projected by aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs, or it can be merged
into the specifier of DegP as with ca-marked adjectival verbs. No additional syntactic
structure (e.g. copula or subordinator) is necessary. We already saw evidence in the
previous subsection which suggests that ’ayóo occurs in different syntactic positions
depending on the morphological shape of the adjectival verb: whereas it must be
adjacent to ca-marked adjectival verbs, negation can intercede between ’ayóo and
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs. Syntactic representations to come below will reflect
the apparent flexibility which ’ayóo permits for its position of merger.
5.6.4 Summary
I have argued for syntactic heterogeneity in the set of Navajo adjectival verbs. The
size of the structure projected depends on the morphological shape of the adjectival
verb. Adjectival verbs which bear aa or pa morphology project only the structure
shown in (95). This structure has a position for one argument, a DP, which is realized
as the subject of the adjectival verb.
(95) AP
DP A.aa/pa
By contrast, ca-marked adjectival verbs project an extended functional projection,
DegP, as shown in (96). The AP contained within DegP still has a position for one
argument, a DP. A second argument — a degree expression — is merged into the
specifier position of DegP.
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(96) DegP
degree expression Deg’
Deg AP
DP A.ca
I related the DegP structure projected by ca-marked adjectival verbs to the vP
structure which is projected by transitivized eventive verbs in accounts by Hale and
Platero (1996) and Hale (2000, 2001). The structure in (96) also has precedent in
theoretical proposals for adjectival expressions by Abney (1997), Corver (1990, 1997),
Grimshaw (1991), and Kennedy (1997, 1999). In contrast with previous proposals,
however, I argue that the DegP functional projection is not available for all adjectival
expressions in Navajo. The syntactic heterogeneity which I propose to exist among
the set of adjectival verbs in Navajo helps us to explain differences in the syntax of
degree constructions which are correlated with the verb’s morphological shape.
5.7 The semantic composition of degree constructions
In this section, I present a compositional semantics for a selection of degree con-
structions containing ca- and aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs. I first propose that
while adjectival verbs are syntactically heterogeneous, they are semantically homoge-
neous: that is, all adjectival verbs in Navajo denote relations between individuals and
degrees. I then consider how this view of adjectival meaning interacts with the syntac-
tic picture I began to develop above. I argue that while degree expressions saturate or
quantify over degree arguments of ca-marked adjectival verbs, the ‘completeness’ of
the syntax of aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs leads to a more complicated process of
composition with degree expressions. To preview, I will say that the adjectival verb’s
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degree argument is existentially closed prior to composition with a degree expression.
However, the process of existential closure introduces a domain variable which can be
manipulated by degre expressions, following proposals by Schwarzschild (2010, 2014).
5.7.1 Background on adjectival meaning
I take as my starting point the points in (97) which come from the semantic
literature on adjectival meaning crosslinguistically.
(97) a. Adjectival expressions can be analyzed as a relation between a degree and
an individual. (I.e. degrees are part of the assumed semantic ontology).
b. The degree argument of an adjectival expression is either saturated or
quantified over when used in a degree construction.
Both of these assumptions are standard through much of the literature on ad-
jectival expressions and gradability (Cresswell 1976; von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985,
2001; Rullmann 1995; Kennedy 1997, 1999, 2007b; Hackl 2000; Kennedy and McNally
2005; Bhatt and Takahashi 2011; and many others).24 Adjectival expressions have
denotations like (98). The adjective first takes a degree d as argument and then an
entity x. The entity x is argument to a measure phrase (e.g. height) which forms
part of the adjective’s meaning. The measure phrase is a function of type he,di which
takes x as argument and returns x’s degree of ‘height.’ The function in (98) will only
return true if x’s degree of ‘height’ exceeds the degree d. .
24Alternative views do exist, of course. Schwarzschild and Wilkinson (2002) argue that adjectives
denote relations with intervals rather than single degrees as I assume. Another type of account which
also accepts degrees as part of the semantic ontology is represeted by Bartsch and Vennemann (1972)
and Kennedy (1997, 1999, 2007b), who propose that adjectival expressions denote measure functions
(type he,di) which take an individual as argument and return a degree along some scale.
There are also a number of accounts which do not appeal to degrees at all. Authors who develop
this view include Kamp (1975), Klein (1980), van Rooij (2011), and Burnett (2014). Under such
accounts, an adjectival expression denotes a set of individuals (type he,ti). Membership within the
set is determined relative to a contextual standard of comparison. In the interest of space and focus,
I do not consider here how the Navajo data could be imported into accounts of these shapes.
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(98) JtallK = d.x.height(x)  d
In accounts of this shape, the degree argument d can be directly saturated by a
degree-denoting expressing like a measure phrase. The outcome of composition of
tall, an entity, and a measure phrase is shown in (99):
(99) JAlice is 6’ tallK = [d.x.height(x)  d](6’)(Alice)
According to the truth conditions in (99), Alice is 6’ tall is true just in case the degree
to which Alice is tall is at least as great as the degree which is denoted by the measure
phrase 6’.
In addition, an adjective’s degree argument can be quantified over by a compar-
ative morpheme such as more/-er. For an overview of the syntax and semantics of
comparative constructions with quantificational comparative morphemes, see Beck
(2011). We will see examples of quantificational comparative expressions when we
return to Navajo degree constructions below.
5.7.2 The semantic type of adjectival verbs in Navajo
With this background in place, we can return to Navajo. Regardless of whether
they bear ca, aa, or pa morphology, I give all Navajo adjectival verbs the denotation
in (100).25 As before, I take degrees to be part of the semantic ontology. An adjectival
verb denotes a function which takes as its first argument an entity x. The entity x
is argument to the measure function a, which relates x to a degree along a scale
25The reader will note that the order of the individual and degree arguments is reversed relative to
the more familar type hd,etientry seen for English adjectives in the previous subsection. Precedent
in the literature for type he,dti adjectival expressions comes from von Stechow (2009) and Sassoon
(2013). The denotation in (99) seems well-suited to Navajo adjectival verbs since it reflects the rel-
ative height of subject and degree expression positions in the syntax. In the case of aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs, only the smaller syntactic structure (AP) is projected: the syntactic structure pro-
jected by the verb does not include a position for a degree expression. Given that degree arguments
are only syntactically realized under special morphological circumstances, it seems reasonable to say
that the individual argument is the more internal of an adjectival verb’s two semantic arguments.
This is an innocent move, however: we could go back to more familiar hd,eti entries.
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appropriate to the adjectival expression. Application of the adjectival verb to an
entity x returns a set of degrees. The degree returned by the measure function is
greater than or equal to all degrees in the set.
(100) JA.ca/aa/paK = x.d.a(x)  d
I give in (101) the (identical) denotations of ca- and aa-marked adjectival verbs
’áníłnééz and nineez:
(101) a. J’áníłnééez.CAK = x.d.height(x)  d
b. Jnineez.AAK = x.d.height(x)  d
5.7.3 The semantic lightness of the Deg head
If all adjectival verbs are already type he,dti expressions regardless of their mor-
phological form, this means that the Deg head present in the structure associated
only with ca-marked adjectival verbs must not alter the type of the expression that
it composes with. To see why, I repeat the DegP structure in (102) with semantic
types added.
(102) DegPt
degree expressiond Deg’hd;ti
Deg APhd;ti
DPe A.cahe;dti
As will be discussed at more length below, the Deg’ is a type hd,ti expression.
Having the Deg’ determine an expression of this type means that the specifier position
can contain either a degree-denoting measure phrase or a quantificational degree
expression (e.g. comparative postpositional phrase y-lááh ‘beyond y’). However, the
259
AP projection is already of type hd,ti. As such, the Deg head itself must either
be ‘invisible’ to the semantics or it must denote an identity function on type hd,ti
expressions as in (103a). In (103b), I show composition between Deg and an AP
structure [AP shimá ’áníłnééz] to illustrate the identity of Deg’ and AP.
(103) a. JDegK = Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)
b. JDeg’K = JDegK(JAPK)
=[Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.height(my mother)  d)
= dd.[d.height(my mother)  d](d)
= d.height(my mother)  d
Regardless of whether we treat Deg as somehow semantically invisible or as an
identity function, the same point is made: Deg is present to project syntactic structure
but does not alter in any way the denotation of its complement. As a result, Deg
makes no contribution specific to any degree construction in particular. That is,
there is nothing in the denotation of Deg which is particular to, e.g., a comparison
of superiority or an equative construction. All meaning which relates to particular
degree constructions comes from the semantics of the degree expression. For instance,
as we will see in later examples of composition of degree constructions, we will see
that the postposition -lááh used in comparisons of superiority determines that the
ordering relation involved is one of ‘greater than.’
There is precedent in the semantic literature for lightening morphology which
marks the adjectival expression itself. In their analysis of English comparative con-
structions, Alrenga, Kennedy, and Merchant (2012) depart from previous proposals
by claiming that both English more/-er and English than contribute to the semantics
of comparison of superiority. In earlier proposals, more/-er does all of the semantic
work relating to the determination of the ordering relation. Much as I have done for
the Navajo Deg head, Alrenga et al. claim that English more takes as argument a
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function of a particular type and returns another function of the same semantic type.
Under their approach, than determines a ‘greater than’ ordering between two sets of
degrees.
There are differences between my account of Navajo and Alrenga et al.’s account
of English, however. Whereas I have defined the Navajo Deg head as a pure identity
function, Alrenga et al. assign more semantic content to more/-er. Like than under
their account, more/-er introduces a ‘greater than’ ordering between the maximal
degree in the denotation of the adjective and a second degree which can optionally
be filled in by context in sentences such as This rod is longer.
In summary, we can think of English (under its standard, pre-Alrenga et al. view)
and Navajo (under my view) as the two ends of a typological scale relating to degree
constructions. On one end is the standard view of English in which more/-er does
all work to determine the semantics of the degree construction and than serves a
syntactic function. On the other end of the scale is my view of Navajo, in which
all semantic work related to a particular degree construction is accomplished by the
morpheme which marks the standard of comparison (e.g. -lááh) and the Deg head
only serves a syntactic function. In the middle is Alrenga et al.’s view of English,
in which both degree morpheme more/-er and the standard marker than do crucial
semantic work.
5.7.4 Degree constructions with ca-marked adjectival verbs
This subsection gives three illustrations of composition between ca-marked ad-
jectival verbs and degree expressions. I present the measure phrase construction, the
comparison of superiority construction, and the intensifier construction.
5.7.4.1 Measure phrase construction
The simplest case to illustrate degree constructions with ca-marked adjectival
verbs is the measure phrase construction, which I repeat in (104).
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(104) Shimá
1poss.mother
hastądi
six
’adées’eez
feet
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is six feet tall.’
As before, the ca-marked adjectival verb ’áníłnééz has an extended DegP projection
around the AP layer. Given a type he,dti denotation for an adjectival verb — and the
assumption that measure phrases denote degrees — the subject and degree expression
saturate the verb in the order in which they are merged into the syntactic structure.
(105) DegP
MeasPd
hastądi ’adées’eez
Deg’hd;ti
Deghdt;dti APhd;ti
DPe
shimá
Ahe;dti
’áníłnééz.ca
(106) a. JAK = x.d.height(x)  d
b. JAPK = JDeg’K = d.height(my mother)  d
c. JDeg’K = JDegK(JAPK)
[Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.height(my mother)  d)
= dd.[d.height(my mother)  d](d)
= d.height(my mother)  d
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d. JDegPK = JDeg’K(JMeasPK)
= [d.height(my mother)  d](6-feet)
True just in case the degree which my mother is tall is at least as
great as the degree which is denoted by the measure phrase 6’.
5.7.4.2 Comparison of superiority construction
I now turn to the composition of the comparison of superiority construction. We
can investigate the composition of this construction either through the lens of the
seemingly simpler construction in (107a) or the more complex subcomparative con-
struction in (107b). I first give the subcomparative construction.
(107) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
[shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh]
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is taller than my little sister.’
b. Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh]
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’
As we discussed in section 5.6.1, the embedded DegP in a subcomparative construc-
tion is marked by the clausal subordinator =ígíí. As shown in the tree in (108), I do
not commit to a particular syntactic category (DP vs. CP) for the clause marked by
=ígíí; the choice between the options shown is not important for us. Furthermore, I
treat =ígíí as semantically vacuous such that the meaning of the DegP is passed on
to the CP/DP.26
In addition, as first discussed in section 5.6.1, the Navajo subcomparative raises the
question of what degree expression occurs with the embedded ca-marked adjectival
verb: as (107b) shows, this position is not occupied by overt material. I proposed that
26I assume that once the postposition has composed with its complement — whether CP or DP
— the attested object marker yi- appears.
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this position is occupied by a covert degree expression, ?Op. Theoretical precedent
for locating a covert degree expression in the embedded clause of a subcomparative
comes from authors including Bresnan (1973), Chomsky (1977), von Stechow (1984),
Kennedy and Merchant (2000), and Lechner (2004). We can think of ?Op as a
syntactic placeholder: it is semantically vacuous such that the DegP remains an
expression of hd,ti.27
(108) DegP2
PPhdt;ti
Phdt;hdt;tii
-lááh
CP/DPhd;ti
C/D
=ígíí
DegP1hd;ti
?Op Deg’1hd;ti
Deg1hdt;dti AP1hd;ti
DPe
’eii naaltsoos
Ahe;dti
’áníłtéél.ca
Deg’2hd;ti
Deg2hdt;dti AP2hd;ti
DPe
díí naaltsoos
Ahe;dti
’áníłnééz.ca
I give the Navajo comparative postposition -lááh the denotation which authors
including Seuren (1973) and Schwarzschild (2008) give for English more/-er.
(109) J-lááhK = DdtD’dt9d.D’(d) & :D(d)
27Precedent for a semantically vacuous operator which maintains a property-type expression comes
from Bhatt (1999: 31) who uses this strategy in his ‘Direct Predication’ model of reduced relatives.
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The composition of the structure in (108) is shown in (110).
(110) a. JDeg’2K = JDeg2K(JAP2K)
= [Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.length(this book)  d)
= d.length(this book)  d
b. JDeg’1K = JDeg1K(JAP1K)
= [Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.width(that book)  d)
= d.width(that book)  d
c. JCP/DPK = JDegP1K = JDeg’1K
= d.width(that book)  d
d. JPPK = J-lááhK(JCP/DPK)
= [DdtD’dt9d.D’(d) & :D(d)](d.width(that book)  d)
= D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[width(that book)  d]
e. JDegP2K = JPPK(JDeg2K)
= [D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[width(that book)  d]]
(d.length(this book)  d)
= 9d.length(this book)  d & :[width(that book)  d]
True just in case there exists a degree d which is:
(i) In the set of degrees corresponding to this book’s length,
and
(ii) Not in the set of degrees corresponding to that book’s
width.
I now turn to the comparison of superiority construction in (107a). In contrast
with the subcomparative construction, the degree expression in (107a) does not con-
tain an overt instance of a ca-marked adjectival verb. However, I will take an adjec-
tival verb to be covertly present: doing so will allow us to keep a constant semantic
entry for the comparative postposition -lááh in both (107a) and (107b). In addi-
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tion, there is a long tradition of positing unpronounced structure in comparisons of
superiority. For discussion of crosslinguistic clausal comparative constructions —
and alternatives to this view — see Bresnan (1973), Heim (1985), Kennedy (1997),
Lechner (2003), and Bhatt and Takahashi (2011).
(111) DegP2
PPhdt;ti
Phdt;hdt;tii
-lááh
CP/DPhdt;ti
C/D
=ígíí
DegP1hd;ti
?Op Deg’1hd;ti
Deg1hdt;dti AP1hd;ti
DPe
shideezhí
Ahe;dti
’áníłnééz.ca
Deg’2hdti
Deg2hdt;dti AP2hd;ti
DPe
shimá
Ahe;dti
’áníłnééz.ca
Composition of the structure in (111) proceeds in the same fashion as the sub-
comparative did, yielding the truth conditions as shown.
(112) a. JDeg’2K = JDeg2K(JAP2K)
= [Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.height(my mother)  d)
= d.height(my mother)  d
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b. JDeg’1K = JDeg1K(JAP1K)
= [Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.height(my sister)  d)
= d.height(my sister)  d
c. JCP/DPK = JDegP1K = JDeg’1K
= d.height(my sister)  d
d. JPPK = J-lááhK(JCP/DPK)
= [DdtD’dt9d.D’(d) & :D(d)](d.height(my sister)  d)
= D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[height(my sister)  d]
e. JDegP2K = JPPK(JDeg2K)
= [D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[height(my sister)  d]]
(d.height(my mother)  d)
= 9d.height(my mother)  d & :[height(my sister)  d]
True just in case there exists a degree d which is:
(i) In the set of degrees corresponding to my mother’s height,
and
(ii) Not in the set of degrees corresponding to my sister’s
height.
5.7.4.3 Intensifier construction
Finally, I turn to the composition of the intensifier ’ayóo with ca-marked adjectival
verbs:
(113) Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is very tall.’
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I define ’ayóo as the type hdt; ti function in (114). The relation >! compares two
degrees — here, d and the contextual standard of comparison stndc — and requires
the first to significantly exceed the second.28
(114) J’ayóoKc = Ddt.9d.D(d) & d >! stndc
The particle ’ayóo merges into the specifier position of DegP. Like other occupants
of the specifier position, ’ayóo takes as argument an adjectival verb that has already
composed with an individual argument and quantifies over the adjectival verb’s degree
argument.
(115) DegP
’ayóohdt;ti Deg’hd;ti
Deghdt;dti APhd;ti
DPe
shimá
Ahe;dti
’áníłnééz.ca
(116) a. JAPK = JAK(JDPK)
= d.height(my mother)  d
b. JDeg’K = JDegK(JAPK)
= [Dhd;ti.dd.D(d)](d.height(my mother)  d)
= d.height(my mother)  d
28This is a simple denotation for the intensifier ’ayóo. The relation >! comes from Fara’s (2000)
discussion of the pos morpheme. For a model of a potentially more satisfactory semantics for
intensifiers which involves recursive application of the stnd function, see see Kennedy and McNally
(2005: 369).
268
c. JDegPK = J’ayóoK(JDeg’K)
= [Ddt.9d.D(d) & d >! stndc](d.height(my mother)  d)
= 9d.height(my mother)  d & d >! stndc
True just in case there exists a degree d which:
(i) Is in the set of degrees corresponding to my mother’s
height and
(ii) Significantly exceeds the contextual standard of compar-
ison for height.
5.7.5 Degree constructions with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs
In this subsection, I take up the semantic analysis of degree constructions which
contain aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs. I begin by considering the semantics of
aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs when they occur in degree constructions. The
account that I develop is based on Schwarzschild’s (2010, 2014) proposals. I then
illustrate the account with the derivation of a comparison superiority construction,
the intensifier construction, and the positive construction.
5.7.5.1 Syntactic vs. semantic completeness
In the case of ca-marked adjectival verbs, all semantic arguments of the verb were
arguments within the phrasal projections (AP, DegP) associated with the verb. This
made the account of ca-marked adjectival verbs extremely similar to standard views
of adjectival expressions in English. As Heim (2001) writes of adjectival expressions
in English:
“The whole [degree construction] is hierarchically structured and com-
positionally interpreted just like an ordinary transitive sentence. The ad-
jective’s degree argument appears to be syntactically projected, just like
the individual argument, and interpreted in an analogous fashion.”
(Heim 2001: 214)
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This is not the case for aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs. I maintain a type
he,dti denotation for such adjectival verbs ((117a)) but assign to them a syntactic
structure which is complete after the merger of the subject ((117b)). Thus, at the
AP level, an adjectival verb is syntactically complete but semantically incomplete:
its degree argument has not yet been bound.
(117) a. JA.aa/paK = x.d.a(x)  d
b. APhd;ti
DP A.aa/pahe;dti
However, we also saw that unlike ca-marked adjectival verbs, aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verbs are well-formed expressions in isolation:
(118) Shimá
1poss.mother
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is pretty.’
The completeness of verbs in isolation is taken up by Faltz (2000), who argues that
if we take seriously the ability of verbs in isolation to behave like complete clauses as
in, e.g., (119), this implies that verbs like sits’il do not denote unsaturated predicates
by the time we reach the maximal phrasal projection associated with the verb.
(119) Sits’il.
3S.shatter.perf
‘It shattered.’
In the case of sits’il, semantic completeness follows from syntactic completeness. As
argued in section 5.5.1, the maximal phrasal projection associated with intransitive
verbs like sits’il is VP. The VP structure only has room for one DP. After the DP
has merged to yield the complete VP structure, semantic completeness also obtains:
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the single entity argument of the verb has been saturated. As Faltz says is necessary,
semantic completeness coincides with syntactic completeness at the VP level.
(120) VP
proe Vhe;ti
sits’il
Faltz (2000) does not consider non-nominal arguments, but I propose to extend
his idea to degree arguments. The maximal phrasal projection associated with an
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verb is AP. The AP determines a function of type hd,ti
but we have reached syntactic completeness.
(121) APhd;ti
DPe
shimá
Ahe;dti
nizhóní.aa
I propose that in such cases where syntactic and semantic completeness do not
automatically coincide, a type-shifting mechanism applies to ‘wrap up’ the verb’s
leftover semantic arguments. In the case of aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs, this
means that the degree argument must be ‘wrapped up.’ A good candidate for an
appropriate type-shifting mechanism is Existential Closure (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982,
Diesing 1992). I assume that the application of type-shifting mechanisms is not
syntactically restricted and, as such, close can apply to AP. After application of
Existential Closure, we obtain a linguistic object which is both syntactically and
semantically complete:
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(122)
9 APhd;ti
DPe
shimá
A.aa/pa
J (118) K = 9d.beauty(my mother)  d
But this cannot be the whole story. Once Existential Closure has applied in (122),
the AP determines a semantic object of type t. We incorrectly predict that aa-
/pa-marked adjectival verbs cannot be modified by degree expressions: there are
no variables in (122) which can still be manipulated by a degree expression. The
puzzle, then, is how to balance the demands of completeness at the AP level with
the empirical observation that even semantically ‘complete’ adjectival verbs can still
somehow participate in degree constructions.
5.7.5.2 Degree constructions via domain restriction
The solution that I pursue builds directly on proposals which Schwarzschild (2010,
2014) makes for Navajo as well as Hebrew. Before turning to my variation, I introduce
Schwarzschild’s approach in broad strokes. For ca-marked adjecival verbs, Schwarz-
schild maintains an account of the shape explored above: degree expressions which
occur with ca-marked adjectival verbs manipulate (saturate or quantify over) the
verb’s degree argument. (123) gives a paraphrase which represents this state of affairs.
(123) Comparison of superiority with ca-marked adjectival verb:
There exists a degree d to which x is A and y is not A to d.
Beginning with empirical observations reported by Bogal-Allbritten (2008), Schwarz-
schild argues that the modifiers of aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs are adverbs.
Schwarzschild further argues that adverbial modification of Navajo adjectival verbs
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can be modeled in terms of domain restriction (von Fintel 1994). That is, adverbial
degree expressions which compose with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs (e.g. -lááh
’át’éego) are of a different semantic type than degree expressions which compose with
ca-marked adjectival verbs (e.g. -lááh). Schwarzschild proposes that degree expres-
sions which occur with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs introduce and manipulate a
set of degrees D. The paraphrase in (124) is simplified from Schwarzschild’s original
proposal but is intended to represent his idea in broad strokes.
(124) Comparison of superiority with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verb:
There exists a domain of degrees D. For all degrees d in domain D, x is
A to d. There exists a degree in D to which y is not A.
The net outcome of both kinds of degree expressions is the same: in both (123)
and (124), there is a degree to which x is A but y is not. However in (123), we come
by this meaning by quantifying over the degree d to which x is A. In (124), we come
by this meaning by making a statement about a set of degrees D: this set is such that
all are degrees to which x is A; y is A to a degree not included in this set. At no
point does the degree expression directly interact with the degree to which x is A.
For the details of Schwarzschild’s proposal, see Schwarzschild (2010, 2011) and his
application of the proposal for Hebrew data in Schwarzschild 2014.
I remain faithful to the core of Schwarzschild’s proposal: aa- and pa-marked
adjectival verbs participate in degree constructions via domain restriction. However,
I will integrate this key insight into the claims that I make about Navajo adjectival
syntax and the interaction between syntactic and semantic completeness. I propose
the following operation on AP structures which contain aa- and pa-marked adjectival
verbs:
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(125) JcloseK = Adt:Ddt:8d.D(d) ! A(d)
For all degrees d, if d is in the domain of D (the set of degrees that holds
of the overt standard of comparison), then d is also in the set of degrees
that holds of the adjective applied to the subject.
The operation close applies at the top of AP just like a simple Existential Closure
operator:
(126) APhdt;ti
close APhd;ti
DP A.pa/aa
Unlike 9 alone, however, close accomplishes two things. First, it meets Faltz’s
requirement: at the point at which AP is syntactically complete, all of the verb’s
original semantic arguments have also been closed. Second, it introduces a new
variable, a domain of degrees. The composition of close and the AP returns an
expression of type hdt,ti. (127) gives the denotation for the AP in (118).
(127) J close AP K = Ddt:8d.D(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d
Domain of degrees D such that for all degrees d, if d is in D then my
mother is pretty to d.
The domain of degrees D will be restricted and then existentially closed in the course
of the derivation. I will illustrate several ways in which this can occur in subsections
below.
One outcome of the modification I propose to Schwarzschild’s account is that
all degree expressions maintain a constant semantics. That is, there is no semantic
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difference between -lááh vs. -lááh ’át’éego.29 However, the manner of composition
between adjectival verbs and degree expressions will differ depending on whether or
not close has applied. A ca-marked adjectival verb is an expression of type hd,ti
whereas at the point of composition with a degree expression, an aa-/pa-marked
adjectival verb is an expression of type hdt,ti.
One point which must be made about close is that whatever its role is in the
syntax, it must be unable to satisfy the structural demands of ca-marked adjectival
verbs. Several times now, we have seen that sentences like the following are not
grammatical:
(128) *Sandy
Sandy
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
(Intended: ‘Sandy is tall.’)
In order to rule out sentences like (128), we must say that the application of close
does not satisfy the requirements of the specifier of DegP. If it did, we would incor-
rectly expect the grammaticality of (128).
In the following subsections, I illustrate how adjectival verbs to which close
has applied participate in three degree constructions: the comparison of superiority
construction, the intensifier construction, and the positive construction. I close by
discussing in brief the incompatibility of measure phrases with adjectival verbs to
which close has applied.
29I find this move appealing since, as previously discussed, the only morphology which separates
one form from the other is the addition of a copula and the subordinator =go. Both the copula
and the subordinator are found in many places in Navajo grammar which have no relation to degree
modification or domain restriction. However, as I have argued, their presence makes sense on
syntactic grounds (section 5.6.3).
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5.7.5.3 Comparison of superiority construction
I will first illustrate the composition of the comparison of superiority construction
with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs as in (129):
(129) Shimá
1poss.mother
[shideezhí
1poss.little.sister
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is prettier than my little sister.’
As we did for comparison of superiority constructions with ca-marked adjectival
verbs, I assume that the degree expression in (129) contains an unpronounced adjec-
tival verb identical to the verb found in the main clause. As before, this will allow
us to maintain a single type for the comparative postposition (hdt; hdt; tii). The de-
notation of the comparative postposition is repeated in (130). As discussed above, I
take the copula and subordinator to play only a syntactic function, I treat them as
semantically vacuous expressions.
(130) J-lááhK = DdtD’dt9d.D’(d) & :D(d)
The tree in (131) corresponds to the sentence in (129). I have added clausal
structure around the postpositional degree expression (viz. section 5.6.3). I strikeout
material which is not overtly pronounced.
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(131)
9 AP4hdt;ti
CPhdt;ti
C
=go
VPhdt;ti
V
’át’é
PPhdt;ti
Phdt;hdt;tii
-lááh
CP/DPhd;ti
C/D
=ígíí
AP3hd;ti
DP
shideezhí
Ahe;dti
nizhóní.aa
AP2hdt;ti
close AP1hd;ti
DPe
shimá
Ahe;dti
nizhóní.aa/pa
One point which has not yet been explained is why the embedded clause contains
an AP but not close. I return to this point below. Before doing so, I give the compo-
sitional semantics for key points of the structure in (131). An important point is that
the CP (degree expression) and AP2 (main clause adjectival verb to which close has
applied) are both type hdt; ti expressions. Thus, I assume they compose via Predicate
Modification ((132c)). The mode of composition, therefore, distinguishes comparisons
of superiority with ca-marked adjectival verbs — where the degree expression took
the main clause adjectival verb as argument — and comparisons of superiority with
aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs.
277
(132) a. JAP1K = d.beauty(my mother)  d
b. J AP2 K = JcloseK(JAP1K) =
Ddt:8d.D(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d
c. JAP3K = d.beauty(my sister)  d
d. JCP/DPK = JAP3K = d.beauty(my sister)  d
e. JPPK = JPK(JCP/DPK)
= [DdtD’dt9d.D’(d) & :D(d)](d.beauty(my sister)  d)
= D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[beauty(my sister)  d]
f. JCPK = JVPK = JPPK
= D’dt9d.D’(d) & :[beauty(my sister)  d]
g. JCPK and JAP2K compose via Predicate Modification:
= JAP4K = D”. JCPK(D”) & JAP2K(D”) =
D”. [9d.D”(d) & :[beauty(my sister)  d]]
& [8d.D”(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d]
h. Existential Closure applies:
9D”. [9d.D”(d) & :[beauty(my sister)  d]] &
[8d.D”(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d]
There exists a set of degrees D” which has the following properties:
(i) There exists a degree in D” which is not a degree to which
my sister is pretty.
(ii) All degrees in D” are such that they are degrees to which
my mother is pretty.
Above, I noted that the embedded adjectival phrase has not had close applied
to it. One part of this decision is to avoid a type mismatch. The comparative
postposition -lááh is an expression of type hdt; hdt; tii. However, an adjectival verb
to which close has applied is an expression of type hdt; ti (viz (132a)). If close
applies to the embedded adjectival verb, we will have to redefine -lááh.
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There may be a more useful outcome of having close fail to occur in the em-
bedded clause. Following Faltz (2000), I proposed that when a verb is pronounced
(phonologically realized), it must be both syntactically and semantically complete.
In the case of AP4 in (131), syntactic completeness has been achieved but in the
absence of close, the verb is not yet semantically complete (its degree argument
remains unbound). We have not made any claims about the necessity of seman-
tic completeness for expressions which are not phonologically realized, however. In
the structure in (131), we want the embedded adjectival verb to go unpronounced:
perhaps the absence of close is compatible with an unpronounced instance of the
adjectival verb.
It is possible that a positive prediction follows from this idea. In section 5.3.2,
we saw that subcomparative constructions — i.e. comparatives in which the embed-
ded adjectival verb is pronounced — require both adjectival verbs to be ca-marked.
The grammaticality of (133a) was contrasted with the ungrammatical sentences in
(133b-d).
(133) a. Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh]
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’
b. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=ígíí
3S.wide.aa=igii
yilááh]
3O.beyond
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
c. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłtéél=ígíí
3S.wide.ca=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
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d. *Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
niteel=ígíí
3S.wide.aa=igii
yilááh
3O.beyond
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf
nineez.
3S.long.aa
(Intended: ‘This book is longer than that book is wide.’)
In both (133b) and (133d), the embedded clause contains an overt instance of
an aa-marked adjectival verb. If the overt realization of verbs requires semantic
completeness but close cannot be applied in the embedded clause, we predict the
ungrammaticality of (133b) and (133d): both sentences contain an overt verb which
is semantically incomplete.
We do not yet have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (133c), however.
Nothing prevents application of close to the main clause adjectival verb (viz. (131)),
nor does anything go wrong with the use of a ca-marked adjectival verb in the em-
bedded clause (viz. (111)). One possible explanation for the ungrammatical status
of (133c) is that the use of an aa-marked adjectival verb in the main clause leads
to unnecessary complications of the structure: not only is the degree expression syn-
tactically more complex (containing the copula and subordinator), but the use of an
aa-marked verb entails the presence of close. If a ca-marked adjectival verb had
been used instead, the degree expression would be simpler in shape and close would
not have to intercede between the verb and the degree expression.30
5.7.5.4 Intensifier construction
The intensifier ’ayóo can modify aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs ((134a,b)) as
well as ca-marked adjectival verbs ((134c)).
30For discussion of various kinds of semantic and syntactic competition which could inform further
investigation of this issue in Navajo, see Heim 1991, Sauerland 2003, Katzir 2007, and Bale and
Khanjian 2014. For previous discussion of competition in Navajo, see Bogal-Allbritten (2014b).
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(134) a. Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is very pretty.’
b. Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
’ayóo
very
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Phoenix is very hot.’
c. Shimá
1poss.mother
’ayóo
very
’áníłnééz.
3S.tall.ca
‘My mother is very tall.’
As in the comparison of superiority construction, I propose that the degree ex-
pression has the same semantics when it occurs with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs
as it does with ca-marked adjectival verbs. I repeat my type hdt; ti denotation of
’ayóo in (135):
(135) J’ayóoKc = Ddt.9d.D(d) & d >! stndc
The intensifier ’ayóo adjoins after close has already applied to yield a type hdt; ti
expression. (136) gives the tree for (134a).
(136)
9 AP3hdt;ti
’ayóohdt;ti AP2hdt;ti
close AP1hd;ti
DP
shimá
Ahe;dti
nizhóní
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Since ’ayóo and the adjectival verb are both of type hdt; ti, I have them compose via
Predicate Modification. This is the same mode of composition employed in compar-
ison of superiority constructions with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs. I give key
points in their composition in (137):
(137) a. J AP1 K = d.beauty(my mother)  d
b. J AP2 K = JcloseK(JAP1K) =
Ddt:8d.D(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d
c. ’ayóo and AP2 compose via Predicate Modification:
D”.J’ayóoK(D”) & JAP2K(D”) =
D”.[9d.D”(d) & d >! stndc]
& [8d.D”(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d]
d. Existential Closure applies:
9D”.[9d.D”(d) & d >! stndc]
& [8d.D”(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d]
There exists a set of degrees D” which has the following properties:
(i) There exists a degree in D” which significantly exceeds
the contextual standard of comparison.
(ii) All degrees in D” are such that they are degrees to which
my mother is pretty.
As before, composition of a degree expression with an aa-/pa-marked adjectival
verb involves restriction of the domain of degrees introduced by close. This set
of degrees includes (at least one) degree which significantly exceeds the standard of
comparison. Because ‘my mother’ is pretty to all degrees within this set, she is pretty
in excess of the standard of comparison.
5.7.5.5 The positive construction
I now turn to the positive construction with aa- and pa-marked adjectival verbs:
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(138) Shimá
1poss.mother
nizhóní.
3S.pretty.aa
‘My mother is pretty.’
Following the claims made so far, I give (138) the following structure:
(139)
9 AP2hdt;ti
close AP1hd;ti
shimá nizhóní.aa
The structure in (139) is associated with the truth conditions in (140):
(140) J 9 close AP K = 9Ddt:8d.D(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d
There exists a domain of degrees D such that for all degrees d, if d is in
D then my mother is pretty to d.
The truth conditions will be verified regardless of what degree of beauty my mother
has. If we take all individuals to have some degree of beauty — even a very low degree
— we predict that a sentence like (138) will be always be trivially true. The sentence
in (138) does not have a trivially true meaning, however: it means that my mother’s
degree of beauty exceeds a contextual standard of comparison for ‘beauty.’31
To remedy this triviality, I propose that when the domain of degrees introduced
by close is not further restricted by an overt degree expression, it is related to the
contextual standard of comparison. The challenge, however, is that under familiar
views of the positive construction, the contextual standard of comparison is taken
31A parallel issue is discussed by Rett (2008, 2015) for degree constructions in English.
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to be a single degree. Given the use of close in the Navajo positive construction,
however, we instead need a set of degrees.
The solution that I give for Navajo is based on von Stechow’s (2009) theory of
the positive construction. A key innovation employed by von Stechow’s treatment is
that the positive construction does not involve comparison with a single degree (i.e.
the standard of comparison) but rather involves a larger interval, which we can define
as a segment of a scale (i.e. an ordered set of degrees). Von Stechow refers to the
interval in question as the ‘neutral interval’: this interval is the portion of the scale
associated with some adjective A onto which are mapped individuals which neither
count as A nor as not-A in some context.32 The right edge of the neutral interval
(i.e. the highest degree on the scale segment) is defined by von Stechow as being the
the standard of comparison (i.e. the degree used in familiar accounts of the positive
construction).33
We can use the neutral interval for the Navajo positive construction in the follow-
ing way. In a positive construction example like (138), the set of degrees D introduced
by application of close is restricted such that it is equated with von Stechow’s neutral
interval. This yields the truth conditions in (141).
(141) 9D’. where D’ is the contextually determined neutral interval of pretty,
8d.D’(d) ! beauty(my mother)  d
There exists a degree interval D’ which has the following properties:
(i) D’ is equated with the contextually determined neutral interval
for pretty.
(ii) For all degrees d in D’, my mother is pretty to d.
32This interval can be thought of as a degree-based counterpart to Klein’s (1980) ‘extension gap.’
33I thank Irene Heim for drawing my attention to von Stechow’s (2009) account.
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The truth conditions in (141) are consistent with the contexts in which Navajo
(and English) speakers accept the positive construction: my mother is pretty is true
just in case her beauty exceeds the contextual standard or norm. According to the
truth conditions above, my mother is pretty to all degrees with D’. Thus, she is pretty
to the rightmost degree (the highest degree) in D’. D’ is restricted by context to be
von Stechow’s neutral interval; the rightmost degree in the neutral interval, according
to von Stechow, is the first degree which counts as ‘positive prettiness’ according to
a contextual standard. Since my mother is pretty to all degrees up to, and including,
this degree, it is the case that my mother’s beauty exceeds the standard of beauty in
the context.34
5.7.5.6 Challenge posed by the comparison of inferiority construction
I close by observing that more will need to be said about the comparison of
inferiority construction with aa-/pa-marked adjectival verbs,e.g. (142).35
(142) Kinłánídi
Flagstaff.loc
[Hoozdodi
Phoenix.loc
yi’oh
3O.short.of
’át’ée=go]
3S.be.impf=go
deesdoi.
3S.hot.pa
‘Flagstaff is less hot than Phoenix.’
Let us define the postposition used in (142), -’oh, as the inverse of the postposition
-lááh used in comparisons of superiority. I give ’oh the denotation in (143).
(143) J-’ohK = DdtD’dt9d.D(d) & :D’(d)
34Precedent for a type-shifting approach to the positive construction is discussed by Grano (2012)
for Mandarin Chinese. Grano argues against the applicability to Mandarin positive constructions of
the more familiar view of the positive construction: that is, he argues against an account in which
adjectival expressions bear a covert morpheme, pos, which quantifies over the adjectival expression’s
degree argument such that it exceeds the contextual standard of comparison (Cresswell 1976, von
Stechow 1984, and many others). Instead, Grano argues that the positive construction in Mandarin
involves a type-shifting operation, much like the application of close that I have invoked for Navajo.
35I thank Seth Cable (p.c.) for pointing this problem out to me.
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Before returning to the problem with examples like (142), I demonstrate that the
denotation in (143) is not problematic with ca-marked adjectival verbs. I strikethrough
material which is not overtly pronounced:
(144) Díí
this
naaltsoos
book
[’eii
that
naaltsoos
book
’áníłnéézl=ígíí
3S.long.ca=igii
yi’oh]
3O.less
’áníłnééz.
3S.long.ca
‘This book is less long than that book.’
(145) J (144) K = 9d.length(that book)  d & :[length(this book)  d]
 ‘This books is less long than that book’ if and only if there exists a
degree d to which ‘that book’ is long but ‘this book’ is not long.
The problem comes when we add close to the adjectival verb in a sentence like
(142). Label nodes come from the tree in (131).
(146) a. Jclose deesdoi.paK = 9Ddt:8d.D(d) ! hot(Flagstaff)  d
b. JPPK = D’dt9d.hot(Phoenix)  d & :D’(d)
c. Predicate Modification applies:
D”. [9d.hot(Phoenix)  d & :D”(d)]
& [8d.D”(d) ! hot(Flagstaff)  d]
d. Existential Closure:
9D”. [9d.hot(Phoenix)  d & :D”(d)]
& [8d.D”(d) ! hot(Flagstaff)  d]
 There exists an interval of degrees D” which has the following
properties:
(i) There exists a degree to which Phoenix is hot which is not
in D”.
(ii) All degrees in D” are such that they are degrees to which
Flagstaff is hot.
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The problem is that as defined, all degrees in D” are degrees to which Flagstaff
is ‘hot’ but the reverse is not required: it is possible for Flagstaff’s maximal degree
of heat to be one which is greater than the maximal element of D”. I illustrate the
problem which arises using the scenario in (147) in which Flagstaff is one degree
hotter than Phoenix.
(147) a. Flagstaff is 90 : degrees to which Flagstaff is hot = {...87, 88, 89, 90}
b. Phoenix is 89 : degrees to which Phoenix is hot = {...86, 87, 88, 89}
In the context in (147), a Navajo sentence like (142) would be judged false. However,
the truth conditions in (146) would be verified. We can define an interval of degrees
D” with the properties in (148). As shown, D” meets all of the demands of the
truth conditions in (146). Nevertheless, Flagstaff is still hotter than Phoenix because
nothing stops the maximal element in D” from being lower than the maximal degree
to which Flagstaff is hot.
(148) D” = {..., 85, 86, 87, 88}
(i) There exists a degree to which Phoenix is hot which is not in D”: 89
(ii) All degrees in D” are also degrees to which Flagstaff is hot:
{..., 85, 86, 87, 88}  {...87, 88, 89, 90}
This problem will need to be addressed in future work, either by rethinking the
semantics of close or the semantics of the comparative postposition ’oh.
5.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, I first presented an empirically rich picture of the morphological,
syntactic, and semantic characteristics of the structures of interest. I then developed
an account of the syntax and semantics of adjectival verbs. I proposed that while
all adjectival verbs in Navajo denote relations between degrees and individuals, they
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syntactic stucture associated with the adjectival verb depends on the morphological
shape of the adjectival verb. Whereas the structure associated with adjectival verbs
marked for ‘Comparative Aspect’ contains two argument positions — one within
AP, one within the surrounding DegP — adjectival verbs marked for ‘Absolute’ and
‘Perfective’ aspect project structures with space for only one argument. I argue that
the syntactic heterogeneity of adjectival verbs has important consequences for the
syntax and semantics of degree constructions which contain them.
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APPENDIX
GLOSSING ABBREVIATIONS
YM 1987: dX - page X in the dictionary portion of Young and Morgan (1987)
YM 1987: gX - page X in the grammar portion of Young and Morgan (1987)
2S - second person subject
3O - third person object
3plO - third person plural object
ArealS - areal subject
1pro - verb-external first person pronoun
3poss - third person possessor
neg - negation
loc - locative enclitic
indef.det - indefinite determiner
wh - wh-word
q - question particle
att - attitude (gloss for verb nisin)
impf - Imperfective Mode marking (sec. 2.2.1)
perf - Perfective Mode marking (sec. 2.2.1)
fut - Future Mode marking (sec. 2.2.1)
OPT - Optative Mode marking (sec. 2.2.1)
prog - Progressive Mode marking (sec. 2.2.1)
aa - Absolute Aspect marking (sec. 5.2)
pa - Perfective Aspect marking (sec. 5.2)
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ca - Comparative Aspect marking (sec. 5.2)
go - subordinator =go (sec. 2.2.3)
igii - subordinator =ígíí (sec. 2.2.3)
yee - past enclitic (y)ę (sec. 2.2.4)
daa - past marker dą (sec. 2.2.4)
ntee - past marker ńt’éé’ (sec. 2.2.4)
nmlz - nominalizer (from Bochnak 2013)
comp - complementizer
report - reportative modal
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